TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION AND

MULTICULTURALISM IN EUROPE

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**Introduction**

This paper(1) which discusses the relationship between cultural diversity in Europe, and that international movement described as “transnational” (“transmigration”), seeks to place the themes of the Workshop in a more general historical and European-wide context. Though not as new or as homogeneous as some have proposed, transmigration will grow in importance in the 21st century. Groups or individuals may return to places of origin or “assimilate” into receiving societies, but without resort to unacceptable levels of control of the movement of people, goods and ideas, transmigration will be a prominent *structural* feature of European societies for the foreseeable future: do we really wish to monitor every exchange between receiving and sending societies? In any case, modern systems of communication (e.g. the Internet), and the cheapness and rapidity of mass international travel make such surveillance difficult, even impossible in a transnational, globalised world.

Transmigration and cultural diversity are related dialectically. Ethnic and cultural pluralism in Europe (including philosophies of integration and institutional mechanisms for implementing policies of what is usually called multiculturalism) shape, and are shaped by, transmigration in its various guises; transmigration shapes and is shaped by the institutional structuring of cultural diversity in European receiving societies and transmigrants experience of it. In investigating this relationship, I identify various transmigration “scenarios” (Fig. 1), and begin to explore their implications for cultural policies and regimes of rights and obligations (Castles and Davidson 2000).

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(1) This is a revised version of a paper originally presented to a “Symposium on Cultural Diversity and the Construction of Europe: Complementarity or Incompatibility?”, organised by Fundació Jaume Bofill and the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya in December 2000 in Barcelona, and subsequently (in slightly different form) to a workshop on “Migrazioni transnazionali, globalizzazione e cittadinanza: cucire legami tra le due sponde del Mediterraneo”, at Bologna and Forlì March, 2001, sponsored by Gruppo Volontariato Civile (GVC) - Bologna, Comune di Forlì, and Dipartimento di Politica-Istituzioni e Storia, Università di Bologna and organised by Dr. Ruba Salih. I must thank fellow participants, including in Barcelona the *Relator* Prof. Joan-F Miro, and the *Moderador* Adela Ros, for their many comments, and the organisers and sponsors for their very generous hospitality.
**Fig. 1. Transmigrant and Multiculturalism: Alternative Scenarios**

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<th>Transnational linkages</th>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Assimilation</td>
<td>Here and the same</td>
<td>Putting down roots in the society of reception, orienting oneself primarily towards it. Acculturation. British etc “with funny names.”</td>
<td>Become more tenuous or symbolic, except where the existence/survival of a homeland is at stake.</td>
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<td>(b) Integration</td>
<td>Here but different</td>
<td>“Weak” multiculturalism Cultural diversity recognised and accepted in private sphere. High degree of assimilation to local population in employment, housing, education and health/welfare systems (or markets), and acculturation in many areas of life.</td>
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<td>(c) Enclavement</td>
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<td>“Strong” multiculturalism. Demands for the institutional recognition and acceptance of cultural difference recognised and institutionally in public sphere; special provision in education, health care and welfare etc. Organisation of representation on ethnic/cultural lines.</td>
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<td>(a) Permanent transmigration</td>
<td>Neither here nor there</td>
<td>Circular migration (in long term by generation): ‘a transnational semiproletariat, caught chronically astride borders’ (Rouse 1992.)</td>
<td>Oriented ultimately to country of origin, but always on the move, utilising transnational ties and engaging in transnational activities so far as resources allow</td>
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<td>(b) Stable dual orientation</td>
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“Culture” and “Cultural diversity”

All European societies are ethnically and culturally plural. Historically, the most significant source of cultural (not necessarily synonymous with ethnic) diversity in European nation-states has been regional, often a result of conjoining economically, socially, culturally, linguistically - and indeed ethnically - disparate places into single polities, and (certainly in Northern and Western Europe) engaging them in what the French call nationalisation. One model of the contemporary construction of Europe, at any rate a European Union, perhaps seeks to replicate that process at a supra-national level. For c. 150 years, however, and increasingly since World War II, another source of difference has been the large-scale movement of populations across what became national boundaries, seeking work and/or refuge. Just as nation-states originally sought to nationalise their regions, so too they attempted to assimilate (or reject) immigrants and refugees.

There is much to be said for distinguishing between these two sources of difference (cf. Kymlicka’s contrast, 1995: 10-11, between “multination” and “polyethnic” states), though many European countries experience both, and peoples such as Jews, Roma and African Americans in the USA do not readily fit with either. The two are not, of course, separate. Their interconnection needs to be understood., and there is also much to be learned about one from the other. For example, what recent migration studies have told us about the nature of culture in a transnational world has great relevance for views of culture(s) traditionally found in discussions of ethno-regionalism. This paper concentrates on the second which has been of great import in Northern Europe since at least the 1960s, and is now of increasing significance throughout the continent.

Favell has argued (1999) that European states are not “nations of immigrants” like the USA, Canada or Australia, where “indigenous” populations are minute and dwarfed (where not exterminated) by voluntary or forced migrants from elsewhere. Nonetheless, in France, Germany and the UK there are several million persons, 5%-10% of the population, who are first, second and even third generation migrants and refugees. In other countries with long-standing immigrant populations (e.g. Belgium, Holland, Sweden), numbers are smaller, but proportionately no less. In these, and in places which previously thought of themselves as countries of emigration (e.g. Italy, Greece, Spain), new or continuing inflows of migrants and refugees, population growth among existing (settled) immigrants, plus intermarriage
(increasingly important in the UK and elsewhere), has heightened ethnic and cultural diversity, most markedly in the residential quarters and employment sectors of the major cities, where for economic and other reasons these populations tend to be concentrated. Migrants, moreover, have an important, indeed iconic status in Europe because from Portugal to Norway, from the UK to Austria their presence has been politicised, and is increasingly prominent on political agendas across the spectrum. Even if not a continent of immigrants, like the Americas, Europe is a place in which immigrants and their descendants play an important economic, social, cultural and political role.

