Does transnationalisation matter in nation-state school education? Normative claims and effective practices in a German secondary school

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This paper discusses the impact of transnationalisation on nation-state school education in three steps: First, the concept of transnationalisation is introduced to clarify the analytical frame of the argument. Second, the attention turns to a specific case of transnationalisation, i.e. European Unification and its effects on the normative projections of education for citizenship. It explains why schools are important sites for researching the related transformation processes before reflecting on the important challenge as well as the set of difficulties nation-state school education faces in this context. Finally, the normative shifts are explored from an ethnographic perspective by confronting the programmatic claims with the empirical reality of a secondary school in Berlin where the author conducted intensive ethnological research over a period of 9 months in the 1996/97 school term.

1. Transnationalisation

Quite different types of phenomena have come to be subsumed under the attribute of the ‘transnational’ in recent years. A number of studies have been published on ‘transnational networking’ among immigrants or ‘transmigrants’, on the ‘transnational communities’ as the new social phenomenon that results from such networking, and the emergent ‘transnational social space’ in which these practices take place (e.g., works by Bauböck 1994 and 1999; Kastoryano 1997 and 1998a and b; Pries 1999 and 2001; Glick-Schiller et. al. 1992 and 1997; Faist 1995, 2000, 1999a and b; D’Amato 1997; Held, McGrew et.al. 1999, not to forget the series of projects carried out in the context of the ESRC Research Programme on Transnational Communities based in Oxford, http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk). Despite the wide use of the terms ‘transnational’, ‘transnationalisation’ and ‘transnationalism’, there is no coherent set of meanings attached to them, and the actual application of the terminology is therefore contradictory:

First, terms such as transnational social spaces and transnational communities are often used synonymously - as if ‘transnational community’ was the only form or type of transnational social space (...) Moreover, the sustained transnationalization of migrant ties is often called ‘transnationalism’ (...). It is not clear, however whether it is the ideology of transmigrants (...), or the conscious-tainting efforts of rulers who try to hold on to expatriates (...), or the worldview of researchers who investigate the associated phenomena (...), or all three. (Faist 1999b: 2)

The analysis of international migration and of the effects which it renders lies at the origin of the concept of transnationalisation, the main hypothesis referring to the new quality of migration
processes in the age of globalisation. While historical migrations could more or less be regarded as passages from A to B, implying the so-called ‘container model’ (Pries 2001: 58) of clearly separate territories and social spaces in the form of nation-states and their societies, recent types of international mobility have established dense relations across national borders and contributed to the constitution of hybrid cultural phenomena. Although there has been discussion over the years as to whether this really is a new quality,\(^1\) there is no dispute about the new intensity of exchange and ties across the borders of nation-states (Smith and Guarnizo 1999), made possible by economic globalisation, together with advances in technology, as well as broader affordability of telecommunications and media, not least mass travel opportunities. The analytical concept of transnationalisation allows one to perceive of these restructurings as dynamic and multi-level processes rather than as teleological, one-dimensional passages or changes, and this applies not only to migration. Though being most visible when looking at migration related phenomena, the involved transformation processes of social, economic and political spaces are evidently so profound in character that they do not just concern migrants themselves.

In the following, the concept of transnationalisation is used in two ways: First and foremost, I understand it as a tool to cover pluri-local configurations in social space that reach beyond national boundaries and consist of an ongoing exchange of ideas, people and artefacts, and by doing so link the reference systems of two or more groups to create something new. Second, I refer to the process of Europeanisation that is fostered by the integration project of the EU as one specific case of transnationalisation which embraces the economic, the political and the social sphere. This particular application of the concept may need further explanation.

In terms of the categorisation developed in political science, the ‘multi-level system’ (Eichener 2001; Scharpf 2002), or even the ‘dynamic multi-level system’ of the EU (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996; Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 1996) goes far beyond conventional types of international or intergovernmental cooperation; the EU is however not a supranational organisation either but establishes a new type of regime that transcends the coordinates of public order in its member states and thereby also reconfigures the social and political relations between national participants and stately institutions. Transnationalisation in this sense is more than just a ‘generic term for the terms supranational and international which exclude each other’ (Bogdandy 1993: 106), for it directs attention to the new quality created in combining elements of both by ways of crossing them over.

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\(^1\) The expansion of a social space across the borders of nation-states and across the related boundaries of the collective identities claimed by nationally framed societies as such is no new phenomenon. Research in borderlands (e.g., Martinez 1998; Armstrong 1998) has validated a general fluidity and the merging of social
In addition to this institutional level of transnationalisation, the European integration process has been connected from its early days onwards to the declared hope that this new type of order – though not yet concretely foreseen in its actual shape – might be a way to overcome the nationalist past that divided the European nations in history and eventually led to the two World Wars. Right from the beginning of the European Coal and Steel Community, signed 1951 in Paris, economic cooperation was meant to prepare closer political cooperation and confidence-building in order to reconcile the internal splits within Europe. The Treaty of 1951 stressed as one main aim that one should finally seek to bring the peoples of Europe closer together:

‘The erection of an economic community should be the first foundation stone of a further and deepened community between the peoples that were divided in the past by bloody confrontations.’ ([http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/de](http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/de))

