The Politics of Migrants’ Transnational Political Practices

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Introduction
Transnational political networks and practices may not be a new phenomenon, but they are certainly a growing phenomenon and receiving unprecedented attention within both policy-making and academic circles. Political ties, networks, and practices across borders are experiencing this proliferation for a whole host of reasons. Some of these, such as processes of globalization, the scale and nature of migration flows, and the ‘death of distance’, are no doubt being repeated at every panel at this workshop. Others are more particular to the area of ‘politics’, such as the sending countries’ particular politico-economic incentives to mobilize their citizens and former citizens abroad, the development of competitive party politics in sending countries, the rise of intra-state conflicts in sending countries, and the increased proliferation of principles of human rights and democratization in the foreign policy agenda of major western powers.

As the above title indicates this paper argues for incorporating not only the political context, but also the consequences of transnational political practices as part and parcel of the analysis. I focus less on the parts of the prevalent research which seek to establish typologies for ‘degrees of transnationalness’ or establish the determinants for why transnational political practices occur in the first place. Instead the following review looks at the continuous feedback mechanism through which such migrants transnational practices are being shaped by – and shape – their political institutional environment.

Transnational political practices are as complex as the multilevel processes, structures, and actors involved. The paper does not claim comprehensive coverage of what is becoming a burgeoning field of research. Rather it sketches out some of the main trends and ideas and presents intuitions inferred from inductive reading of the literature as well as my own research on Turks and Kurds in four European countries. In so doing some areas with which I am less familiar, such as gender, has been left out relying on the other paper to cover them. Also a number of the terms and concepts central to the field of transnational political practices are uncomfortable because they are too
exclusive/inclusive, stigmatized or contested, but this does not seem the place to scrutinize them all.

What is meant by transnational political practices?

Inclusive/exclusive concepts

It is a paper in and of itself to delimit what ‘politics’ means in the context of migrant and refugees’ transnational practices. Generally, it is impossible to separate economic, socio-cultural or religious transnational practices at either the level of states, migrant organizations or individuals from their political context – and consequences. For instance, Danish immigration authorities’ attempt to restrict family reunification of a Turkish youth marrying someone from the parents’ village of origin is a way to trying to restrict migrants’ transnational social ties in the context of a much politicized debate on immigration. Another example is the (re)formulation of political agendas into issues of culture and religion is everyday practice within both the Turkish State and Turkish and Kurdish immigrant organizations abroad. Likewise, the issues of multiple transnational membership or ‘post-methodological nationalism’ and ‘transnational social formations’ are subjects at the very core of the ‘politics’ of transnational practices as their proliferation can be perceived as contesting the nation-state order of things. In particular the question of membership is central to the discussion of the politics of transnational political practices (see R. Smith, 1998).

A couple of decades ago the study of more elitist transnational agency of ‘diasporas’ dominated the research field (see Sheffer, 1986; Constas and Platias, 1993). This has been supplemented by the focus on more bottom up/grassroot political transnationalism of both migrants and refugees. Within the latter body of literature, analysis of transnational political practices range from liberal uses of the term to the attempts to lay down more strict criteria for what it designates. Among the more wide definitions of transnational political practices are those which include the political consequences of transnational ties between migrants and their countries, that is the act of migration as a political action in and of itself, a so-called ‘unintentional political action’, which can bring about change at national and international level (Mahler, 2000:202). Such observations are not just
confined to the empirical data from Latin America on which Mahler bases her observations. Migration has clearly had an (often negative) impact on German-Turkish relations (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2000b) and Mahgreb-French relations (Collinson, 1996).

In order to make sense of a very dispersed field of inquiry recent studies seek to map transnational political practices by looking at the intensity of the field (see Portes et al. 1999). One such attempt is to distinguish between ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ transnational practices as opposite ends of a continuum of different practices (Itzigsohn et al. 1999). The more a transnational political practice is institutionalized and has migrants involved, and the more they move around to carry it out, the narrower it is understood to be (Itzigsohn et al. 1999). Thus, in terms of political practices ‘narrow’ refers to actual membership of parties or hometown associations while ‘broad’ refers to the (occasional) participation in meetings or events. Such distinction help identify the more durable patterns of transnational political participation, and as such this mapping exercise is a necessary first step in the efforts to establish transnational practices as research field in its own right.