The discussion of “cultural diversity” in this context encounters a number of complications, indeed the very notion has to be seen as trebly problematic. First, the emphasis on national integration (e.g. ‘turning peasants into Frenchmen’, Weber 1976), means that historically contemporary nation states have had, and continue to have, great difficulties with difference. In much of Europe, as Blommaert and Verschueren point out in their account of the diversity debate in Belgium, ‘an homogeneous community is regarded as the norm, and diversity is only acceptable to the extent that it does not touch social harmony as viewed by the majority’ (1998: 81). Though (see below), there has across Europe in recent years been a shift towards greater acceptance of the legitimacy of regional and ethnic (immigrant) minority difference - under certain conditions - for many people cultural, ethnic, and “racial” otherness continue to be a threat and a challenge, and multiculturalism, where it exists, a constant site of struggle.

Let me interject a brief comment on religion. Historically religion would have been a very important (some would have said the most important) source of diversity in a Europe divided into a Catholic South, a Protestant North, and an Orthodox East, with a Jewish (and now Muslim) Europe scattered throughout but generally concentrated in the major cities. (This “map” is a caricature, but let that pass.) In the past, of course, such differences were of enormous importance, and still are in certain places (e.g. Ulster). In most European societies religion and state are now firmly separated. Constitutionally this is not true of the UK, but by and large we live in a secular Europe in which religion, if it has a place at all, is firmly in the private domain. Yet religion cannot be kept entirely out of the picture of cultural diversity. Even though religious practice continues its decline in most of Europe, for some people religion remains a very strong source of culture, and religious leaders continue to exercise a powerful influence: consider, for example, the pronouncements of Biffi, Cardinal Archbishop of Bologna, who in September 2000 called for the closure of mosques, and for the Italian
government to admit only Catholic immigrants. Moreover, religion appears to be reclaiming public space (e.g. in the USA), and cannot yet be written out of the European equation. Finally, even if religious practice is in permanent decline, and the power and influence of religious leaders on the wane (e.g. the position of the Catholic Church in the Republic of Ireland), the way in which religion has shaped cultural perceptions over a very long period needs detailed consideration. There may still be a protestant and a catholic Europe (lower case “p” and “c”), even if Protestantism and Catholicism are not the forces they once were.

The reference to religion, especially to Islam, leads us to the second problem: the relationship between perceived cultural difference and xenophobia (e.g. “Islamophobia”). In the 1980s there was much discussion in academic circles in Britain and France of a “new racism.” Since it was no longer possible openly to employ classic forms of racial discrimination and abuse, the language of cultural difference became a coded way of speaking about “race”, a disguised form of “real” racism (for discussion and references see inter alia Stolcke 1995, Grillo 1998a) Undoubtedly this is sometimes the case, but I agree with Stolcke (1995) that cultural hostility is also something sui generis. Stolcke identifies the rise of a ‘rhetoric of exclusion and inclusion that emphasises the distinctiveness of cultural identity, traditions, and heritage among groups and assumes the closure of culture by territory’ (p. 2.) This discourse of “cultural fundamentalism”, as she calls it (cf. Amselle 1998), ‘rather than asserting different endowments of human races’ (p. 4), emphasises the incommensurability of cultures and assumes that relations between them are ‘by “nature” hostile’ (p. 6.) Though ‘hostility against extracomunitarian immigrants may have racist overtones, and metaphors can certainly be mixed’ (p. 8), the ‘contemporary rhetoric of exclusion’, she continues, ‘thematizes … relations between cultures by reifying cultural boundaries and difference’ (p. 12.) This view is also associated with an essentialism (see below and Grillo 1998a) in which individual and collective identity is rooted in culture, and readily leads to what I call “cultural conservationism”, a mode of thinking (present in many forms of multiculturalism) in which cultures are conceived as static, bounded entities whose authenticity must be preserved (or invented), and protected, like rare species.

In commenting on Stolcke’s paper, Terence Turner rightly observes that cultural fundamentalism is not confined to right-wing xenophobes: ‘an often equally fundamentalist multiculturalism is becoming the preferred idiom in which minority ethnic and racial groups are asserting their right to a full and equal role in the same societies’ (in Stolcke 1995: 17).
This leads to a third point. Both majorities and minorities frequently express anxiety about cultural change and cultural power. We see this historically in the opposition by regional minority intellectuals influenced by Romanticism (e.g. Mistral’s Félibrige, with its dream of a resurrected Latin culture and society) who rallied to Herder’s call: “National cultures, where are you?”, in contemporary concerns (e.g. in the UK) about the influence of Europe and/or the United States and/or the arrival of immigrants with different cultural traditions, as well as among migrants worried about their children’s loss of the religious and cultural values they brought with them. Underlying such anxiety is a static view of culture and society in which the principal communities (which define peoples and their identities) are “ethnic” (and territorial), and ethnic communities have attached to them “cultures” which are under threat from other communities with other cultures, and should be preserved. This may be contrasted with the more dynamic view (widely held in contemporary academic anthropology, if not in the “real world”), that cultures and communities are socio-historically (and politically) constructed (dialectically from above and below), and in constant flux. The paradox of transmigration is that it both stimulates cultural anxiety and conservationism and questions its static assumptions.