In other words, the aim was to establish not only a common economic space – which has in the meantime been created successfully together with a tangible infrastructure of governance – but also a common social community in order to get rid of the inhibitions of nationally contained societies. Meaning not less than a declared project of transnationalisation as regards the formation of a collective identity, this aspect of Europeanisation has received comparatively little attention thus far, which might have to do with the fact that political scientists and constitutional law experts have developed the main domains of research to explore the European integration process. While those disciplines have mainly focused on the emergent structural order of governance in the EU and on the related problems of democratic legitimacy, such as the missing separation and control of powers in Brussels, or on concerns about a common constitution, the complementary question has remained curiously open whether a transnational community introduced ‘from above’ and on such a big scale as the EU – which will experience further enlargement – is possible at all. What does it take to constitute a unified demos in and for a transnational polity?

Until now the success story of the European unification has been designed and carried out mostly in top-down procedures of administration and legal adaptation. On that level, transnational Europe is already a substantial reality, and likewise, institutional reforms can be thought of to solve the structural part of the EU’s so-called democratic deficit or legitimacy problem. Nevertheless, the other part remains an open question and is of particular relevance from an anthropological perspective. The sense of social cohesion in transnational Europe needed to motivate political

identities there that falsify the programmatic vision of nation-state ideology to think of the nation as of a bounded collective, the territorial borders of which are identical with its social boundaries.

2 To name at least a few, some of the rather exceptional works to bridge the gap between empirically rich anthropological micro-analyses and the predominantly theoretical focus in political science are Goddard, Llobera and Shore 1994 as well as Shore 1998 and 2000.
engagement in and for a European civil society as well as allow for solidarity across national boundaries cannot occur by means of top-down procedures alone. That is, it requires the involvement of people’s bottom-up affiliations. The ‘impressive achievement of an egalitarian mass democracy was bound to the political form of the nation-state’ (Brunkhorst 2002: 8) and to the creation of an ‘imagined community’ of abstract solidarity in this frame (Anderson 1991). The particular challenge which is imposed by the EU project of transnationalisation can thus be paraphrased as, ‘can this kind of civil solidarity be transnationalised?’ – or even ‘globalised?’”, as Brunkhorst (2000) put it.

To study questions of whether and how processes of transnationalisation matter, it is necessary to examine the practises of intermediary agents that organise communication, spread normative ideals of the EU and echo the people’s readiness to become citizens of transnational Europe. The state-run education systems in the EU can be expected to fulfil a special role as mediators in this sense.

2. The competing assignments of nation-state schools in the wake of transnationalisation

Before discussing the impact of transnationalisation in schooling, one should briefly recall the principle role of state-run education in nation-states: Nation building and the establishing of a state-run school system went hand in hand in most of the European nation states. Far from being coincidental, Gerd Baumann calls this ‘commonsense nexus’ of nation state and school – the ‘quintessential mechanism by which nation states turn children into citizens or individuals into political persons’ (2002: 2).

Schools are in other words crucial interfaces of communication between the generations and between the public and the private. State-run schools transmit the ideals and preferred argumentative styles, as well as the norms and limits of civil and political culture. The tasks and skills one is expected to apply as good citizen are translated from general ideas into practices in schools. Each school will do this job in a particular way, but all schools under state supervision are to fulfill this function of transmitting normative ideas of participation in public to the next generation. Historically, education for citizenship has without doubt ‘been construed in a nationalist idiom which both reflects and reinforces existing cleavages based on nation and language’ (Finaldi and Shore 2000: 2). Ernest Gellner (1983) and Benedict Anderson (1991) argued convincingly that these mechanisms work together to construe, shape and reproduce nations as reified collective

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3 This function of school has been validated by the work of Gellner (1983), Harker (1984), Anderson (1991) and Bourdieu, though the latter’s theory of reproduction does not employ the same terminology of the civic or political culture (1987 a, b; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977, Bourdieu and Boltanski 1981). For the German
actors of first modernity. And the very model of projecting and creating collective identities as national ones has proven to be highly effective not only in terms of mobilising the political effort for state formation but likewise as a means to create and maintain social cohesion within the national societies. Several factors have however led to an undermining of the conventional nation-state arrangement, these combined political sovereignty, social and civic rights with the territorial expansion of its ‘imagined community’ Anderson (1991). Twentieth century Europe has undergone various processes of de-nationalisation\(^4\); mass immigration has made her populations more multi-ethnic and multi-national; the European unification enterprise has questioned national projections of collective identities, and many forms of legitimate representation as well as political participation are no longer tied to the condition of nationality.

Likewise, education for a nationally codified citizenship has come under pressure in the wake of these changes. Being prime agents to facilitate the next generation’s ability to act in the public arena, state schools in Europe have been confronted with new, partly competing assignments in recent decades. Whether their pupils are nationals or not, long or short term residents, recent arrivals like refugees with or without return orientation – irrespective of this potential plurality, schools have to prepare adolescents for their adult participation in the public. What this public means, to where it extends and what competences it requires, is, however, no longer bound to territorially framed nation-state societies. Nowadays, ‘the nation-state school (...) is expected to perpetuate a sense of nation-state continuity, but also to integrate non-nationals and first-generation citizens into the democratic project of equalizing chances and access for all’ (Baumann 2002: 1).

