The Para-Site of Governance: 
Transborder Regionalism in the *Euregios*

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Drawing on a burgeoning academic literature devoted to issues of institutionalized cross-border regionalism within the European Union, the author attempts to theoretically contextualize observed cross-border dynamics as a problematic of “cosmopolitical governance”, defined by an ongoing deficit of socio-political rights and duties constitutive of forms of citizenship applicable to the uniquely trans-national environments of cross-border milieux. By exploring Kantian categories of aesthetic judgement and the forms of political community implicit in their manifestation of reason, the author posits a conceptual model of cosmopolitical right which adheres neither to the morally charged rationalities sustaining the liberal, modernist nation-state nor the Hobbesian rationalities characterizing inter-state relations, but is critically informed by the ethical demands required in achieving agreement around claims rooted in affect and the passions. As elaborated in a case study of tranfrontier labourers within the trans-border (and tri-lingual) Euregion Maas-Rhein, this Kantian “sensus communis” is meant to lead to the acknowledgement of a spatial and cultural politics capable of empowering cross-border regional actors in negotiating a measure of agency vis-à-vis nation-state communitarian logics.

“Des stations, des chemins font ensemble un systeme. Des points et des lignes, des etres et des relations. On peut s’interesser a la construction du systeme, au nombre, a la disposition de ces stations, de ces chemins. On peut s’interesser aussi au flux de communication qui passe par ces lignes. Autrement dit, on peut avoir decrit formellement un systeme complexe, par exemple celui de Leibniz, puis un systeme en general. On peut avoir saisi ce qui transite en eux et nommer ce transport du nom propre d’Hermes. On peut avoir cherche leur formation et leur distribution, leurs frontiers, leurs bords et leurs formes. Il faut pourtant ecrire des interceptions, des accidents du flux, en chemin, entre les stations, de ses changements et metamorphoses… Comme un trou dans un canal fait que l’eau se repand dans l’espace alentour. Il y a des fuites et des pertes, des obstacles, des opacites. Les portes, les fenetres se ferment, Hermes peut mourir ou s’evanouir entre nous. Un ange passe. Qui a vole la relation? Peut-etre quelqu’un, au milieu, la detourne-t-il. Existe-t-il un troisieme homme? Il n’est pas question que du logiciel. Ce qui passe dans le chemin peut etre de l’argent, de l’or ou des merchandises, de la nourriture, bref, du materiel. Il ne faut pas grande experience pour savoir qu’ils n’arrivent pas si facilement a destination. Qu’il y a partout des intercepteurs qui travaillent a grands frais a detourner, a devier ce qui transite au long des chemins. Le parasitisme est le nom donne le plus souvent a ces nombreuses et diverses activites, dont je crains fort qu’elles constituent la chose du monde la plus commune.”

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Since the early 1990s the European Union has accorded special importance to the development of its former internal and existing external border regions as potentially key sites of economic dynamism resulting from the economic integration and enlargement of European space\(^2\). With the attainment of EU structural financing capabilities, these cross-border *euregios* have become eligible since July, 1996 for INTERREG funds in the co-financing of local cross-border initiatives, involving programs of technology transfer, the construction of transport linkages, transborder industrial training and labor market development, the creation of joint leisure areas, and the establishment of consumer as well as small business advisory services\(^3\). Future cross-border planning efforts have also been ensured by the promotion in June, 1997 of the Draft European Spatial Development Perspective. Supported by INTERREG IIc and III\(^4\), the primary goal of the ESDP is to promote transnational cooperation among Member States’ planning and development strategies as a means of improving the impact of Community policies on spatial development\(^5\). Supported by a purposively “bottom-up” planning approach, the policy assumptions guiding both INTERREG and the ESDP are that increased integration of spatial planning between Member States will contribute to an improved balance of development, resulting in heightened levels of socio-economic cohesion and a more comprehensive vision for transnational regions within the European Union.

Lacking a clear competence for European-wide spatial planning, however, the administrative implementation of INTERREG and ESDP now involves a complex network of actors comprised of the European Commission, Member States, regional and local authorities\(^6\). Within the framework of this emerging “multilevel institutionalisation”, subsidiarity conditions apply in the sense that Member States, rather than the Commission, are responsible for the allocation of funds. Recommendations on the distribution of funds and project evaluation are in turn the responsibility of joint monitoring groups made up of representatives from national, regional and local authorities of each country within a given joint cooperation area\(^8\). Given the diversity of governance mechanisms between the Commission, Member States and the regions, and the largely voluntary nature of inter-governmental cooperation
required for the administration of structural funds, there are significant differences in the administrative bodies that have been set up to initiate, plan and implement cross-border cooperation among the varied euregios of the European Union.

The variability of cross-border administrative mechanisms has translated into a wide range of operational outcomes in managing Euregional networks during the 1990s. While intermunicipal cross-border cooperation under the aegis of Dutch-German-Belgian euregios, for example, has been facilitated in areas sharing similar legislative systems, and can be considered a relative success in the domain of environmental management, fire and disaster relief, as well as tourism promotion, the overall record of economic, political, and cultural cross-border collaboration since the founding of the Euregional program has fallen below expectations. Similarly, despite the signing of a Benelux Agreement on cross border cooperation in Brussels in September, 1986, offering local authorities the possibility of collaborating within the framework of a public corporation or by formal administrative agreement, few municipalities have taken advantage of this legislation. For some observers the constraints on increased transborder integration within the Euregions is attributable to the lack of a harmonized and uniform tax structure, as well as the existence of uneven employment and social security regulations prevailing within different Euregional subareas. Others raise deeper issues of public accountability by pointing to the small number of policy-makers at the helm of Euregional projects and their often erratic financing mechanisms, including the relatively uncodified manner of cooperation characterizing relations within distinct Euregional subareas (at times based on public or civil law, at others on written declarations of intent, or in some cases with no formalization at all). A frequent and persistent source of bottlenecks to further cross-border cooperation is also attributed to cultural and linguistic differences, reflected across myriad workplace and leisure practices.