In my own work (and in this paper) I concentrate on migrants’ ‘intentional’ transnational political practices as well as the politics of those. One of the main units of analysis is ‘transnational political networks’ mainly understood as the ever changing patterns of cooperation between migrant or refugee organizations and parties at home and abroad. I operate with a rather wide definition of ‘political transnational practices’: various forms of direct cross border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees, as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country (or international organizations). In the latter case the transnational element includes the way that political participation in one country, such as voting patterns or lobbying, is informed by political events in another. This dimension, which in my research constitutes a major part of the political activity of the migrants and refugees means that actual mobility of the migrants involved is not a main parameter for the ‘transnationalness’ of the political practices. In contrast to economic and social practices,
regular cross-border contact, but not necessarily actual travel is a constitutive part of political transnational practices (see also Itzigsohn et al. 1999:329).

**Types of transnational political practices:**

Besides the efforts to establish the transnationalness of migrant political agency, quite a bit of literature has been devoted to discuss if and when migrants are transnational political actors in the first place. Notably a large body of literature is devoted to listing criteria for who is and who is not a ‘diaspora’ (see Safran, 1991; Cohen, 1997). At best these discussions reflect the broadness of practices, the main types of which are:

*Immigrant politics* are the political activities that migrants or refugees undertake to better their situation in the receiving country, such as obtaining more political, social and economic rights, fighting discrimination and the like. Immigrant politics can be transnational when the country of origin becomes involved in helping its citizens or former citizens abroad to improve their legal and socio-economic status.

*Homeland politics* denotes migrants’ and refugees’ political activities pertaining to the domestic or foreign policy of the homeland. That is, it means opposition to or support for the current homeland political regime and its foreign policy goals.

For some *diaspora politics* is a subset of this type of transnational practices confined to those groups that are barred from direct participation in the political system of their homeland – or who do not even have a homeland political regime to support/oppose – like the not so often used concept of émigré politics (Cohen, 1997). For others Diaspora politics has a much wider connotation in line with the recent more inclusive definitions of the term and thus overlaps with the term homeland politics. Yet, analysis who use the phrase ‘diaspora politics’ is usually about the politics of sensitive issues such as national sovereignty and security political disputes (see Constas and Platias, 1993).

Finally, another (again, somewhat overlapping) subset of homeland politics is the ‘trans-local politics’, that is initiatives from abroad to better the situation in the local community where one originates. There are next to no studies of this kind in European scholarship on transnational political practices whereas it seems to dominate on the other side of the Atlantic.
Clearly the types of transnational political practices overlap and blend into each other relating to the particular constellation of diverging/converging interests of the main actors involved. Notably migrant politics and homeland/diaspora politics are inseparable categories within Turkish and Kurdish organizations, where the migrant political claims for ethnic or religious distinctiveness send strong homeland political signals to the Turkish political regime who may try to suppress such proliferation within Turkey. Migrant political disputes may also serve foreign policy agendas of the homeland, when treatment of Turkish citizens in Germany provide counter-arguments to German criticism of human rights violations in Turkey. For instance, former Turkish Prime Minster Tansu Ciller once remarked that she wished that ‘Turks in Germany has just 10% of the rights that Kurds in Turkey have’, thereby upsetting the entire spectre of German political actors (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2000b). Likewise it is no longer the case that diaspora politics is nationalist and local in its orientation while migrant politics is cosmopolitan and global. Both sets of political practices seek legitimation in international norms of individual rights and democratization (Shain 1999, Soysal, 2000).

Differences in Perspectives across the Atlantic

Studies of transnational political practices mainly come out of the West and, as is the case with almost all political science areas, the perspective differs somewhat between the US and Europe on a very generalized level. Most strikingly, there is noticeably less attention to and research available on transnational politics in Europe than on the other side of the Atlantic (Rogers, 2000). This has less to do with occurrence of the phenomena than the extent to which it is observed and the political context in which it is observed. When looking at political activities of migrants, European based research has tended to focus on their immigrant political participation – their efforts to better their situation in the receiving country, such as obtaining more political, social and economic rights, fighting discrimination and the like. The significance of transnational ties are mainly included as a factor in the analysis of political integration rather than as a phenomena in its own right (more on that later). There are, for instance, few studies of one of the only successful ‘diaspora political’ lobby groups in Europe: the Armenians in France (in English at least).
This is not unrelated to the fact that they are not an ‘immigrant group’ on par with those groups who arrived as guestworkers or refugees in the last five decades.