One result of the new requirements is that school education is redirected to follow new trajectories. Nationalist stereotypes and prejudices against other European nations have nearly completely been abolished from teaching materials (Pingel 1995: XI). The nation-states’ school education in current-day Europe provides a kind of political socialisation that is oriented more towards the national civil society than towards the state itself. This diversion from traditional notions of education for citizenship relates to a different cognitive process implying a process of ‘civil enculturation’ (Schiffauer et. al. 2002a and b). Adolescents are made familiar with nationally specific fields and standards of discourse. They learn how to pursue their argument in public in case, the historical development of how public education went along with the process of nation-building has been documented and analysed, for example, by Giesen, Junge and Kritschgau (1994: 363 ff.).

\(^4\) It needs to be stressed that – in spite of the economic globalisation and the increase of cross-cutting transnational phenomena in the wake of, e.g., transmigration – there is not any unidirectional trend towards a political de-nationalisation on global scale. The modern nation-state itself has remained an ideal-typical vision rather than a general reality on the globe (see Krasner 1999), yet when looking at the nationalist wars that followed the break downs of USSR or Yugoslavia, the normative appeal of national ideology for state-building seems unbroken. There are hence as well explicitly opposite trends to de-nationalisation. For
order to be successful and thus undergo a process of ‘discursive assimilation’ (Mannitz 2002a and b) rather than being socialised in terms of any crude or ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 1995).

Beside this shift from contents to methods of discourse, normative shifts towards transnationalisation can also be found within contents of programmes for schooling all over Europe. As a result of the EU integration and its unfolding as a transnational political system, the closure of national collectives evidently needed rethinking. Comparative analyses of history and civic textbooks for lower secondary schools of different European countries have shown remarkable changes since the ‘50s. Though it is specific to each case, there is a general Europeanisation of issues that were formerly presented in a fashion as to stress national uniqueness in history. National symbols or ‘heroes’ and ‘heroines’ (e.g., Bismarck in the case of Germany, or Jeanne D’Arc in the case of France) tend to be presented in much more relative terms than 50 years ago when, at least in some of the countries in question, the tradition to celebrate them as representatives of a glorious national past was still very much alive. Current-day teaching materials stress global responsibility, societal pluralisation, intercultural encounter and the normalcy of diversity in everyday life. On this level of the normative discourse in education, traditional notions of national collective identities as revolving around fixed sets of attributes, traditions and cultural heritages to care for have clearly been suspended (for a more detailed analysis see Bertilotti et.al. 2002).

Supplementary to these textbook revisions, Europe has been incorporated in national education programmes as a formal subject. Increasing emphasis is put on broadly defined European ideals such as the principles of democracy, the values of Enlightenment, human rights or social justice (see also Pingel 1995). The Council of Europe has worked to foster such a development since its foundation, and in the 1980s and ‘90s, together with the growing density of cross-cutting relations in the EU – and, the necessity to redefine Europe in view of the fundamental changes in the former Eastern Hemisphere – the claim to do justice to transnational dynamics and in particular to the so-called ‘European dimension’ in teaching attracted more and more attention. As a norm this can be found in the curricula all over the European Union now (Pingel 1995).

Europe, however, the voluntary transformation of political order means without any doubt that “the principle of sovereign nation-states is (...) in the retreat (Bogdandy 1993: 123).

Germany represents a rather odd example in this respect, for such a trend towards Europeanisation started comparatively early after 1945: “Germany provides an interesting puzzle from a comparative perspective to the study of nation-state identities in textbooks. More so than in other European countries, in Germany, social science textbooks display remarkable prudence in representations of national identity. Rather than asserting national myths and irredentist narratives as the core components of nationhood, the textbooks focus on the representation of a more globalized and diversified world, and the place of a relativized German identity in it. This (...) should, no doubt, be understood vis-à-vis the critical juncture of the National Socialist Rule, the Holocaust and World War II. Given this harrowing nationalist and militarist past, the Federal Republic of Germany (...) had no choice but scrutinize the stock of national traditions and anchor its identity
In the case of Germany, many federal states have included ‘intercultural education’ in their programmatic guidelines as an aspect that should be reflected in school lessons and have, by doing so, followed an advice of the Standing Conference of Education Ministers from 1996. Topical reference works and manuals for teachers explain that ‘information about life in all the different cultures are an essential element of learning’, and this implied ‘to take the emotional and living conditions of migrants and refugees into account as well as to investigate the relations between indigenous people and their fellow citizens from other cultures of origin’ (Hölscher 1994: 9). The state of Berlin has included Europeanisation and Globalisation in the programme for ‘World Studies’ (Rahmenplan Weltkunde grade 9/10, 2001), a subject which combines social studies, history, civics, some economics and geography. In this subject, pupils are to learn that ‘human and children’s rights are the object of as well as the expression and standard of civilisation’ (Rahmenplan für Unterricht und Erziehung in der Berliner Schule, social studies grade 8: Human Rights, 2001). Many topics are meanwhile framed as European in these guidelines. The ‘Foundation of the German Empire in Europe’ is, for instance, connected to the syllabus about the all-European impact of that historical moment (Berliner Rahmenplan, history grade 9, 2001); Europe is introduced as our common economic and social space (Berliner Rahmenplan geography grade 7, 2001), global interconnections, international dependencies and migrants shall be taken into account. All this finally contributes to the main aim that ‘in a society of rapid social change, the pupils shall acquire the abilities to participate in democracy’ (Zur Zielsetzung und Praxis Politischer Bildung in der Berliner Schule, 2001).