Within the context of ongoing academic research, the development of a normative theoretical framework shedding light on the evolving dynamics of transborder regionalism is still relatively underdeveloped. Concepts drawn from urban regime theory and social constructivism have recently surfaced, promising new avenues for investigation. In urban regime theory, however,
functionalist explanations regarding cross-border cooperation dynamics predominate, as reflected in accounts suggesting that differences in policy outcomes are closely related to the timing of INTERREG projects with respect to ongoing cross-border initiatives; divergent patterns of national territorial organization; or the extent of territorial devolution in the implementation of Structural Funds policies. More despondent functionalist narratives propose INTERREG as entirely the supranational creature of the European Union, and cross-border regionalism merely a promotional strategy or opportunistic means of obtaining public subsidies. Alternatively, social constructivist approaches lean towards voluntarist narratives whereby the success/failure of euregional cross-border interactions is attributed either to the particular political leverage of local INTERREG animateurs vis-à-vis agents located at higher spatial scales, to the faulty “mental maps” of entrepreneurs or to a surfeit of nation-state “patriotism” on the part of local actors implementing cross-border urban development projects. Others have been more explicitly voluntarist, framing the difficulty as one of switching “mind-sets traditionally fixed on the hinterland, on the interests of a particular nation-state, towards a concern that is more universal, international.” Under these circumstances, perhaps badly appropriating Milan Kundera, the transborder euregios suffer from an “unbearable lightness of being”, defined by the lack of an adequate context within which the subjects of cross-border interaction acquire historical and spatial “purpose” within a specifically transnational milieu.

Defining Cosmopolitical Governance

In what follows, I attempt to construct preliminary building blocks for such a contextual framework through the notion of “cosmopolitical governance”. The reference to governance, by now a dominant motif in debates over the nature and form of territorialized political community under conditions of late capitalism, signals the increasing importance of meso-level institutions, located between the state and market, serving to regulate the latter through diverse forms of associational networking linking disparate political and economic communities of interest. Significantly, it is increasingly observed that cities and regions constitute key sites for the establishment of such forms of “institutional thickness”. The term “cosmopolitical” has come to acquire its own semantic density for those
attempting to rethink the normative bases of economic and political community in the context of accelerating transnational connectivity. Additionally, the term has proved attractive for many on the Left groping for a way beyond the reductionist stances of both neo-nationalist communitarianisms and the narrow identity politics of American-style multiculturalism.

Anchored within a more explicitly urban and regionalist agenda, the discourse of “cosmopolis” has resonated strongly with those seeking to trace the lineaments of a broadly transfigured spatial order in the shift from a self-styled era of modernity to one of a putatively globalized postmodernity. Within the horizon of this transition, during the age of modernity the cosmopolitical ideal sought to conjoin the totality of rational knowledge of the cosmos (later the scientific understanding of natural phenomena) with the enlightened political principles of the polis (the administration of cities) thus serving to define the economic and political “order” of the modern nation-state, grounded in a notion of sovereignty coterminous with the limits of state borders. Within this territorial framework, the idea of political and economic community was built on a notion of citizenship restricted to a specific, national space separated from similarly bounded sovereign spaces, thus founding the basis of the Westphalian interstate system bequeathed to us in our day.

The procedural form of political community associated with the territorially bounded nation-state was to be grounded in a conception of rights and duties attained through the self-interested use of the rational human faculties, the latter conceived as separate from the body and the passions. In Kantian terms, the entirety of the known social order would come to be shaped by the antinomy of cognitive judgment and the practical demands of nature, perceived as the realm of necessity lying beyond man’s moral capacity to act in the world. In this view, while the nation-state was infused with human purposiveness and agency, the space between nation-states, the specific geography of interstate relations, would remain in an “a-rational”, Rousseau-like “state of nature”, off-limits to human moral investments. For Kant, the outcome of such a Hobbesian compact in the sphere of international relations would be made evident in the predatory European wars of the 18th century, calling for new measures to ensure “perpetual peace” among nations.
But as Toulmin and others have shown, the broad sweep of modernity and its contemporary unfurling cannot be exhausted by the dichotomous narrative implicated in the struggle between moral and practical reason, between the “warmth” of national belonging and the “cold”, rational universalism of cosmopolitan, interstate relations. For a “hidden”, urban strand of cosmopolitical modernity, secreted from the early Enlightenment geographical “peripheries” of Hume’s Edinburgh, Vico’s Naples and Kant’s Königsberg, pointed to an alternative arrangement of the human faculties in their relation to the polis, one which called for the simultaneous enlargement of the moral and spatial imagination prior to the establishment of the rights and duties of national citizenship. From such city-regions thus emerged an alternative ethical and geographical order founded on the proposition of reflective aesthetic judgement, whose spatially indeterminate form would ultimately result from the desire to bridge the gap between the cognitive realm of freedom and the practical domain of nature, without being entirely accommodated by the logic of either manifestation of reason.

For Kant, the form of aesthetic judgement which in such a manner partially escapes cognition provides special access to human purposiveness; such judgement, -- captured in the sympathies and the passions, of affect and taste -- harboured the potential for creating a sensus communis grounded in the communicability of pleasure and pain which, while representing a form of reason in its own right, would not be subsumed under pre-existing universal categories and rules. The point of departure of this aesthetic rationality is what remains unaccounted for when all pragmatic and economic interests have been removed, and likewise when all desire in the existence of objects has been subtracted. Thus, for Kant, aesthetic reflective judgement offers the possibility of achieving a normative “kingdom of ends” rather than of instrumental means, but the demands necessary to transcend claims of fact or moral value through the faculty of taste require an enlarged mentality which would “lay the foundation of an extension of judgements of this kind of necessity for everyone” obtained by the imperative to “think ourselves into the place of others”. The form of judgement Kant locates in affect and the passions vis a vis cognitive and practical reason thus becomes a basis with which to
provide an opening for an ethical determination of the subject defined by responsibility towards others.