While European-based research is (pre)occupied with the implications of transnational political practices on receiving countries, the role of the sending country as a mobilizing factor is at the forefront of US-based studies of transnational political practices. Indeed, a recent article defines immigrants’ political transnational field as a realm of ‘recurrent and institutionalized interactions and exchanges between, on the one hand, immigrants and their social and political organizations and, on the other hand, the political institutions and the state apparatus of the country of origin’ (Itzigsohn, 2000: 1130). Another very recent publication states that ‘transnational political organizations rarely capture the attention of ‘host-countries’ governments’ (Mahler, 2000: 209).

Such observations are far from the European experience. Most of the US-based studies deal with migrants or refugees from Central or Latin America residing in the USA and their sending countries are therefore all at the weaker end of highly asymmetrical bilateral power relations with the receiving country. Local initiatives from abroad and cooperation with local counterpart at home, so-called ‘grassroots transnationalism’ or ‘transnationalism from below’ are analysed in dialectic with the attempts of sending country governments and elites to co-opt nationals abroad in the attempt to tap into their various economic and political resources (see among others Landolt et al. 1999; Mahler 1998; Levitt 2000). Admittedly, the institutions which engage themselves in the field of transnational political practices in order to channel some of its energy to their own use are usually from the sending country (see Levitt 2000). However, the lack of research on the role of receiving countries institutions may also stem from the fact that there is very little comparative research on these issues in the USA. In Europe, on the other hand, the ‘one migrant group in several countries’ approach is much more common - probably because it points to the ever popular issues of policies of reception and integration.

Finally, perhaps partly for the same reasons, there is a difference in level of analysis. As illustrated in publications such as Smith and Guarnizo (1998) and the *Ethnic and Racial*
Studies special issue on Transnational Communities (1999) there is more local to local bottom up research of political practices in the US than in Europe where researchers are more drawn to those practices that are more directly plugged into national ideologies and policies. For instance, there are next to no studies of hometown associations among Turks in western Europe, although they are the center of both economic, social and political trans-local activity albeit in a less institutionalized form. Instead, the main ethnic, religious or party political organizations have to cope with a steady flow of researchers and journalist who come to probe their agendas. Consequently most of these organizations have appointed spokespersons fluent in 2-3 languages and printed information material which answers the most frequently asked questions about their origins and agendas.

Different level of analysis: The Why, The How and the Then What

The disciplinary unboundedness of research on transnational practices is one of its defining features (Mitchell, 1997). This makes it uncomfortable to divide it into disciplines since most studies lie somewhere in between and draw on multilevel analysis, such as the structural division between macro (state oriented), meso (migrant institution oriented) and micro (individual) levels. The combination of these levels is one of the strengths of several studies of migrants’ transnational practices. Here level of analysis refers to different foci on the various stages of transnational political practices as a process: mobilization (the ‘why’), participation (the ‘how’) and its consequences (the ‘then what’).

The ‘Why’:

One, quite dominant, level of analysis is to focus on the determinants for transnational political orientation. More specifically, the central question, as formulated by Smith, is ‘...how principles of trust and solidarity are constructed across national territories as compared to those which are entirely locally-based and maintained’ (Smith, 2000). Some research discusses the extent to which a given migrant group has such orientation in the first place, while others speculate on the reasons for the particular directions such
orientation may take such as ethno-nationalism, strict versions of the homeland religion, cosmopolitanism, hybrid third space identification, etc.