Such ambitious norms are not easy to translate into social practices of education. In particular since education policies are minefields in themselves, and schools face very different situations in terms of their societal environment and their material conditions. The extent to which the wonderfully revised new textbooks can actually be found in schools is ultimately dependent on the national education system, its instruments, political priorities and the financial situation. State School Supervision in a country like France, with a unified National Curriculum, can exert a higher pressure on the replacement of outdated teaching materials more so than in a country like Germany, where teaching programmes and the supervision of textbooks are regionalised and subject to a variety of funding options and funding shortages. Furthermore, as regards the status of unified Europe, the transferring of sovereignty to the EU is a contested issue. In fact the risk of counter-mobilisation against the process of political de-nationalisation is visible throughout European
member states.\textsuperscript{6} The normative claims of integrating the European dimension in to teaching has therefore remained a rather vague and weak additional guideline for curricula orientation. Research has shown that very different interpretations as well as didactical forms of implementation are derived from the resolution to create a unified Europe in the sense of a social community to embrace all European people. Hence under the surface of the glossy rhetoric there is not much reason for optimism, since no comparable efforts and/or investments have yet been made to help translation of the aspiring claims into adequate practice (Leclerq 1995: 13f.).

Another difficulty is to be seen in the fact that the distant world of Eurocratic Brussels is not yet likely to stimulate any relevant collective identification (Münch 1998: 297); nor do the concrete efforts as they are pursued by EU legislation adequate to cope with the challenges of a transnational polity. Citizenship rights and their relation to nationality are a well researched case and at the same time an unfortunate example for the output of the European Union. Though the implications of societal transnationalisation on concepts of citizenship rights have been discussed in much detail for many years,\textsuperscript{7} the introduction of EU citizenship with the Maastricht Treaty 1992 has not counterbalanced but rather worsened the structural inequality between non-EU nationals residing in the EU and the member state nationals. The newly created Union citizenship operates with the territorial principle of residence and entails a whole set of new privileges, yet these are combined with the condition of being a member state’s national. Labour migration, travelling and moving house within the EU have been made much easier in order to cater for the needs of a mobile workforce in a transnational social and economic space, but only member state nationals are granted the right to adjust their scopes accordingly. In effect, the difference between the latter’s extended rights and the limitations of non-EU nationals who might be long-term residents within the EU has widened. This dynamic might not be a big surprise if one takes into consideration that the historical making of unified nation-states in Europe and the introduction of national citizenship also meant the fortification of boundaries towards neighbours as well as conceptually misfitting minorities:

\textsuperscript{6} The regionalist and right wing populist movements of FPÖ, Vlaams Blok, Front National, Lega Nord or SVP all work on the basis of countering further European integration as a loss of national sovereignty and rights of democratic participation (Betz 2001: 122). Claus Offe aptly names this bundle of reservations the “picture of the enemy Europe as agency of a supranational foreign rule“ (2001: 429). Though being a marginal phenomenon up to the present, the counter-mobilisations indicate that a danger of internal fragmentation exists as a result of further Europeanisation. Automatic identification with the enlarged community cannot be expected. The difficulties that accompanied ratification of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty in all member states that consulted their people have also reflected a far-reaching mistrust in the outcome of European decision-makers.

\textsuperscript{7} Based on Marshall’s concept of “social citizenship” (1965), the link between citizenship and nationality has been thoroughly questioned by a number of studies. With the term “postnational citizenship”, Soysal has, for instance, claimed that the international rule of human rights has in the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century fostered a sense of citizenship that is no longer based on particularistic national membership but on universalistic
‘It is thus no coincidence that the history of Northwestern Europe revolves so blatantly around the drawing of boundaries and the legitimation of exclusions. (...) The problematics of boundary maintenance describe perhaps the crucial dilemma of these civil societies: their own internal logic and conception aim at universalization; yet in practice any expansion spells a higher degree of imposition and a wider field of competition, not to speak of ever more anonymous authorities to watch over the process. (...) Not uncommonly, the integration of new groups led to the exclusion of older ones, or integration on one level was counteracted by exclusion on another.’ (Baumann 2002: 14)

One of the lessons from that history is however that societal peace is put at high risk if large groups are excluded from equal access to resources. This is particularly so in democratically organised market economies where the creation of equal chances to take part in the competition is of central importance as source of credibility. In this sense, the situation in the European Union remains highly problematic. An adequate understanding of ‘transnational citizenship’ would, according to Bauböck, imply that all democratic rights were derived from residence and remained completely detached from the formal membership status of national citizenship (1994 a and b; 1999: 19). This challenge has, amongst others, not yet been tackled sufficiently in unifying Europe. Until now, the nation states have remained important gatekeepers for the brokerage of rights and most tangible sites of agency for the political public. Can schools succeed in training young people for an allegedly postnational age under such countering circumstances?