Transmigration and globalisation

Contrary to what was predicted in the 1970s, international migration did not slacken, but intensified, with ever greater numbers of migrants and refugees drawn from an ever-increasing range sending societies seeking entry to an ever-widening range of countries of reception. It has been suggested, however, that whereas past migrants settled in the countries of reception, in this “new age of migration” (Castles and Miller 1998), they retain significant, continuing ties with countries of origin. During the 1990s scholars based mainly in the USA (e.g. Glick Schiller et al. eds. 1992a and b, Basch et al. 1994, Kearney 1991, 1995, Rouse 1992, 1995, Smith 1998, 1999, Smith and Guarnizo 1998) used “transnationalism” for this type of international migration (“transmigration”).

(2) I use “cultural anxiety” with some trepidation. Interestingly, a Sussex student, Rebekah Webb, has drawn my attention to a site (http://www.die-kommen.net) where the term angst is employed by a right wing political group in this context.
to emphasize the emergence of a social process in which migrants establish social
fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. Immigrants are understood
to be transmigrants when they develop and maintain multiple relations - familial,
economic, social, organizational, religious, and political - that span borders (Glick
Schiller et al. 1992a: ix).

Transmigration entails manifold socio-economic, political and cultural linkages across
boundaries, raises questions about identity (and identification), and rights and entitlements,
and problematises ‘bounded conceptualizations of race, class, ethnicity, and nationalism [we
should add culture] which pervade both social science and popular thinking’ (p. x).

Over the past decade there has been much debate about whether, and if so how, contemporary
transmigration is a new phenomenon, about its causes, its various forms, and long-term
trajectories. Anyone with knowledge of international migration over the past century is bound
to have a sense of *déjà vu* when reading about transmigration (Grillo 1998b). Certainly, the
literature on circular labour migration in colonial and post-colonial Africa dealt extensively
with what would now be called “transmigration”, and political and economic activities
straddling two or more countries is not new: Irish Republicanism, Jewish Zionism, and the
Italian Mafia offer three very different examples of migrants and their descendants engaged
in transnational social, economic and political linkages *continuously* since the 19th century.
Even so, I agree with Smith (1999: 3) that such migrations were ‘not theorized as
[transnational] they were rarely analyzed as being systematically related, and as producing
new and interesting outcomes at both sites.’ Thus, many interesting questions concerning
comparison between past and present experience would not have been asked without a lead
from the transnational perspective.

If not new, then qualitatively or quantitatively different? Guarnizo and Smith argue that
‘although not entirely new’ transnationalism has

reached particular intensity at a global scale at the end of the 20th century …
Intermittent spatial mobility, dense social ties, and intense exchanges fostered by
transmigrants across national borders have indeed reached unprecedented levels
(1998: 4, 11.)
Reasons for this include globalisation and economic restructuring in North and South, technological change at work and in travel and communication systems, and processes of decolonisation.

Some discussions have tended to blur a distinction between transnationalism and globalisation; that is one reason I prefer “transmigration”, which better signals my specific topic. There is, however, what I call a “strong”, political economy version of transmigration wherein globalisation is the context within which contemporary movement must be understood. The globalisation of production, distribution and exchange (banking, stock markets, debt, the division of labour, mass international transportation systems, new communication technologies, the media etc. etc) has been accompanied by new forms of international organisation. Post-1973 there has also been a global political and economic shift in which Northern economies, then those of developing countries, and after 1989, those of the former socialist world, underwent major restructuring. A “Washington consensus” around neoliberal economic and financial principles replaced the post-World War II “Keynesian consensus”; “Fordism” gave way to “Postfordism” and flexible, deregulated working arrangements where people scrape together a living from multiple income-earning opportunities. In the North, especially, changes in the occupational base and a progressive disintegration of forms of social and political organisation associated with modernity led to the apparent displacement of class from centre stage, and the emergence of “new” social movements, many of them transnational, based on gender, sexuality, regional, ethnic or religious identity, or special interest e.g. environmentalism (Appadurai 1996: 23).

What is the significance of these developments for transmigration? The American anthropologist Rouse, emphasising the importance of the ‘shift from multinational processes of capital accumulation to the growing dominance of processes organized along transnational lines’ (1995: 357), argues that for migrants fast and cheap modes of transport and communication have led to

a considerable amount of movement back and forth and a concomitant growth in their own role as conduits for the further flow of money, goods, information, images and ideas across the boundaries of the state (p. 367).
Above all, economic and political insecurity do not allow migrants to commit themselves to long-term residence in the country of reception. Taking the case of Aguilillan (Mexican) migration to California, Rouse criticises former views of migration as movement between independent communities, and settlement ‘as a process in which people steadily shift their focus of attention and the locus of their principal social ties from one community to another’ (1992: 26). Economic restructuring in Mexico has made it impossible for Aguilillans to fulfil goals of developing small family businesses locally, and their main source of income is from international migration. But the restructuring and polarisation of employment within the US means few opportunities for advancement in the economy of reception. Thus Aguilillans are trapped within what Rouse calls a ‘transnational migrant circuit’; they are ‘a transnational semiproletariat, caught chronically astride borders and class positions’ (1992: 45).

Migration, then, has been increasing globally due to economic restructuring which is making everywhere insecure. Racism in the US and Europe add to that insecurity, and transmigration is both a consequence and an attempt to come to terms with this. This is not, of course, the whole story. For example, much refugee movement cannot be understood within this framework, and demographic pressures in both sending and receiving societies have a part to play. In Italy, an ageing population and increasing tendency for women to seek employment outside the home mean that there are demands for domestic service workers which can only be met by immigration. Indeed, the large scale international movement of female domestic and “caring” service workers is a striking feature of contemporary transnational migration. There is a gender dimension here which needs careful consideration.