The cosmopolitical imagination sketched here, while rejecting traditional communitarian notions of rights and citizenship vested in territorially delimited communities defined by “unchosen commonalities of history, belief, geography and civic culture”\textsuperscript{44}, also departs from the looser, Habermassian notion of “civic solidarity” rooted in forms of national “constitutional patriotism”\textsuperscript{45} (Table 1). It diverges as well from Rawlsian accounts of Kantian liberalism, which presents cosmopolitan views as essentially “self-standing” representations grounded in a notion of rights independent of their recognition by any given society or culture, and motivated by mere mutual advantage resulting from individuals acting on the basis of rational self-interest alone\textsuperscript{46}. Importantly, Kant’s “imagination” -- invoked as the basis for an enlarged mentality -- is neither public nor private, but “indeterminate with respect to both of these insofar as it is simply subjective”\textsuperscript{47}.

In this context, aesthetic judgment, unlike cognitive and practical reason, is conceived as a uniquely “deterritorialized” phenomenon stretching across national borders, as the geographical scope of imaginative consensus required of it could in theory be limitless. Thus, rather than assume the eventual convergence of cognitive, practical and aesthetic rationalities in one underlying form of Reason, then -- fulfilling one promise of Enlightenment modernity -- the Kantian cosmopolitical ideal sets aesthetic judgment apart as a category with its own moral and spatial imperatives which can be subsumed neither under the terms of cognitive judgment (the sphere of morality) nor practical reason (necessity/nature). And yet, throughout the course of Western modernity, the particular “difficulty” associated with political community founded on the principles of Kant’s aesthetic judgment lay precisely in its inability to carve an apriori space of cause-effect relations separate from these categories of rational judgment. Precisely because aesthetic judgements do not “fall in to a province of their own”\textsuperscript{48} -- as do cognitive and moral judgements -- there is a constant temptation to assimilate the former to these categories\textsuperscript{49}; never achieving “pure” differentiation from the realm of cognitive and practical rationality, aesthetic judgements therefore perpetually find themselves in a contingent
process of becoming, as yet-to-be-created\textsuperscript{50}: the stuff of a cultural and spatial politics whose geographical expression I suggest is played out in the assymetrical and tension-filled relationship between state and non-state territorial forms of political and economic governance\textsuperscript{51}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical Basis for Citizenship Rights</th>
<th>Potential Actor Space</th>
<th>Qualitative Conditions of Social Bond</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) Liberal Universalism</td>
<td>EU, national public sphere</td>
<td>Formal demands of egalitarian, rational, “free standing” individualized self-interest (i.e., Rawlsian “veils of ignorance, Habermassian “solidarity” rooted in “ideal” speech acts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Hard/Soft Variants of Communitarianism</td>
<td>Nation, region, locality</td>
<td>Culture, history, shared traditions, “small stories” (Rorty), “ethics of care/obligation” (Benhabib), reciprocities of recognition/validation (Fraser)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Kantian “sensus communis”</td>
<td>“Cosmopolitical” public sphere; cross-border euregios; nation-state/region interaction as “parasitical” forum (Serres)</td>
<td>Aesthetic judgement grounded in an ethics implicit in affective social relations (Kant); towards a “radical democratic” cultural/spatial politics defined by a continual “slippage” in relating to “concrete” otherness (Mouffe); on need to get beyond “thin” layer of engagement of liberal universalism, while avoiding the trap of paternalistic toleration characteristic of “soft” communitarianism (Rocco).</td>
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Caught in the (Im)passe of Kantian Reason: the Predicament of Transfrontier Workers

Such a tension between discrepant scales of territorial governance is well illustrated by the dynamic of cross-border labour markets within the European Union. Aiming to devise a formula to avoid the double-taxation of cross-border workers subsequent to European economic integration, numerous Member States have established a régime derogatoire whereby cross-border labourers are mandated to pay income taxes only in the country in which they reside (even if the income is generated elsewhere), and are levied social security payments based on their country of employment. The juridical basis of fiscal duties and obligations in the cross-border territorial context is codified within bilateral legal frameworks involving Member States. Social security issues, on the other hand, are subject to European Union legislation. In principle, this latter system allows Member States to establish their own social security regimes under the condition that they apply non-discriminatory principles in their design and application at national levels. This is meant to ensure European-wide parity among employers in the payment of social security compensation, as well as for benefits accruing to workers circulating within the EU and those remaining within their national territories.

The regulation of cross-border taxation and social security within the European Union is thus predicated on a specific régime travailleurs frontalières, which in turn is based on a somewhat paradoxical legal “construction” of the transborder labourer. On the one hand, the definition of such a worker is partly shaped by the physical routines of time-geography, perceived as someone who lives within a border region and returns daily or at least once a week to her place of residence. But other elements of this regime are more subjective. The stipulation that cross-border workers pay taxes in their country of residence, for instance, is predicated on the assumption that as residents they are more rationally qualified to judge the uses to which those monies are dedicated than those residing elsewhere, justified by virtue of the location and nature of the collective goods consumed. In this, fiscal obligations and the rights flowing thereby are derived from a relatively strong communitarian
notion of citizenship rooted in a primary loyalty to the nation-state. In the case of social security, on
the other hand, a more “deterritorialized” notion of citizenship holds, derived from the rights of non-
discrimination and equality of circumstances pertaining to labourers working in disparate national
contexts. Such rights are rooted in a liberal universalist conception of the individual, whose primary
allegiance is to an abstraction: the European worker, from which no affective relation is required.

The transborder Euregion is the space where both principles of governance -- the one communitarian,
the other liberal-universalist -- collide. The consequences are more than theoretical, however, as they
result directly in the production of ongoing socio-economic inequality within the transborder regional
milieu. For instance, in the case where cross-border workers are required to increase their social
security payments in their place of employment, such a system will ultimately place them at a
disadvantage vis a vis their worker-colleagues; as the effects of the measure on the latter will be
“neutralized” by a corresponding reductions in their fiscal obligations, the former will be doubly
burdened as they will continue to be taxed at the rate applicable to their alternate country of residence.

Moreover, given the frequency of legal modifications made to national fiscal and social security
legislation on both sides of national borders, it is not uncommon for the net revenues of cross-border
labourers to be subjected to the instabilities characteristic of an annual “lottery”, whereby the balance
of fiscal and social security burdens can shift unpredictably from one year to the next55. The disparity
here between the “visionary” rhetoric of European integration and the structural constraints on cross-
border mobility is thus starkly etched.