The mobilizing role of ‘sending countries’ (an ambiguous term since not all countries ‘send’ their nationals abroad) has not been underestimated in the more recent literature on transnational political practices. The literature is full of interesting examples of how sending countries’ political elites wish to tap into the resources of the communities abroad. R. Smith (1997) distinguishes between ‘homeland policies’ where sending states create institutions aimed at orienting migrants towards return, and ‘global nation policies/diaspora policies’, where sending states seek to encourage migrants to stay abroad but stay in touch. In the case of Turkey the latter form of policies has gradually replaced the former ‘Everybody wants a Jewish lobby’, one Turkish MP commented during an interview, and continued to outline how Turkish citizens abroad, in particular those living within the EU, could provide economic (remittances) and political (lobbying) support. Accordingly, Turkish governments, as is the case with a whole host of Central and Latin American countries, have tried to woo its nationals abroad by a wide range of measures. This includes more straightforward strategies for economic investment or political inclusion such as granting extended political rights for citizens abroad and co-opting migrant organizations into consultative fora, as well as measures to forge national loyalty such as sponsoring rallies at national days, state sponsored student exchanges, sport events, cultural performances (Mahler, 2000, Louie, 2000). Even academic exchanges – in particular the sponsoring of academic chairs – can serve as a tool for promoting certain pro-sending state ideologies. Turkey, for one, has tried to screen candidates to academic positions abroad sponsored by pro-state donors according to their views on the massacres on Armenians in the beginning of the century.

Sending countries may also engage in efforts to better the situation of their citizens abroad, urge them to integrate and become good lawabiding and prosperous citizens. ‘Alman ol, Turk Kal’ – become German, remain Turkish was among the slogans used by the Turkish government to encourage naturalization of Turkish citizens abroad. Shain, in his historical analysis of sending countries has described how the interwar government of
Italy replaced the term ‘emigrant’ with ‘citizen’ as of Fascist policies to 'redeem the emigration from the political ineptitude and social irresponsibility of the liberal state' and to achieve 'the spiritual recovery of all Italian communities abroad by strengthening material and moral contacts between Italy and the citizens abroad' (Shain, 1989:51). Exactly the same semantic changes can be identified in chronological readings of Turkish parliamentary proceedings (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2000b).

However, only the crudest of analysis ascribe homeland political orientation among migrants to the agency of the sending country only. Not only are such efforts often reactive rather than pro-active, but the extent to which this falls on deaf ears or fertile ground relates to the societal and political-institutional context in the receiving country also. Drawing on ethnographic or more quantitative sociological research methods and data it has been argued that transnational political orientation is related to mode of migration, length of stay and migrant/refugees’ structural position in the receiving countries. The following is an initial attempt to decouple some of these understandings.

**Mode of migration:** Studies have concluded that political refugees who left on a collective basis take a more active political stance towards their homeland than economic migrants, who left on an individualized basis (see Portes 1999: 465; Landolt et al. 1999). This observation can surely be recognized throughout Europe as well, although it should be noted that the political refugee/economic migrant categories are blurred because of the inseparability of economic and political reasons for departure, and the rules of the immigration political regimes. Since the mid-1980s, restricted immigration controls make the asylum application one of the few ‘open’ doors to Western Europe. Furthermore, in my own research I have often come across cases where refugees wish to leave political activism behind while so-called economic migrants become politicized from afar. Although such observations are sporadic they are still interesting because they highlight the dynamic between modes of incorporation and the transnational element in political mobilization among migrants and refugees. Similarly, a comparative study of Bosnian and Eritrean refugees under the auspices of the transnational communities programme show that the study of political refugees requires a more skeptical conceptualization of
transnationalism than that found in recent studies of migrants’ transnational identification (Al-Ali and Koser, 2001)

Length of stay: There is also the argument that the longer the migrant/refugee group stays abroad, the less they are interested in their homeland. Younger generations have a stronger interests in involvement in the politics of the receiving country. This only goes for ‘settling groups’ – such as Turks or Croats in Europe and Mexicans in the US. In analysing my own data I have desisted from correlating length of stay with a more/less understanding of transnational political identification. Rather there seem to be qualitative differences between so-called first, second and third generation.

Structural position in the receiving country: A related discussion is that of how the socio-economic position in the receiving country impacts transnational political orientation. It has been noted that contexts that are less receptive of immigrants tend to encourage a stronger identification with the homeland (Smith 1998: 212). Such a process of identification is also referred to as ‘reactive identity’ (Portes 1999: 465) and has been found among several migrant or refugee groups in the USA such as Salvadorans (Landolt et al. 1999: 291), Mexicans (Smith 1998: 212) and Guatemalans (Popkin 1999). Similarly, studies in Western Europe, including several of Turks, have argued that a sense of social exclusion and marginalization make Turkish youth in particular turn to more radical forms of Turkish nationalism or Islam (see, among others, Heitmeier et al., 1997; Schiffauer 1999).