The normative programmes of school education are constantly revised and rewritten throughout Europe to meet the changing requirements and to adapt guidelines to the ideals of postnationalism. But are pupils actually made fit for a transnational engagement? Are they motivated to see themselves as Europeans, or maybe even as citizens of the world rather than as nationals? Do they learn to value societal plurality and face the challenge of cross-national mobility as is envisaged in the official documents? Is the next generation equipped with the necessary knowledge and appreciation of foreign languages? Are the noble visions of humanity, the teaching units on Enlightenment and the respect of individual rights applied to the pupils’ actual situation?

3. School practice

In their exemplary research on the EU-funded European Schools, Finaldi and Shore (2000) have found that these pioneering European Schools manage to impart a certain sense of postnational Europeanness. It does however take the shape of a distinctiveness vis-à-vis the ‘outside world’ which appears less familiar with the code of the postnational era than the children of people working for EU institutions, who are in fact used to cross-national mobility and having peers...
coming from different European countries. Absolvents from these schools demonstrated their ‘fitness in being a highly adaptable and mobile population’ (ibid.: 11 f.). They were ‘undoubtedly ‘hybridised’ individuals who have grown up between national cultures, never quite fully integrated or socialised into any single national culture’ (ibid.: 12). Though the reproach against these schools with fostering elitism might be objected with reference to the necessity of creating some kind of laboratory for the innovative European integration effort (see the analysis of the debate in Finaldi-Baratieri 2000: 10-3), that does not change the fact that the European Schools are exclusive institutions. It is no secret that the European Schools do not cater for a mass public and are in this sense, by definition, elitist. Most children in Europe continue to attend regular state-run schools that are nowadays likewise required to take Europe into consideration as a new ‘dimension’ but are much less well equipped than the privileged European Schools. For the following examples from social practice we turn to such a public school in Berlin to test the reach of the normative shifts towards transnational Europe in a relatively underprivileged setting.

Many pupils in the school where I conducted research were children of labour immigrants from countries outside the EU. Like their peers in the European Schools, they were engaged with friends coming from many different (European as well as non-European) countries. They were likewise ‘hybridised’ individuals and were growing up with the experience of different national cultures, or to put it more precisely, with competing ideas, discourses, practices and expectations relating to the concept of cultural difference. How was this fact dealt with in school? How was the presence of foreign students (most of whom were nationals from Turkey, Lebanon and former Yugoslavia) assessed, who are after all themselves representatives of the transnationalisation processes under consideration? The answer to this bundle of questions is that foreign pupils were considered a major problem in school, and not seen as any sort of enrichment. Many unambiguous statements were made by teachers expressing the view that the foreign pupils in school were bearers of a profoundly different culture, and of a culture that one did not appreciate but thought to be backward and hindering. Likewise, these foreign pupils’ mother-tongue knowledges were not assessed as an asset or useful skill under conditions of a transnational society but seen as a handicap that would hinder the foreigners’ integration in German society. In particular those children who had attended primary school in their families’ countries of origin and had thus been instructed systematically in their native language – which according to several studies in the field of language acquisition is the ideal basis for learning more than one language thoroughly – were not regarded as having extra skills but as having extra problems in learning sufficient German.

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8 According to some theoreticians, migrants might even be regarded the most innovative driving actors of globalisation (see Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999; Pries 2001: 48 f.).
The negative stereotype of immigrants’ children as ‘sitting between the chairs of’ or even ‘being torn apart between’ two different cultures was reproduced in many instances. The immigrant parents were not appreciated as partners in socialisation either but tended to be judged as sources of further obstruction insofar as they would follow a completely different pedagogical agenda at home. Two exemplary statements made by teachers on this issue:

Especially regarding foreign pupils, role behaviour is in my eyes a bit backward (...) There are hardly any possibilities to solve conflicts verbally, no willingness to compromise, and partly also in the tensions between male and female teenagers, with our big proportion of oriental pupils, it must be said there are many failings.

Turkish pupils are victims of circumstance. Turkish parents fail in so far as little esteem is placed on the acquisition of the German language. Our pupils’ Turkish parents throw their children into the German school system without any assistance. Turkish boys especially are often confronted with such unreal expectations by their parents that many are in danger of breaking apart. This pressure naturally produces ways of behaviour that we feel to be very unpleasant (...) My opinion is that the Turkish Parents’ Association fails completely.