Hence, a mustard seed of “discontent” festers within Europe’s cosmopolis-in-the-making. In this
light, and perhaps not merely metaphorically, cross-border labourers caught within this dynamic
literally shuttle back and forth across different “territories” of Kantian reason, defined by nationalist-
communitarian and liberal universalist claims to citizenship (modelled on the realms of cognitive and
practical reason, respectively). In crossing the borders of the euregio in search of work, they thus
embody the Enlightenment dream of reconciling the spaces of nature/necessity and freedom. The
predicament of ongoing socio-economic inequality produced by this spatial “fissure” within
Enlightenment reason can thus be interpreted as a sign of the unfulfilled and tension-laden nature of modernity’s promise. I suggest that it is largely because of this legacy of modernity, grounded in competing claims of citizenship underpinning disparate levels of territorial governance, that localized, cross-border institutional initiatives aimed at guiding development within the euregions are incapable of adequately addressing problems occurring within their territorial jurisdiction. As an empirical case study of such institutional “failure”, I turn to the experience of one of the longest-running experiments in cross-border governance in Europe, located within the tri-national and tri-lingual Euregio Maas-Rhein.

The Maas-Rhein “Stichting” and the Cosmopolitical Limits of Private-law Governance

Established as an informal “working group” of cross-border partner regions in 1976 at the instigation of Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, the Euregion Maas-Rhein constitutes one of the oldest institutionalised transborder euregios in the European Union. In 1991 the Euregion acquired the juridical status of a foundation under the terms of Dutch private-law, embodied in the Stichting Euregio Maas-Rhein. From this time on, the Stichting has served the development needs of a cross-border community of approximately 3.7 million inhabitants, encompassing the southern portion of the province of Dutch Limburg; the Province of Belgian Limburg; the Province of Liege; the German-speaking Community of Belgium; and the Aachen Regio (Figure 1 – see Appendix). The population under its jurisdiction, partaking of Dutch, Flemish, Walloon and German languages and cultures, is thus the most culturally and geographically complex of the Euregions lining the border of the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. Housed in the seat of government of the Dutch Province of Limburg in Maastricht, the Stichting is the principle institutional interlocutor between provincial, national and European actors in the selection, implementation and management of cross-border initiatives within the Euregion, ranging from the promotion of transborder economic cooperation, public transportation, environmental protection, technology transfer and tourism.
Organizationally, the Stichting is comprised of an Executive Committee, which acts as its primary decision-making body, and is assisted by consultative organ, the Euregional Council (Figure 2 – see Appendix). Established in January, 1995, the Council represents one of the few instances of transborder parliamentarianism within the European Union; its 118 members, rather than elected by popular suffrage, are nominated by the different political, economic and social actors found within each partner region, which include established political parties, chambers of commerce, labor unions, and universities (Figure 3 [in Appendix] reveals the breakdown of Euregional Council members by partner region and political party). The Stichting is further made up of a central bureau entrusted with managing public relations on behalf of the Euregion, as well as co-ordinating various working commissions and steering groups engaged in the direct management of INTERREG structural fund budgets and projects. Within INTERREG, a Commission of Experts (Stuurgroep) provides aid in co-ordinating Euregional projects with other institutional actors, including universities, municipalities, labor unions, employment agencies and chambers of commerce. The Stichting’s commissions and steering groups, composed of experts from all five partner regions, are grouped according to four broad themes: Structural Policy-making, Socio-economic Activities, Socio-cultural Activities, and Social Issues. The annual program of INTERREG-funded projects within Maas-Rhein is broken down further into two general thematic axes, defined by socio-economic and socio-cultural criteria. The funding of individual projects is subject to various co-financing arrangements involving the European Regional Development Fund (FEDER), the Maas-Rhein Stichting and public and private-sector actors situated within the immediate cross-border environment. For any given project, the Stichting commits itself to half the financing, the remainder being paid either wholly by the partner region or via a burden sharing scheme involving provincial governments and local economic agents.

Despite an elaborate organisational structure geared to channelling INTERREG structural funds into the Maas-Rhein Euregion, the experience of the Stichting and its partners in stimulating cross-border development has met with mixed success over the course of the 1990s. Perhaps reflecting the low level of R&D within the Euregion as a whole, attempts at technology transfer within Maas-Rhein have met with ambiguous results. In the Aachen subarea the Aachener Gesellschaft fur Innovation und
Technologietransfer (AGIT) is a strong regional body responsible for promoting business start-ups and spin-offs, regional technology transfer, as well as the marketing of the Aachen region\textsuperscript{60}. In South Limburg two nationally designated organisations, the Innovation Centre and the Industriebank LIOF, also engaged in technology transfer and consultancy. In Belgian Limburg the Gewestelijke Ontwikkelings Maatschappij (GOM) is the main regional development body, focusing on attracting inward investment. The regional development organisation in Liege, the Societe Provinciale d’Industrialisation (SPI) concentrates fully on real estate management offering inward investors suitable site locations. And the technology transfer agency at the University of Liege, INTERFACE, is considered the main technology transfer unit in this subarea. But during the past decade cross-border technology transfer and networking between these bodies have proven to be difficult and slow, reflecting an uneasy mixture of competition and co-operation marking their alliance.

Similarly, although the variety of public research universities in the Euregion is large, cross-border technology transfer among them is observed to have occurred at a generally modest scale\textsuperscript{61}. Despite the establishment of a Euregional Transfer Agency (ETRA) to co-ordinate technology transfer from universities to firms within the Euregion, advanced research facilities located in the environs of Aachen – including the largest technical university in Europe, Technical University RWTH, the Polytechnic Aachen, the Federal Research Center Julich and the Fraunhofer Institutes for Laser Technology and Production Technology – are generally neglected by economic actors in South Limburg and Belgian Limburg\textsuperscript{62}. Moreover, although cross-border unions and professional associations for the machine-building trades were forged in Maas-Rhein during the 1980s and 1990s (such as the Technologie-Arbeitskreis der Euregio, the MHAL-Initiative, or the Ingenieurvereinigung Dreilander-Ingenieurkontakt [DIK]), technology transfer has been particularly weak flowing from the German into the Dutch and Belgian sub areas of the Euregion\textsuperscript{63}.