Thus many European states contain migrants and refugees, some long resident, others recent arrivals, who (to greater or lesser degrees, and in different ways, and not uniformly within them) have a multiple orientation: to the receiving society where they may be citizens and in which they may be resident, and to another place with which they maintain economic, political, familial, religious and linguistic ties, and which may be conceived of as “home.” That orientation may be dual (cf. the South Asian phrase Desh Pardesh, “Home from Home”), or triple in that populations from “home” may be spread across several countries or continents, and transnational diasporas may themselves become communities of orientation. (Like others I have reservations about the way all migrations are now “diasporas.” “Diaspora” stakes a political claim for recognition of a particular kind.)
At the same time, many receiving countries have, especially since the 1960s, moved away from policies seeking to assimilate immigrants (e.g. “Americanization”), and to greater or lesser degrees made room for difference, along the lines of the British policy of “integration” as set out (rather complacently) in the so-called “Jenkins formula” of c. 1966 (after the British politician, Roy Jenkins):

I do not think we need in this country a “melting pot”, which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman ... I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance (Jenkins 1967: 267, my emphases.)

“Integration” and similar terms in English and other European languages (e.g. *insertion*), are extremely fuzzy, with no fixed, readily agreed meaning. (Confusion is compounded because “European integration” has another connotation.) In the context of immigration, integration is sometimes a synonym for “assimilation”, but usually refers to something which falls short of that, envisaging immigrants becoming an integral part of, though not necessarily absorbed by, the receiving society and culture: in social and economic terms it may be thought of as the opposite of “exclusion”, or from another point of view separatism or what I call “enclavement.” Although the Jenkins formula illustrates only one (British) use of the concept (as Favell, 1998, shows there are many different philosophies of integration), across Europe social and cultural policies regarding immigrants have been broadly consonant with that formula, allowing greater space for ethnic and cultural difference than did earlier philosophies of assimilation, and that is frequently what “multiculturalism” is taken to mean. How much, when, where, for whom and on whose terms are, of course, crucial questions: “the devil is in the detail.”

**Transmigration Trajectories**

A criticism of the literature on transmigration is that it sometimes assumes a homogeneous entity, e.g. undifferentiated as to gender. It also sometimes assumes that current practices and linkages will be maintained by future generations, when it is controversial whether
transmigration is a long term or transitional phenomenon, with migrants eventually loosening transnational ties, and settling in the country of immigration. Take, for instance, two groups currently important in Italian immigration which provide a relevant contrast. Senegalese live and work in Italy leaving wives and children in Senegal. Many more Moroccans live as couples with children, though more women than is supposed originally arrived as single workers. Moroccan families in Italy are steadily increasing, while Senegalese family reunions remain exceptional. From this it can be anticipated that Moroccan and Senegalese experience of living in Italy will be very different, as will demands on the health and educational services, the range of Italian “intercultural” and other professionals (housing officers, teachers, nurses, trade union officials) with whom they interact, and the “problems”, as they will be seen, for integration and multiculturalism. Yet both are transmigrants.

For the Senegalese, this means engaging in economic transactions across international boundaries, and over considerable distance, spending much of their time away from home, but returning there at frequent intervals with the goal of creating an economic, social and spiritual life for themselves and their families in Senegal (Riccio 1999). Moroccans too maintain strong ties with their region of origin, and have traditionally done so, but modern methods of communication ‘enable migrants to rely on two countries to construct their social personhood by distributing not only economic but also symbolic resources’ (Salih 1999: 88). They have two homes - Morocco, Italy. Domestic space in Italy is constructed in ways which display Moroccan roots, while homes in Morocco reflect an Italian reference. This might be interpreted as the best of both worlds, though the way of life is not necessarily sustainable: decisions about what must happen to children or in old age are critical in this regard, and as Salih (1999: 102) points out the ‘dual belonging allowed by transnationalism is also cause of a sense of rupture and discontinuity for women.’ Whereas Senegalese migrants in Italy are (for the time being) oriented towards an ultimate return to Senegal, Moroccans manifest (also for the time being) a dual orientation. Both Senegalese and Moroccans are “here and there” (Italy and Senegal/Morocco) but in different ways.

With early 21st century transnationalism we are at the beginning, or at best in the middle of the story, and forms of transnationalism that look different might ultimately converge, and those which look similar may be headed in different directions, though this might not be apparent for several decades. With this in mind, let me explore two scenarios (“Staying On”,

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and “Betwixt and Between” in Fig. 1), seeking to identify their relationship with/implications for cultural diversity.

Staying On

In the 1970s there was much discussion in the UK of the so-called “Myth of Return”. A commonly reported motif among migrants and refugees is a shift from the dream of return to the reality of staying on. The reasons why sojourning becomes settling might be different for refugees and migrants, for obvious political reasons (when, for example, will those who left Iran or Afghanistan in the 1970s feel able to return?) But for both the situation of families and children (especially their education) is very similar, and may be a crucial factor in the decision to stay. The role of sending and receiving states, and the nature of the society of reception are also important factors. But there is staying on and staying on.

(a) Assimilation: “Here and the same”

By this I mean rooting in the society of reception, and orienting oneself primarily towards it. This does not mean abandoning ties with the sending society, but as time passes, and first generation immigrants turn into second or third, ties may (as in the past) become more tenuous or symbolic (Gans 1979), a fondness for a cuisine or sports team. (The Conservative politician, Norman Tebbitt, once proposed a simple test for second-generation immigrants: what football/cricket team do they cheer? Backing the Indian cricket team was, he believed, incompatible with British citizenship.) This sounds like the classic passage from immigrant to assimilated citizen which (in theory) was the fate of many of those who crossed the Atlantic in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and were “Americanized.” Similarly, many of those entering Britain or France during the same period, or after the World Wars, settled down and became French or British “with funny names”: Rothschild, Zidane, Grillo.