A number of teachers even went so far to declare the German school’s tasks of education for irreconcilable with certain ‘other cultures’, particularly so with that of the ‘oriental pupils’. Attempts to inculcate the desirable code of civility in such a ‘problematic clientèle’ were assessed as hardly realistic if not considered as being doomed to complete failure. Therefore, these Others were constructed in opposition to the style being aimed at: backward gender roles, repressive education norms and authoritarianism were supposedly reproduced in the foreign families, all of which are obviously irreconcilable with the ambitious ideals of a liberal civil society’s school education. Teachers felt clearly overburdened by the difficult circumstances. The community as well as the public authorities saw the school as being in a poor part of Berlin. The overall shortages created a lot of frustration, and it seemed to add fuel to the tendency to blame the immigrant families for failure. The prevailing notion was that migrants represented other cultures, and this sort of otherness was seen as contributing to a further worsening of underprivileged living conditions. Altogether, this left a desperate impression, as if school had no chance to work successfully as the institution of civil inclusion for all.

In an inquiry, that three teachers conducted among their colleagues (in which 50% of them participated), one third expressed the opinion that the ‘foreign cultural origins’ – and not their underprivileged socio-economic living conditions! – were responsible for problems such as: rudeness, a lack of cultural techniques and, on the whole, too low a level of skills and achievements. Forty percent considered the influence of ‘foreign cultural origins’ as significant in the increase of violence at their school. There was hence a substantial devaluation of the different national cultures these pupils were thought to represent. Rather than being conceived as protagonists of
transnationalisation, the children from immigrant families were marked negatively as foreigners whose peculiarities constitute no valuable contribution but on the contrary create splits and dangerous backlashes in society. Again a quote from a teacher, reacting to two pupils whom she heard talking in Turkish with each other:

You talk in Turkish, you stay in your own circles, you go shopping only in Turkish shops – integration cannot work like that!

The clear message was that assimilation was required to become an integrated member of German society. Different culture, like languages from home, were seen as a handicap that needed be given up.

To classify this argument one should insert here that the model-type Europeanness found among absolvents of the elitist European Schools by Finaldi and Shore (2000) was not the result of any consistent socialisation norms shared between schools and parents either. While the pioneering European School staff strives to convey the postnational horizon required for coping with the changing boundaries in Europe, the socialising influences of most parents involved remained oriented towards their own national background, and ‘as de-territorialised expatriates’, they often displayed ‘an exaggerated and somewhat atavistic sense of their own national identity’ (ibid. 2000: 12). Their preferred consumption of national cable TV programmes from the countries of origin pointed to the same direction. In brief, when it comes to cultural reproduction at home, even the highest ranks of the exemplary mobile and avantgarde EU personnel follows an agenda that is well known as typical for migrant parents who tend to expose their children to high demands of loyalty with their families’ background and the related symbolic expressions of cultural belonging.

As regards the concerned adolescents in Berlin, they did not appear to suffer from incongruency of the different spheres but managed to act in both. Networking among them was highly individualised and crossed boundaries of ethnic, lingual or cultural origin. Practices like celebrating christmas parties in school were not simply shared as social routines of the majority society but in some cases even initiated by Muslim pupils and given new shape as events of hybrid character. Relations to the places of their parents’ emigration and the relatives back home were marked by an ambivalence that captured the familiarity with life in different countries as well as a certain distance to both. Vis-à-vis their migrant parents they showed complex skills of mediation. Beside a high appreciation of their elders’ migrations that had after all facilitated the own access to a diversity of options, there was a lot of understanding of the parents’ special biographies and of the parental interest in defining boundaries as to retain a distinct cultural identity. Home and the surrounding German society were typically seen as two separate spheres, but in their everyday life, the adolescents from immigrant families did not see themselves as victims of circumstance. Though
often replicating a reifying discourse of cultural differences and bounded social entities, be it on the basis of culture, religion or nationality, they managed in fact well to cope with the situation practically. Even though this was admitted to pose special problems from time to time, to require extra competence of negotiation or create a further source of exhaustion, their confidence in the own abilities to master the situation generally prevailed over frustration or self-victimisation; they were not sitting ‘in between two’ but ‘on all chairs’, as Otyakmaz phrased it (1995). One young woman from a Kurdish family described their ‘foreigner-situation’ as a clear advantage in terms of a widened horizon in a classroom discussion:

‘As we, the foreigners, also know another mentality, another culture, we can decide which one is better or appeals to us more. As a result, there is always this longing for the culture that one likes best. I think Germans do not have this choice.’

In a similar vein, when one teacher made the – so to speak transnationally correct – statement in a lesson of ethics that the ‘rigid drawers’ of being German, Turkish or foreign no longer fitted social reality, the students from migrant families immediately agreed with this view, but they answered straightaway that their problem remained that ‘everybody in the surroundings still uses the drawers’, ‘especially parents’, and ‘even though the cupboard is too small’. Their problem was hence not handling the multi-sphere reality personally but coping with the fact that there was no recognition of their competence to bridge gaps of understanding and promote the crossing over – even though this lies at the heart of postnationally oriented education programmes nowadays.