The whole Maas-Rhein Euregion now stands at an economic crossroads, grappling with problems of industrial conversion in its mining sector and searching for an appropriate developmental pathway drawing from new technologies and cross-border synergies at a time when traditional forms of
regional policymaking rooted in Fordist labor-state compromises supporting coal production and the attraction of inward investment are being supplanted by initiatives supporting the endogenous development of small- to medium-sized firms. Yet despite similar traditional production structures throughout the Euregion, attempts to co-ordinate economic reconversion efforts across the Dutch, German and Belgian subareas have remained negligible. In the Dutch subarea, industrial conversion has largely been completed by transforming state mines into a large chemical concern; Aachen has engineered its conversion on the presence of the largest European technical university in that city, which has lead to the establishment of hundreds of small engineering and consultancy firms; and over the past decade manufacturing in the Belgian parts of the Euregion has largely been supplanted by service industries. For some observers, the economic performance of these sectors in Dutch and Belgian Limburg illustrates a positive, ongoing “peripheralization” of Flemish industry.

Nevertheless, others cannot avoid the overall conclusion that each part of the Euregion has followed different restructuring policies devised at national government levels, with a national orientation to prevailing knowledge networks.

The relatively limited success of the Stichting in achieving cross-border socio-economic integration is related to the fact that its mandate is restricted to a purely consultative role vis-à-vis member states and the EU. This limitation is further reflected in that the Stichting is legally proscribed from intervening in matters related to spatial planning and the regulation of local labor markets. As expressed in a recent Euregional policy document, this condition has rendered “problematic” the approval of projects involving large financial sums within the Euregion, a matter which can only be resolved through the “transfer of [economic] means between [corresponding territorial] domains of action… [a matter which] would not be possible without the assent of DG XVI.” This “caveat” to subsidiarity has significantly shaped the profile of INTERREG initiatives sponsored during the latter half of the 1990s; within the first phase of INTERREG implementation (1996-1999), a larger amount was spent on socio-cultural than on socio-economic initiatives. “The socio-cultural (realm) was not expensive”, this author was told by an INTERREG manager for the Belgian province of Liege. “And besides, culture was at least within the competence of the provincial governments.” In the ensuing years,
socio-cultural initiatives of the Stichting have included the support of transborder music festivals, dance and theatre. Since January, 1997, the Stichting has also successfully nurtured a transborder regional press agency, entitled Euregio Media, comprised of public broadcasting operators within each partner region: WDR Studio Aachen, BRF Eupen, RTBF Liege, BRTN Radio 2 Hasselt, and Omroep Limburg.

On the socio-economic front, given the Stichting’s limited competencies, intervention has been restricted largely to an information gathering and dissemination mode. Within the realm of economic innovation and technology transfer, for instance, the actions of the Stichting have been confined to the publication of materials aimed at fomenting contact between professional communities within the five partner regions, taking inventory of existing regional technological capacity, organizing annual exchange programs, and conducting site visits to cross-border regions within the EU of comparable technological scale. In this spirit of improved cross-border regional “transparency”, the Maas-Rhein Stichting was chosen by the European Union in 1992 to host a pioneering information dissemination program targeting its cross-border working population (EURES). Convening employers, an interregional labor council and various regional employment agencies, including political representatives at the provincial and EC level, the Stichting-operated steering committee responsible for EURES attempts to provide the Maas-Rhein’s cross-border labor force the same information available to public and private-sector firms, with the ultimate aim of improving cross-border mobility. Within the framework of a bi- and multi-lateral cooperation program promoted “on the ground” by a working staff of self-designated “Euro-counsellors”, EURES seeks to improve communication and dialogue between those bodies concerned with the provision of employment within the partner regions, as well as offering the cross-border labor community information relating to employment supply and demand, changing labor market conditions and variable quality of life issues.

In June, 1996 the various organizations informally overseeing issues of cross-border labor mobility within the euregio were gathered into a consultative “round table”, thus expanding the potential scope
for civil society participation in the coordination of cross-border labor market services beyond that provided by EURES. By opening a channel of communication with European parliamentarians, this “round table” attempted to increase the political leverage of local transborder actors vis-à-vis Member States. With the support of such a platform, a grouping of mayors from the five Maas-Rhein partner regions has promoted a political agenda seeking aid from their respective national governments specifically addressing the unresolved predicament of cross-border workers. But as it involves only European and regional scales of territorial governance, EURES, despite all its goodwill, is incapable of influencing national labor market regulations affecting its partner regions. The Achilles Heel of the Euregion is that fiscal and social security issues remain a matter for policy-making at the Member State level. For one top INTERREG administrator based in Maastricht, this means basically that Stichting “can only give signals.” Essentially, the [Euregional] Commission has “no decision-making powers of its own, it has geen been om op de staan.”

In an effort to address such weaknesses, the Stichting has embarked on an ambitious restructuring plan, a core element of which is defined by the transformation of the foundation’s legal framework from private to public-law statute. This is meant to produce a “harmonization” of territorial competencies by increasing the power of local actors within the Stichting’s Executive Committee, and by more clearly “delineating the relationship between the foundation and the Euregional Council.” Under this framework, the structure of the Euregional Council is to be transformed into a bicameral consultative assembly, the one made up of political representatives, the other comprised of non-governmental groups. Four new commissions directly responsible to the Executive Committee and the Council are to be created to replace previous commissions and steering groups, the former composed of representatives of both the Council and functionaries from the partner regions. Moreover, the Executive Committee of the Stichting is newly empowered to create temporary ad hoc working groups as the need arises. Taken as a whole, these changes are made to produce greater decision-making flexibility within the Stichting and improve its democratic accountability with the cross-border community at-large. According to one leading INTERREG manager, the increased presence of local social actors within the top decision-making echelons of the Stichting are necessary because in the
previous arrangement “politicians didn’t work well together with civil society… [there was] little trust of civil actors”82.