(b) Integration: “Here but different”

For many, assimilation in the old sense remains the ideal. Some migrants actively seek it, and may be encouraged to do so. More likely, however, is a second variant on the “Staying On” scenario: not assimilation, but integration, à la Jenkins. What the Jenkins formula foresees for
immigrants and the next generation (who in the UK become “ethnic minorities”), is a high
degree of assimilation into employment, housing, education and health/welfare systems (or
markets) on equal terms with the autochthonous population, and a fair degree of acculturation
in many areas of life, at any rate in the public sphere, but (ignoring difficulties with the
dichotomy) with distinctive beliefs, values, practices, religion, language, at least in private.
They are “Here but different.” In much of Europe, including the UK, this describes the
situation of many Jews, though some, possibly many, would think of themselves as
assimilated, and others would espouse a more separatist route. Sikhs are another example.

Followers of the Sikh religion number some sixteen million world-wide, around one million
abroad, mainly in the UK and North America. A ‘complex web of exchanges’ links the
diaspora and the Sikh homeland ‘facilitated by a strong attachment to the Punjab, cheaper
travel, and the increasing availability of media and communication channels’ (Tatla 1999: 68).
These ties, not just a function of contemporary transnationalism but established in the
early years of migration from the Punjab 100 years ago, are formed by remittances,
investments in village agriculture and businesses, charitable enterprises and family
prestations (dowries). Economic exchanges parallel social and cultural exchanges ranging
from marriage to music, through which Sikhs overseas have an important and continuing
influence in the Punjab, and vice versa. Within the diaspora, where there is an active Punjabi
language press, and over 200 gurdwaras (temples) in the UK alone, a defining issue is the
protracted dispute with India over the status of the Punjab, which some wish to see become
an independent state called Khalistan. In pursuit of this goal, US Sikhs have ‘joined the well-
established ethnic diplomacy of such groups as African Americans, Cubans, Haitians,
Koreans, Filipinos, Chinese, Vietnamese, Dominicans and Mexicans’ (p. 181). Although long
settled overseas, with the majority taking up citizenship, there is ‘a firm sense of the
hyphenated Sikh’ (p. 201). They are resolutely British, Canadian or American, and
passionately oriented to the Punjab and the Sikh diaspora.

‘Egalitarian multiculturalism’ (Rex 1996: 2), toleration of difference in private within a
common public sphere of shared norms and values, coupled with measures to ensure equality
before the law and protection from discrimination, xenophobia and racism, is probably a
widely held ideal in Europe, though by no means everywhere. For some, it concedes too
much, admitting difference where none should exist, or of a kind not to be tolerated,
undermining historic national identities. For others it does not go far enough. It is what Goldberg (in the US) calls ‘weak’ multiculturalism:

a strong set of common, universally endorsed, centrist values to which everyone - every reasonable person irrespective of the divisions of race, class, and gender - can agree. These universal principles are combined with a pluralism of ethnic insight and self-determination provided no particularistically promoted claim is inconsistent with the core values (1994: 16.)

This milk-and-water version he condemns as ‘implicit monculturalism dressed up as weak pluralistic multiculturalism’, and calls for something much stronger.

(c) Enclavement: “Here but separate”

Integration and multiculturalism constitute a spectrum (“weak” to “strong”) of practices and policies, and if, we wished to emphasise differences between, say, Britain and France (rather than their similarities) we could say that the “Anglo-Saxon” version of integration is at the strong end of the multicultural spectrum, while the French “republican” version is at the weakest. The French response to the Headscarves Affair and the British response to demands by Sikhs to wear turbans instead of official headgear (established in British and Canadian courts in the 1970s) illustrate the two perspectives. Calls for the extensive recognition and acceptance of religious and cultural difference in the public sphere, for instance separate schooling for Muslim pupils, much debated in Britain, are obviously at the “strong” end of the spectrum: across Europe, the most widely discussed examples concern real or imagined Islam, the ‘archetypal emblem of otherness’ (Castles and Davidson 2000: 80).

Demands for the institutionalised recognition of difference (and perhaps separate provision) in education, health care and welfare, together with experiments such as the so-called “Muslim Parliament” led Goulbourne to condemn outright what he calls the communal option, as ‘highly dangerous’ (1991: 14). Retreat into the enclave (ghettoisation) may be, however, as Goulbourne recognises, a reaction to rejection by the receiving society, a protection against racism. It may also reflect distaste (to put it no stronger) for that society’s values. Many Senegalese, for example, express what Riccio (1999) calls an “Afro-Muslim” critique of Italian (Western) society, and they are not alone in this.
Such demands are not the only source of enclavement. Through civil war, a third of Sri Lankan Tamils currently live in exile. This population consists preponderantly of young men, with women predominating among the population remaining in Sri Lanka. Tamil refugees in Norway arrived via a fisheries development project which acted as a conduit to the remote villages of the Norwegian fish processing industry. There they work hard in difficult conditions, saving to repay families for the (legal and illegal) costs of the journey, and fund sisters’ dowries. Their life is divided into two domains (from Fuglerud 1999: 104):

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<th>Norwegian</th>
<th>Tamil</th>
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<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week</td>
<td>Weekends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
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Relationships with Norwegian society are mediated principally via social workers, police and immigration officers, and much effort is expended maintaining links with Sri Lanka and the Tamil diaspora. Their concern is not integration, but ‘how to remain in touch with their Sri Lankan origin’ (p. 17), and even migrants who have been in Norway for over fifteen years ‘turn their backs on Norwegian society in order to search for a sense of belonging in the exclusive company of fellow Tamils’ (p. 130). Oriented towards their homeland (in some sense recreated in the society of reception) and the transnational diaspora, they make few claims on Norwegian society, seeking merely to get by. Fuglerud quotes one young Tamil, grown up in Norway: “If I could choose I would become Norwegian”, but comments ‘as he reached adulthood he came to understand that he was not able to choose, that becoming Norwegian in the sense he wished was not possible’ (p. 128). For those born and brought up outside Sri Lanka, but rejected by the natives whose values they themselves may reject, return to Sri Lanka is also very difficult, and because of unemployment and poor housing, they are ‘in danger of becoming permanently excluded from mainstream Norwegian society’ (p. 183).
Betwixt and Between

The Tamil example shows that “Staying On”, with or without ongoing transnational linkages, even if these diminish over time, may fade into a second scenario in which transnationalism is paramount, and in which transmigrants are “Betwixt and Between”, though here, too, we find different trajectories..