The crucial difference that exists between the children of EU-staff in the European Schools and the children of labour immigrants in a regular secondary school in a poor part of Berlin is, besides the obvious difference in material working conditions, the valuation of their other background; and this extends to factual recognition in the shape of substantial equal rights. Having said this, one more school lesson from the fieldwork in Berlin shall briefly illustrate the powerful impact of that dimension:

A history course in grade 11 was to treat problems of democracy in ancient Greece: The practice of ostracism was discussed and how such decisions were taken in the people’s assembly. Ali, a Turkish pupil, asks: ‘Would foreigners be allowed to vote then as well?’
Teacher: ‘Come on! Please!’
Ali: ‘And suppose the Germans decided that all foreigners must leave!’
Teacher: ‘In principle, Parliament could decide that.’
Ali: ‘And then we would have to go, or what?’
The Teacher quickly leaves the issue: ‘Well, there are courts and human rights and all those things.’ – After a while, the discussion turns to citizens’ rights: A pupil wonders what it meant that after the reforms of Pericles only those people whose parents had been citizens of Athens were also citizens with full rights.
A German boy comments: ‘That would not work here.’
Teacher: ‘I beg you pardon? My parents are both Germans, so I am a proper German, too.’
A Turkish boy asks: ‘Are there any improper Germans then?’
Teacher: ‘Of course! What about those who have a Turkish father, ey?! – Pericles’ law laid
down that the children of a mixed couple from an Athenian and a Metok could no longer
consider them citizens. If an Athenian girl had fallen in love with a Metok boy, she will have
thought twice about having a child with him: Full citizenship for her child was important
after all. Imagine such a situation with us.’

In fact, the foreign pupils in class did not need to imagine such a situation, for most of them were
concerned by it as non-EU nationals. Immediately they entered a discussion on the uncertainty of
residence permits and visa restrictions that had been recently introduced. Such topics which
reminded the non-EU foreigners of their limited rights not only created feelings of uncertainty
among them, but also meant that boundaries were emphasised rather than relativised. Human rights
came into play here not in the sense of a postnational regime that makes us all equal but as a set of
norms that the non-EU foreigners would have to rely on in critical cases because they cannot invoke
all the citizens’ rights like their German classmates, nor the rights that peers with an EU member-
state’s nationality enjoy wherever they may choose to reside in the European Union.

In practice, the hybrid social reality and mediation competence demonstrated by the young
people across ethnic groups in Berlin proved to be ahead of the guiding concepts that were still
applied to them in school. Many teachers continued to spread static conceptions of cultural diversity
attached to ethnic communities and thereby followed an agenda of the foreigners’ integration which
still laboured under the conventional container-model of national societies. Even if it is meant as an
ironic or provocative remark that there can be ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ Germans, the pupils who are
concerned by legal restrictions and conceptual exclusion from Germanness will have
understandable difficulties in taking an emotional distance from such comments. All this should
however not be mistaken as putting the blame on a burnt-out or narrow-minded teaching staff. In
fact the teachers’ space to argue in favour of democratic involvement in the EU is extremely narrow
under conditions that are marked by the structural constraints and mentioned deficits of the
European integration endeavour. As long as the glossy vision of a transnational order that claims to
be based upon the universal validity of human rights is not substantiated by an appropriate
arrangement to guarantee comprehensive rights irrespective of nationality in the EU, credibility is
hard to attain and likewise hard to convey in teaching: Right now, teachers are actually expected to
mobilise adolescents for engagement in a transnational polity that continues to exclude some
residents from equal participation rights along lines of national membership!

Paradigmatic categories like the social, ethnic, national or cultural origin of one’s family,
native language or religious belief are without any doubt subject to competing assessments in
schools as well as at home and among peers. More than just options of identification, they do
represent social sites of contestation which are marked by the continuous negotiation of societal status and, thereby, of intersubjective meaning. It does make a considerable and meaningful difference if someone’s personal background gives them a qualifying club-card, signifying membership in a highly valued and privileged avantgarde of transnationalisation, or is understood as an indicator of lesser rights and underprivileged status in society. Since there are no efforts to do away with this factual imbalance, unifying Europe can hardly be taught as common platform for comprehensive integration, let alone radiate any considerable appeal for collective identification.

4. Conclusion
Increased international exchange and the process of European integration have restructured the public space of the European nation-states, and consequently, the agenda for political socialisation in school has taken on different tasks. The nation-state, once the major reference frame to fence for territorial limits, the political arena, public forum and the community of solidarity, has substantially lost meaning in the wake of these transformations. Whilst factors of denationalisation constitute an influential reality on the level of European policy-makers and the structure of governance, the emergence of a multi-level polity in the European Union raises the core question of the extent to which one can expect the constitution of social cohesion and political agency outside of the nation state. In this respect, the process of Europeanisation poses a special challenge for the public institutions of socialisation. It is particularly in schools that the European citizenry for the future needs be made fit for expressing their interests, mobilising support, making claims and solving conflicts in a polity that is no longer bounded by nation-state borders.