But in determining the system of representation of political and civil society actors within the newly created Council, or Euregioraad, national prerogatives seem once again to have trumped the needs of local social actors. An initial scheme to share the representation of political and civil society equally had to be abandoned, as “politicians wanted a greater voice in guiding INTERREG projects” and “Christian and Social Democrats wanted an equal number of seats”83. Since all the political parties within the Euregion could not be accommodated within the Euregioraat under the original framework, the initial system of representation has had to be shifted to one which is 70 percent political, with the remainder of seats for the entire Euregion allotted to civil society actors. Unsurprisingly, as a result of this such actors have felt “a bit used, misused”84.

**Traversing the Kantian “Kluft”? Preliminary Notes Towards Cosmopolitical Governance in the Euregios**

Despite gestures of internal organisational restructuring, it appears that in the near future the dynamic of the Stichting will continue to be disproportionately influenced by agents drawing their political legitimacy from national and EU scales of territorial governance, to the detriment of local cross-border civil society actors. In straining for greater democratic legitimacy and “transparency”, the tensions that riven the Kantian field of theoretical and practical reason -- the moral-cognitive domain and the realm of nature-necessity -- are resolved in favor of the former at the expense of a language of rights applicable within a truly transnational, cross-border context. This “inability” to cross the Kantian divide of practical reason does not augur well in addressing issue areas which transcend the nation-state framework, as revealed by the contradictions inherent in the existing cross-border labor market of the euregio. The question is thus posed: what preconditions would be needed to achieve a type of territorial governance more attuned to the needs of transnational interest groups directly affected by cross-border initiatives85? What forms of rationality should be called on to guide its underlying
action-frameworks? If there is an ethico-political dimension to this form of rationality, how should it be conceptualized analytically?

I suggest that a critical reworking of Kant’s “sensus communis” may point to the type of renewed geographical imagination required to achieve the cosmopolitical promise, the “perpetual peace” of Europe’s contemporary transborder euregios. This cross-border sensus, which I believe may draw fruitfully from the language of post-realist international relations theory in a “register of freedom” 86 , may be conceptualized neither from the standpoint of a morally transcendent universal – Kant’s realm of cognitive reason, circumscribed by the nation-state -- nor from an a-moral realism which – reflecting the Kantian domain of nature governing inter-state relations – is subject to the practical reason of Hobbesian necessity. Rather, I suggest it derives from a space which accepts a dynamic and unresolvable tension between both forms of rationality as they “unfurl” within the evolving geographical trajectories of discrepant cross-border settings. It is the peculiar and persistent “gap” between either form of reason, and the “dissatisfaction” produced by such a discrepancy, that forms the context and provides the key to understanding the historical specificity of the particular cultural politics encountered within each transborder milieu 87 .

What is such a politics made of? How is it to be examined empirically? How are its spaces inhabited and who are its primary agents? In the case of the Maas-Rhein euregio I suggest they are partly located within the “theatre” of the Stichting and its Euregional satellites, and is defined by that “unease” which leads its members to call for an internal restructuring in order to become more accountable to its “citizens”. It is also embodied in the rationalities of actors located outside the fortress-like building of the Stichting 88 , in that “surplus” of energy which is the street, the shopping district, the café, the realm of disinterested Nachbarschaft. It is the “silent” bond suspended between the two. It thus has a particular relation to “expert knowledge” in that it operates within the horizon of legislative reason, but also escapes it and “walks freely” in the planned space of the city 89 . It is not so much a form of “resistance” as a negotiated space of surprise, as movement situated off-stage from orchestrated tri-cultural gatherings. It thus finds the space of national sovereignty “useful” the better
to measure its distance, requiring it like the parasite its host. It partakes of the Stichting’s language of “accountability” and “transparency”, infusing efforts to create a transborder information service for cross-border workers, attempting to instil in the euregio’s inhabitants a sense of shared border identity, but it also happens without fanfare or prompting, working outside the eddies of this discourse with the “naturalness” evoked by a woman observed by the author at the central train station in Liege who, when aided by others helping her son descend, offers her thanks in Dutch (“bedankt, meneer”), then French (“merci, merci bien”), in low, muffled tones. So, dissatisfied with the closed self-referentiality of its “partner-region” identities, the Kantian sensus implicitly offers a call and response to territories “beyond” Europe, quietly drawing attention to them, without fuss.

Finally, against the grain of post-modern accounts of international relations studies calling for a type of theorizing without location, from a void or no-place, the Kantian sensus also embraces the “foreign” social scientist-ethnographer traversing the space of the transborder euregio, smelling the differences, eyeing the similarities and the discrepancies from the train window, in the throng of foot traffic (Kant’s invitation to “think [oneself] into the place of others…when communicating with them”). It is a sensibility thus partly rooted in spaces of affect: in taste and sense and touch, working with but also moving beyond the a priori legislative categories of electoral judgement and “objective” scientific detachment. Cosmopolitical freedom thereby navigates between the islands of Kantian reason somewhat like a stowaway aboard a ship, in the sense of being “hidden”. It seeks neither transcendental universals nor the complacency of realist cynicism; it survives on the tension between these antinomies of spatialized reason, abiding on their border, like Hermes, the ancient, “unprotected” and melancholy God of mobility.

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FIGURE 1: MAP OF MAAS-RHEIN EUREGIO

ADMINISTRATIEVE INDELING - ADMINISTRATIVE GLIEDERUNG - DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE
FIGURE 2
MAAS RHEIN STICHTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
FIGURE 3
MAAS-RHEIN EUREGIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS, BY POLITICAL PARTY AND PARTNER REGION
NOTES


4 INTERREG I was established to cover the 1990-1993 period; INTERREG IIc extended this initial phase from 1994 to 1999. On April 28, 2000, guidelines for INTERREG III were approved for the period covering 2000-2006.


8 Nadin and Shaw (note 5).


12 Krebs and van Geffen (note 3).


17 INTERREG is thus perceived as more attuned to local needs when supporting a pre-existing pattern of transborder cooperation and more prone to technocratic, nationally-driven development agendas when grafted onto a cross-border policy vacuum (see Perkmann, note 15 p. 662).

18 Perkmann (note 15) p.662.

19 Scott (note 7) p.613.

20 Scott (note 7) p.663.

21 van Houtum (note 16).