(a) Permanent transmigration: “Neither here nor there”

Transmigration could become (or remain) a return movement, with or without replacement, or could involve life-long shuttling between one country and another, one town and another, one job and another, as a permanent, regulated, Gastarbeiter underclass, or in a state of permanent illegality and insecurity, ‘a transnational semiproletariat, caught chronically astride borders’ (Rouse.) The latter is the fate of many transnational migrants, not least the large and growing number of migrant women in the domestic service sector in Europe, North America, and the Gulf.

Some forms of contemporary transmigration in fact resemble African circular (urban) labour migration, in which the reproduction of labour power and provision for old age was left to the (rural) sending society, or the European Gastarbeiter system wherein workers were recruited from abroad for contractually limited periods as “guests” in a “host” country. Senegalese in Italy (some Senegalese in France have longer-term attachment to the country of reception) come closer to Rouse’s clandestine ‘transnational semiproletariat.’ Their roots are (for the most part) in their local communities in the towns and villages of Senegal, for devout Mourides, the city of Touba. They actively engage in a multiplicity of transnational projects, and their presence in Italy (or New York) which may involve repeated visits or be extended over a considerable length of time, is essentially subordinate to their orientation to Senegal (Riccio 1999.) From the point of view of the receiving society they are “birds of passage”, though neither side is untouched by the encounter. In employment and housing their position is extremely precarious, hovering between illegality and “regularisation” in the grey, if not black, economy.
This is how it seems at present. However, whether individual Senegalese remain birds of passage, or whether they eventually shift their focus to the society of reception, does not mean that this type of transmigration is transient. It has long been a part of the European (and US) scene and will remain so, especially if Europe re-opens its official doors to migrants. Flexible labour markets favour transmigration (Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 18): it is a structural feature of the contemporary world.

(b) **Stable dual orientation: “Here and there”**

The first variant of the “Betwixt and Between” scenario is characterised by precarious presence in the receiving country. There is, however, another in which contemporary migrants are, for reasons to do with the political economies of sending and receiving societies, neither settlers, whose long-term project is permanent location in the country of reception, nor sojourners, whose long-term project is return to the country of origin, but, unless clandestine, what Hammar (1990: 13 ff.) calls “denizens”, migrants with rights to permanent residence in a country of immigration (and possibly other rights) but legally foreigners. There are thus more (or less) stable and enduring forms of dual orientation, some involving secure denizenship, with or without enhanced rights, e.g. voting in local, even national elections, or maybe dual citizenship (much debated in many countries, not least Germany.) This more stable variant comes close to the integration trajectory outlined earlier.

Much discussion of transnationalism has concerned questions of citizenship and rights. Here I look briefly at questions of citizenship, where the postnational idea comes into its own. Soysal writes:

>A new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in the postwar era, one whose organizing principles are based on universal personhood rather than national belonging. To an increasing extent, rights and privileges once reserved for citizens of a nation are codified and expanded as personal rights, undermining the national order of citizenship (Soysal 1994: 1).

Later she adds:
The postwar era is characterized by a reconfiguration of citizenship from a more particularistic one based on nationhood to a more universalistic one based on personhood ... Rights that used to belong solely to nationals are now extended to foreign populations, thereby undermining the very basis of national citizenship (p. 137).

A key issue is the distinction between nationality and citizenship, with an emphasis on granting membership of a polity on the basis of residence rather than on the basis of criteria such as birth or descent. Increasing movement of capital and labour led Hammar himself to argue that,

A form of citizenship adapted to our time will have to take into account the now prevailing economic and political preconditions of the state, including existing transnational and international economic and political relations, and among them those caused by international migration (1990: 56).

Criticising the ‘idea that national identity is a zero-sum-game, and that a person can have only one national identity, and [pace Tebbit] only be loyal to one country’ (p. 105), he concluded that for many European immigrants and their children born in the country of reception a widespread extension of dual citizenship would be a ‘fair expression of their dual national identity’ (p. 108). Denizens should have political rights, including local, and where the situation allows, national voting rights; naturalisation should be liberalised; dual citizenship encouraged; and there should be greater use of a of a refined notion of domicile to establish citizenship.

In this vein Bauböck develops the long-standing distinction between ius sanguinis and ius soli as the historic alternative bases for citizenship, by proposing a third, ius domicilii: citizenship rights would be distributed not on the basis of birth, or descent, but of residence, and that might apply to voting (“No taxation without representation”), and access to social services and education. (Rogers, 1986: 35, has also drawn attention to the ‘anomalous position’ of transnational migrants working and paying taxes in countries where their tenure is precarious, and the awkward position in which young people find themselves, e.g. with regard to military service.) Wishing to make citizenship ‘more inclusive in transnationally mobile societies’ (1994: 202), Bauböck concludes:
What the idea [of an open civil society] means with regard to immigrants is that they ought to be seen as members of society after some period of residence, no matter whether they themselves have made a conscious choice about this, or whether institutions of the receiving society have so decided (1994: 173.)

Not considering them members of the society would ‘jeopardize the social foundations of liberal democracy.’ Thus one might have: nationality, British by birth (*ius soli*); citizenship, Irish by residence (*ius domicilii*); ethnicity, Italian by descent (*ius sanguinis*).