While the so-called democratic deficit of the EU is often discussed in terms of the institutional structure and the observation that European citizens do not yet display the necessary engagement with the EU, the role of intermediary agents, such as schools, to organise political discourse and transmit ideas for collective identification on new level has been ignored. Definitely, one has to concede that it is complicated to disconnect the traditional links of collective identity, nationality and citizenship. But whatever solution one might favour to replace this, it does not work without intermediary actors who organise communication in accordance with the new frame of reference. It should hence be seen as part of the changing tasks that Europeanisation implies to scrutinize the ways mediators of normative concepts understand the political arena they are to prepare for. However, this argument needs to be backed by an equivalent constitutional set-up to be on order to be convincing. What the example of EU citizenship legislation as well as the exclusive character of the European Schools demonstrate is that mere confidence in good out-put of decision-making in Brussels will not be sufficient to cherish an inclusionist understanding of transnational
Europeanness. Even the explicit efforts to adapt to the requirements of increased and ever increasing international exchange, to help transnational networking and ease the personal costs of moving places of residence from one country to another by means of EU citizenship, have created new hierarchies and/or reconfirmed some of the existing lines of exclusion vis-à-vis non-EU nationals. Against the creed of equal educational opportunities, the European Schools cater for a privileged minority of European migrants, and by doing so contribute to a further hierarchisation of different groups of immigrants. The chance to principally recognize the legitimacy of all denizens to being equally involved in the polity of their places of residence has so far been missed, and the crucial challenge remains thus

‘(...) to ensure the legitimacy of a democratic order by an approximate congruence between residents who are subjected to a legal order and citizens who are represented in legislation via their democratic votes. (...) A European Union should not tolerate that member states (...) deny access to citizenship to persons who would qualify under the Union’s own republican or societal approaches to citizenship. Even if one grants that individual member states may have historical or demographic reasons for defining their citizenship along lines of common descent and culture, once they are or become part of the union they should have to accept that this emerging polity and its membership require a different conception.’

(Bauböck 1999: 19, 21)

Establishing this conception as normative base would indeed mean a constructive step towards the creation of a democratic EU as of a civil society beyond the conventional boundaries of nation-states. Education for citizenship would in fact have to become transnational if the powerful differentiations between ‘us’ and the ‘others’, be they Germans and foreigners in the frame of a national public, or likewise EU- and non-EU nationals in the European public, were lifted to empower all residents equally for participation. Such a concept of European citizenship would after all also imply the necessity to deconstruct and transcend the traditional terms of in-group formation much more thoroughly than is foreseen in current recommendations to include Europe as a dimension in teaching.

Measured against that demand, the reality is far from satisfactory. The general importance of teaching the future generation to see Europe as their common home meets a lot of principle acknowledgement amongst educators. The national is hence re-interpreted in transnational terms in all of the EU member states; respective discursive shifts can be found in teaching materials and guidelines. Their actual implementation is however a lengthy and contested procedure. Thus far, vaguely phrased normative claims have been written into programmes that have hardly any binding character, do not necessarily go along with better funding for activities, staff or new textbooks, let alone a reformulation of the set of skills and competences that are subject to the distribution of marks in school. The fact that decisions about the way and extent to which Europe becomes
integrated in national education systems has remained subject to the individual member-states’ authorities and is without doubt been a factor that prevents rapid change towards the implementation of a grand common narrative. This ‘obstacle’ may on the one hand be a chance for maintaining the diversity of interpretations that make up Europe. The slow pace of coming to general agreements in the EU might thus prevent that the normative self-image of unified Europe is too easily purified from accounts of the bloody bath that European political history was in the past, and which belongs to it as genuinely as the nicer parts like Humanism or Enlightenment that are most often stressed as the common heritage in revised education programmes. On the other hand, the exclusionist traditions to essentialise and stereotype Otherness, reify ethnicity and culture and bind both to a delimited territory and political entity – which was part of the construction of nation-states in Europe – might as well inform the conceptualisation of unified Europe if the efforts of struggling for alternative narratives were given up in favour of national subsidiarity.

In the landscape of secondary schools in the EU and supported by means of the EU, a trend towards hierarchical re-shapings has already started to take effect. Drawing on the programmatic shifts towards transnational Europe, politically dominant players have started to institutionalise their positions as insiders (as well as their languages), e.g. in the extraordinarily well-equipped European Schools. While these schools appear to be successful in overcoming national boundaries and conveying an ethos of transnational Europe instead, research in a less privileged school in Berlin has shown that such an orientation is still far from being a general reality. The vision of a unified Europe did not seem to inform teaching very much in the Berlin school. But then, in what shape could it come in? The additional languages and the experience represented by ‘oriental’ migrants and their children in school were not valued as collective nor as individual assets but merely regarded as obstacles. Selective and exclusionary effects within transnationalisation processes become visible here: Europeanness marks a new site of distinction and is therefore a promising trait to be cultivated for elitist reproduction and upward mobility. If the language and cultural heritage one might deploy is associated with a ‘backward’ part of the world, as was the case in the Berlin school, they are not recognized as valuable contributions.

In brief, the answer to the question whether transnationalisation matters in nation-state school education falls into different parts: On the level of normative rhetorics and public claims of socialisation, it has become a very prominent and tangible discourse, particularly so in the shape of united Europe as model-type transnational space. For a number of actors in school, first and foremost the pupils with migration backgrounds, whether they are European migrants and attend a European School in Belgium or children of Turkish labour immigrants in Berlin, transnationality is an everyday experience which requires some special competences to be managed and eventually
leads to hybrid practices. The extent to which these are assessed as desirable outcome in school appears to be valued against a hierarchised scheme of Europeanness and by doing so devalues what lies outside its conceptual boundaries.
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