22 Scott (note 7) p.610.

23 I am not arguing here that such social constructivist accounts are necessarily untrue, only that, by remaining in a largely descriptive expository narrative mode, they implicitly replicate a static and Hobbesian view of socio-spatial relations characteristic of “realist” theories of international relations [A. Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (London: LSE and Political Science 1982)]. As social-scientists I suggest we must remain aware of the reciprocal nature of thought in relation to practice “on the ground”, and therefore struggle with normative language capable of revealing possible “futures” to the historical unfolding of political community inhabiting the various transborder regions of the EU [J.J. Linz and A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press 1996)].


25 Translated from the French by author.


35 Held (note 28).


37 Nussbaum (note 29).

38 In a footnote to the Preface of his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1974), Kant explicitly highlights the role of his home city-state in facilitating that “knowledge of the world” capable of extending the range of anthropology as a disciplinary science:

“A city such as Konigsberg on the River Pregel – a large city, the center of a state, the seat of the government’s provincial councils, the site of a university (for cultivation of the sciences), a seaport connected by rivers with the interior of the country, so that its location favors traffic with the rest of the country as well as with neighboring or remote countries having different languages and customs – is a suitable place for broadening one’s knowledge of man and of the world. In such a city, this knowledge can be acquired even without travelling.” (p.4, footnote)

Granted, the decidedly “imperial” ambitions to which this knowledge was subsequently put to use are not to be whitewashed on the basis of this citation [on this, see S.L. Malcomson’s cautionary insights, ‘The Varieties of Cosmopolitan Experience’, in P. Cheah and B. Robbins (eds.), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press 1998) p. 237]. Restricted to Konigsberg, however, Kant is admittedly recuperated here as a “provincial” European philosopher [D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2000)]. But within the broader context of my cosmopolitical argument, such a “regionalization” of European philosophy hides more than it reveals, as it points to the production of certain early-Enlightenment urban milieux acting as the seedbeds of discrepant, non-universalist, cosmopolitical action-frameworks. An appropriate precedent, I suggest, for approaching incipient 21st century transborder euregios [for a recent endorsement of this idea, see D. Harvey, ‘Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils’, Public Culture, 12/3 (2000)].
In the “Preface” to the first edition of the Critique of judgement, Kant refers to a critique which “sifts these faculties one and all, so as to try the possible claims of each of the other faculties to share in the clear possession of knowledge from roots of its own” [cited in A. Cascardi, Consequences of Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999) p.3]. It would be the later task of the Romantic tradition to reinscribe value with fact and thereby to endow a disenchanted empirical world with the powers of self-animating spirit” (ibid: 15).

Cascardi (note 39).

This formulation goes beyond the post-structuralist critique of universals by reconstructing the very notion of universal validity as it relates to subjectively grounded claims, highlighting the role of the passions in shaping human purposiveness vis a vis the contingency of the world. Here, the Kantian principle of reflective aesthetic judgement models a form of reason that doesn’t proceed according to concepts, but rather begins from a process of reflection on those relations that resist, escape or are lost to conceptual thought, including the so-called “primary” experiences of pleasure and pain [Cascardi (note 39) pp.16-17, 55]. In this context, “reflective” judgement differs from “determinant” judgements in that whereas the latter subsumes particulars to pre-given, universal laws, in the former only particulars are given. A universal term found to govern such “free particulars” is located in the talent for “selecting what is exactly right in a certain case (judicium discretivum) [Kant (note 38) p. 96].

Cascardi (note 39) p.56.

Alternative translations have referred to this attitude as thinking “from the standpoint of everyone else” [cited in Cascardi (note 39), p. 34], but I suggest this is an a-spatial, Archimedean perspective that is ethically as well as analytically untenable. Rather, emphasis is placed here on the mutually transformative experience of cosmopolitical thinking, as the principle of “enlarged mentality” is for Kant an analogue for the subject’s thinking autonomously and consistently (ibid). As with Hume and Rousseau, Kant’s enlarged mentality requires a mutuality of affect, a “thinking with” which is every bit as much as a “feeling with” [Cascardi (note 39) p.36].

Critically, such a disposition is invoked not in abstract rumination about others, but “when communicating with them” [Kant (note 38) p.72]. The inherently inter-subjective and spatially contextual nature of cosmopolitical judgment is thereby underscored [E. Isin and P. Wood, Citizenship and Identity (London: SAGE 1999)].


Cascardi (note 39) p.70.

ibid: 64.

Straddling the border of theoretical and practical realms, aesthetic reflective judgement thus constitutes a middle articulation (Mittelglied) specific to neither. Focusing on this Kantian “gulf” and its corresponding indeterminacies, Derrida describes aesthetic judgement in terms of the impossible mediation of theoretical and practical domains:

“Since the Mittleglied also forms the articulation of the theoretical and the practical… we are plunging into a place that is neither theoretical nor practical or else both theoretical and practical. Art (in general), or rather the beautiful, if it takes place, is inscribed here. But this here, this place is announced as a place deprived of place. It runs the risk, in taking place, of not having its own proper domain… The Mittleglied, intermediary member, must in effect be treated as a separable part, a particular part (als ein besonderer Theil). But also as a nonparticular, nondetachable part, since it forms the articulation between two others; one can even say, anticipating Hegel, an originary part (Ur-teil).”
Pursuing the border metaphor further, the indeterminacy of aesthetic judgement in Kant can be associated with the larger project of boundary distinction which governs his entire critical oeuvre (ibid: 72).

The “fissure” or “gap” between the realm of moral freedom and the causality of nature, which aesthetic reflective judgement is called upon to bridge, implies a “legislative, judicial fiction” based on the idea that the faculties of cognition delimit “territories” and “realms” over which they exercise governance [Cascardi (note 39) p. 76]. The realm of the “ungrounded” aesthetic, contrary to Adorno and Horkheimer’s deep wartime pessimism, is thus recuperated as a potentially key site of emancipation: the space of a radical and truly transnational democratic politics [T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Seabury Press 1972); E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso 1985); J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizek, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universalism: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left* (London: Verso 2000)]. Despite his anguished claim that “the nation-state today remains the only concrete terrain and framework for political struggle”, the former position has also recently been conceded by F. Jameson, ‘Globalization and Political Strategy’, *New Left Review* 4 (2000) p. 65. But framed as the product of an evolving cultural and spatial politics requiring sustained, purposive human agency, the emergent post-Westphalian trans-national civic order is not quite so “immanent” as some authors would have it [Linklater (note 32) p.120].