**Withering Away?**

A brief summary. Historically, most migrants to the countries of Europe (often from within Europe itself, moving South-North or East-West) settled in those countries, abandoned all but symbolic ties with places of origin, became citizens of their new homes, and took on the local culture, values and language. Even then, however, some were transmigrant, living across borders. Transmigration is not new, but much more widespread and persistent because of swifter and cheaper means of international travel and communication, the flexibility and uncertainty of contemporary job markets, precarious tenure in the receiving society, racism and xenophobia which migrants face each day, the inability to live lives and bring up children in accordance with strongly held religious, moral and social beliefs, the relative cost of living after retirement etc. etc. Undoubtedly some will stay on, assimilating, in the classic sense. Many others will engage in a contested integration seeking to create more private *and* public ethnic and cultural space in the receiving society. For others, transmigration will be a permanent way of life, at worst as a transnational subproletariat, at best (not to be despised) with dual citizenship or citizenship in one place and secure denizenship in another.

These scenarios can be combined with transnational linkages and multiple orientations in various ways. But is transnationalism itself an ‘evanescent phenomenon which will not last beyond first generation migrants … or are transnational social practices becoming and enduring structural characteristic of global social organization?’ (Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 15-16). Under what circumstances will multiple orientations become tenuous and finally
symbolic? Could one say that the more migrants assimilate (or integrate), the looser and less significant will be transnational connections, or is it the other way round?

The twentieth century was not kind to transmigrants. Glick Schiller et al. (1992b: 2-3) contrast Haitian associations with earlier Jewish Landsmanschaften: the former deal with hometown matters, whereas the latter existed to assist fellow ethnics in the US. It would have been hard for those Jewish associations to have dealt with hometowns from which they had been driven by Tsarist pogroms (one post-holocaust role of the Landsmanschaften has been to record how things were, recapturing cityscapes where the Jewish population has ceased to exist, Soyer 1997, Weisser 1985.) Pogroms, World Wars, the Cold War, decolonisation, the re-drawing of maps, for many migrants and refugees the possibility of transmigration has frequently been drastically and abruptly curtailed.

“Staying On” does not, however, preclude the maintenance of long-term transnational ties when a diaspora has a strongly political character and an identifiable homeland whose existence (actual or potential) is at stake (Armenia, Croatia, Eritrea, Ireland, Israel, Palestine, the Punjab, Tamil-speaking Sri Lanka, among many others), especially when diaspora politics intersect with ethnic identity politics in the receiving society. In such cases, a transnational orientation might persist or be rediscovered even when contacts have disappeared or become dormant. Another example of dormant links being revived (or new ones created) is South Africa where “Indians”, whose families migrated from the sub-continent over a hundred years ago, and whose ties were lost in the intervening period (Hansen 2001). Since the collapse of Apartheid many have begun to seek out their “roots”, trying to locate villages from which grandparents came, and perhaps find long-lost relatives. Possible reasons for this “roots tourism” include seeking a place of long-term refuge should the need arise (though India would not be the first choice, more likely it would be Canada or Australia); hoping to develop commercial relations; or the exigencies of South Africa’s multiculturalism in which everyone must have roots.

There is a growing literature in the US on second-generation transnationalism which is as yet inconclusive. Mahler, for instance, reports that many New York Salvadorans appear to be settling down:
their lived reality is primarily local, punctuated by infrequent transnational events such as sending monthly remittances or watching a video of the local patron saint festival. Maintaining more vigorous transnational ties remains quite formidable for many if not most (1998: 80.)

Some will 'retain transnational links over the coming years, and use those links as tools to fashion identities resistant to the forces of acculturation in the United States', but ‘the majority of the first generation will live within a transnational social field constructed largely through remittances, letters, and interactions with recently arrived migrants’, and possibly participation in transnational household rituals.

On the other hand, reviewing fifty years of Ticuanense (Mexican) migration, Smith concludes that second generation transnationalism exists, but in changing form. The closer integration of a regional political economy centred on the US, and the ‘likelihood of continued high levels of immigration to the US for the foreseeable future … and the efforts of many major sending countries to cultivate, deepen and make more permanent the relations between themselves and their emigrants abroad’ (1999: 1-2) will probably sustain transnationalism over a long period. ‘Consistent with the assimilationist critique of a transnational perspective’, he argues, ‘the second generation sees their lives mainly as taking place in the US, and invest their time and energy accordingly’ (pp. 7-8). Nonetheless, second and third generation Ticuanense return to Mexico for ritual events and the use of family homes for vacations; the technology of communication and travel ‘facilitates simultaneous social action and the acquisition of lived experience by the current second generation. Cell phones, videos, air travel all help in this regard’, p. 16). At the same time Ticuani rituals performed in New York have become central to their Mexican American identity in the US regime of multiculturalism. This leads to further consideration of the relationship between transmigration and multiculturalism.

Transmigration, Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity

The relationship between the strength, durability and form of transnational ties and cultural diversity in the society of reception is complex. Faist, whose approach is broadly similar to
my own, contrasts three socio-cultural models for the incorporation of immigrants: “Assimilation”, “Ethnic Pluralism”, and what he calls “Border-crossing”, as in Fig. 2 (adapted from Faist 2000: 253). Although he remarks elsewhere that ‘transnationalization in the cultural realm is readily advanced by discourses and even public policies favouring multiculturalist tendencies’ (2000: 228), i.e. ethnic pluralism, here he associates transmigration with “Border-crossing”, a very different form of cultural construction.

I noted earlier the problematic nature of the concept of cultural diversity. In similar vein Faist observes that assimilation and ethnic pluralism both employ a container concept of culture. They

overemphasize culture as a fixed and essential phenomenon; assimilation theory does so with core cultures and ethnic pluralism with minority cultures. This container concept sees culture as essentially territorial, based on a shared language and somewhat static. In this view culture stems from a learning process that is, in the main, tightly localized (2000: 287).

The point is echoed widely in the multicultural literature. Faist contrasts this extensively shared conception of culture with one which foregrounds ‘transnational syncretism’ (p. 286). Syncretism, creolisation, hybridity, and ‘multicultural convergence’ (Baumann, 1999: 26, referring to the way in which activities are taken up across ethnic groups: Xmas cards and trees, birthday celebrations, the “Birdie Song”, “Viva España”) are important, dynamic

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<td>Main Prediction</td>
<td>Melting into the Core</td>
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<td>Political Dimension</td>
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<td>Cultural Dimension</td>
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Fig. 2 Faist’s Three Models
processes in contemporary society which static conceptions of cultural diversity ignore. Culture is a much more eclectic set of ever-changing practices than some politicians (and social scientists) suggest. In Britain, for example, pre-Celtic culture and society was absorbed by and gave way to Celtic which in turn became Romano-British, Anglo-Saxon, Anglo-Norman and so on up to our present Euro-Atlantic (and more) créolité; and it could be argued that all the categories in this schoolbook history are themselves cultural constructs. “Turkish culture” is an ideological and above all political construct, just as much as “Kurdish culture”, and it is important to ask when, where, how, and why culture is/was politicised (and essentialised) in this way, and with what implications. Culture is continually under construction, and what is striking is the complexity and creativity it actualises. This is widely recognised in studies of contemporary urban music where we find a multiplicity of forms of “rap”, for example, drawing on global and local cultural forms and motifs from Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia. Essentialism may be a ‘useful strategy in arguing for rights and exemptions, collective demands, and even group privileges’ (Baumann 1999: 87), but not for ‘any kind of multicultural future or even analysis: It turns children into cultural photocopies and adults into cultural dupes’ (p. 84).

A recent report on *The future of multi-ethnic Britain* (Parekh Report, 2000), much criticised in the press, argued for a view of Britain as a “community of communities”. Reading the Report suggests a tension in this idea, which seems to imply a collectivity of ethnically and culturally distinct groups. Yet this interpretation is at odds with a statement which the Report itself cites, with approval, of an informant from Bradford:

> I could view myself as a member of the following communities, depending on the context and in no particular order: Black, Asian, Azad Kashmiri, Mirpuri, Jat, Marilail, Kungrieslay, Pakistani, English, British, Yorkshireman, Bradfordian, from Bradford Moore … I could use the term “community” in any of these contexts and it would have meaning. Any attempt to define me only as one of these would be meaningless (Parekh Report, 2000: Section 4.17).

(Interestingly he does not include “European” or “Muslim”.) The Report implies that on the one hand there are “English”, “Pakistani” or “Mirpuri” communities, on the other individuals, like this informant, who see themselves belonging to a multiplicity of such “communities”, and whose identity relates in a complex (and evolving) way to all of them. To suggest that
Britain, as “community of communities”, consists of a finite set of such entities (themselves finite and bounded), and that these define homogeneous individual identities, is to fall into the trap of essentialism and reification, to classify human beings as cultural (and in one version national, territorial) subjects, bearers of a culture located within a boundaried world, which defines them and differentiates them from others. By contrast, the Ottomans defined persons as religious subjects by reference to their scriptural traditions (as Muslims, Jews, Orthodox, “Armenians” and Latins.) The Ottomans employed religions of the book we employ “cultures.”

Three points follow from this. First, a key question becomes how - through what practical mechanisms - can we take into account (recognise) diversity and difference without essentialising, reifying and fetishising them on the one hand, and jeopardising social cohesion on the other? I have no answer, beyond affirming that we must accept that cultural processes always occur within a framework of political and economic power. We must also ensure that in “multiculturalism” we are not simply institutionalising a particular anthropology, meaning vision of humanity and of the human subject, in which communities are conceived as ethnic communities, with cultures attached, and rights to recognition as such, and that this vision instructs us how we can/should cope with difference. Otherwise, cultural fundamentalism, essentialism, reification, and stereotyping, along with cultural conservationism, will remain persistent players in the management of diversity, and the underlying anthropology of place, territory, culture, which informed the construction of nation-states, will continue to guide the incorporation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the construction of Europe.

Secondly, in pre-colonial Africa people shifted readily across ethnic, cultural, and political boundaries (cf. Amselle’s ‘originary syncretism’, 1998:1); incorporation was relatively easy, and occurred constantly through population movement, intermarriage, the attachment of “strangers” to households and so on, and I suspect that historically this was true of Europe. In the last two centuries, however, European nation-states have been based on notions of cultural essentialism and policies of nationalisation and assimilation. Neither such policies, nor the conservationist reaction to which they give rise, make allowance for the intersection of the local and the global in the production of cultural identity in a contemporary transnational world in which societies have (once again?) become ‘porous’ (Taylor 1994:63). Castles and Davidson (2000: viii) pick the same metaphor to draw out the political
implications. ‘Porous boundaries and multiple identities undermine ideas of cultural belonging as a necessary accompaniment to political membership.’

Thirdly, transnational ties may not be entirely absent under conditions of assimilation, and may well form part of (indeed reinforce) systems of essentialist multiculturalism. But under certain conditions transmigration becomes one vector through which that essentialism, which has been integral to the hitherto prevailing system of nation-states, breaks down, replaced by more complex networks and identities of a diasporic, cross-over character. At the same time this process may generate precisely that reaction which I term cultural anxiety. We should not fear change or give way to that anxiety. Essentialism, conservationism and their political instantiations seek to block the ‘infinite process of identity construction’ which is ethnicity (Gilroy 1993: 223). Globalisation and transnationalism have opened the Pandora’s Box of cultural essentialism, and as Sollors remarks, there should be ‘as much joy in syncretism as … in purity and authenticity in the past’ (1986: 246).

References