During the 1980s and 1990s such cross-border regimes have been established between Belgium and the Netherlands, Germany and France, Spain and France/Portugal, as well as Germany and its French/Swiss neighbors [M.J.G.A.M. Weerepas and A.H.M. Daniels, *Travailleurs Frontaliers, les Pionniers du Marche Unique: Une Enquete sur la Problematique des Travailleurs Frontaliers entre la Belgique et les Pays-Bas* (Eupen: IVR Maas-Rijn 1997) p. 31].

Specifically, enshrined in Reglement No. 1408/71 du 14 juin, 1971, Relatif a l’Application du Regime de Securite Sociale aux Travailleurs et Independants Ainsi qu’aux Membres de Leur Famille se Deplacant dans la Communauta” [see Weerepas and Daniels (note 52) p. 34].
In the case of INTERREG-funded projects selected within the Province of Belgian Limburg, for instance, the share of co-financing is shared equally between FEDER and the provincial council. According to one INTERREG manager for the province, such an arrangement makes it easier to find partners within Belgian Limburg, especially from the private-sector, whose initial level of exposure is thereby limited [D. Plees, Bestuurssecretaris, Provincie Limburg. Personal communication. Hasselt, July 26 (2000)]. Such co-financing arrangements differ from one partner region to another. So, for this Belgian civil servant, German private-sector actors (“comically”) still want to participate in INTERREG despite the fact that they must on average pay 20 percent of matching funds for any given project.

For example, as regards the socio-economic budget for the entire Maas-Rhein Euregion during this period, each of the partner regions provided 50,000 florins (250,000 total); within the realm of the socio-cultural, each partner region provided 62,500 florins (312,000 total) (http://www.euregio-mr.org/F/F3/F34/F341.htm, 2000: 1).

The Conseil Syndical Interregionaux (CSI) Meuse-Rhin, inspired by the example of the European Confederation of Labor Unions founded in 1973, represents the seven unions of the partner regions: the Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond (ABVV), the Flemish Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond (ACV), the Federation Generale du Travail de Belgique (FGTB), the Walloon Confederation des Syndicats Chretiens (CSC), the Dutch FNV (Federatie Nederlands Vakbeweging) and CNV (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond), and the German...


77 Organizations represented on the central bureau of the “round table’s” include the Euro-Info-Center of the IHK; transborder consumer advisory services; health insurance companies, associations of judges, notaries and attorneys; the immigration advisory bureau of SKSM/Caritas; VdK, the labor organizations DGB and CSI; the transborder community of Euro-counsellors; and private associations of cross-border workers (Stichting Euregio Maas-Rhein, 1996: 72).

78 Stichting Maas-Rhein (note 76) p.74.


80 English translation: “no leg of its own to stand on”.

81 Stichting Maas-Rhein (note 76).

82 Evers (note 79). This statement is qualified by the assertion that the previous structure of the Stichting represented “an important exercise”, in that through a system of “compulsory seating” politicians from the Social and Christian Democrats got to “know each other face to face” [Evers (note 79)]. This “geography of table manners” is important in another context, for it is at the lunches hosted for the gouverneurs of the Stichting’s Executive Committee “where usually projects are born”. For this reason, it is vital that such a gathering have a “relaxed atmosphere”, a “simple broodje (sandwich) lunch will not do” (ibid).

83 Evers (note 79).

84 Ibid.

85 Bellamy and Castiglione (note 46).

86 R.K. Ashley and R.J.B. Walker, ‘Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies’, International Studies Quarterly 34 (1990) pp. 367-416. Criticizing the epistemological standpoints of both realist and idealist perspectives in international relations theory, Ashley and Walker contrast “theorizing in the register of desire” -- meant as a form of “territorializing” theory which seeks to affirm the boundaries of cognitive and moral thought – with “theorizing in the register of freedom”, defined as a “celebratory register in which such boundaries are called into question rather than established”. Exemplifying a form of “de-territorialized” thinking which I suggest may be applicable to our reflection on the Stichting, they go on to write that for such a theorist:

“… the practical site is one where paradoxes of space, time, and identity disturb and undo any attempt to live and act according to some semblance of sovereign territorial being. For this person, who must make her life but cannot make of it a triumph of religious desire, the problem might be posed thus: How might one proceed in a register of freedom to explore and test institutional limitations, in a way that sustains and expands the cultural spaces and resources enabling one to conduct one’s labors of self-making in just this register of freedom, further exploring and testing limitations?” (p.391)

87 Framed in this way, I purposely avoid the strategy of setting up a normative endpoint for the Euregios from which deviations can be “mapped”. Rather, the focus here is to show how in each instance cosmopolitical “freedom” is defined by an open-ended process that achieves its dignity in the very attempt at reaching
transcendent universals, as elusive as this may be [Butler et al (note 50)]. In the end, it is perhaps this form of cosmopolitanism – grounded in a keen awareness of both the necessity and impossibility of genuine cross-border political community – which drives the Kantian cosmopolitan project in the borderlands [Malcomson (note 38)].

88 In reflecting on the Stichting’s architectural form, the author is reminded by a comment from one INTERREG manager: “This building is very easy to defend, there are only two access points. For this reason it often plays host to top-level meetings, such as NATO summits” [Evers (note 79)].


90 Serres (note 1). “Who is master here? Who servant?” Following Michel Serres who, in *Le parasite* (1980), suggests through the metaphor of “good table manners” how Rousseau is able to win daily bread from his patron with words, thus overturning the master-slave dialectic and establishing a new moral “technique” of inter-societal relations, I propose an alternative to the *gouverneur’s* lunch table reunions and their implicit exclusionary hierarchies. The question is thus posed: who, as Nietzsche forwarned, is to be the “uninvited guest” at the Euregional *gouverneur’s* luncheon?