Clearly, it makes sense for migrants to orient themselves towards transnational social spaces if this enables upward mobility in their locality of origin (Goldring, 1997). However, I have met Turks and Kurds qualifying the label of socially marginalized who could not care less about Turkish politics, as well as university students, hardly among the excluded in society, who are very much into rallying around political issues in Turkey. Only very careful anti-essentialist ethnographic accounts (see Armruster 2002) can capture move beyond homogenous constructions of the link between social base and
political identification, between the personal and the political in transnational political spaces (see also Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Skrbis, 1999).

Moreover, while social exclusion and marginalization may contribute to certain identification processes such dynamics do not take place in a vacuum. How does the receiving country’s particular political institutional context impact the scope and agency of transnational political practices? On the one hand it is argued that exclusionary political systems, with more or less explicit demands for full identification with the receiving state may reinforce transnational orientation among migrants (Abadan-Unat, 1994; Portes, 1999). On the other hand it has been found that also multicultural policies can be conducive to transnational practices as they provide resources and space for institutionalization of ethnic or religious organizations (Faist, 2000b: 214). Comparative research on the case of Turks and Kurds in the Netherlands and Germany question these assumptions as will be discussed further below.

The ‘How’
Another level of analysis is that of how migrants’ transnational political practices are articulated and received within the political institutional context in both the sending country and receiving country. Literature engaging with this dimension of analysis asks how political connectedness is organized across borders to guarantee commitment and motivate social action? Migrants’ organizational patterns are central components in research on these issues. How do they form their networks? How do they attract members? Among Turks and Kurds, associations, organizations and federations represent the institutionalization of ethnic, religious, and party political currents and movements from the homeland and the situation in the host-country. Similarly their networks are not just a ‘function of’ homeland politics. Indeed within the transnational network of Turkish and Kurdish organizations the question of ‘who initiates what’ is crucial for understanding the dynamics of the political links. Simultaneous processes of Europeanisation and decentralisation shape transnational political networks of Turks and Kurds. Generally homeland politically oriented organizations in the Netherlands (as is the case in Germany and Denmark) find it difficult to come together because of their
differing homeland political orientations. Rather, there are intense trans-state links within the different sub-groups of the communities from Turkey (Kurds, Alevi, Sunni-Muslims, right-wing nationalist Turks, etc). In more cases than not the institutionalization of trans-state networks within Europe, are mainly initiated either from Turkey or from communities based in Germany. Or both, when the organizations in Germany act as bridgeheads between the political party/movement in Turkey and organizations elsewhere in Europe. As a consequence, the networks within Europe are often quite hierarchical, and organizations in particularly the Netherlands are slightly wary of the German based organizations, which they feel dominate in terms of membership and agenda setting. In the Netherlands there is therefore also a tendency to decentralize and act more independently from the German or Turkish counterparts (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2000c).

How do such networks go about trying to influence politics? Which strategies and means do they use? First there is the issue of why different migrant groups choose different strategies to promote their agendas. It is certainly a question of social, economic resources of the group itself, of which the transnational dimension is significant: Homeland political organizations pool financial resources and draw on expertise and manpower in sister organizations elsewhere. They reinforce their campaigns by coordinating them with political counterparts in other countries – either in the form of producing joint informational material or in organizing and co-ordinating confrontational activities (demonstrations/mass meetings) to happen simultaneously.¹

Yet, while this unboundedness is one of the ‘strength’ of many transnational political networks there is also the question of the boundedness, the way that transnational political practices are anchored in their local context. How do such transnational networks interact with or accommodate to local power structures? Which institutions shape the transnational field and which institutional channels are used to put transnational

¹ A minor point related to the grief that I have experienced during my own empirical research. It seems to me that there is little explicit consideration of the methodological issues which are particular to research on transnational political practices. Information on certain essential features, such as direct transfer of money within transnational political networks, is hard to come by.
linkages into practice? A systematic appraisal of such dynamics calls for comparative empirical data as indicated by several scholars based in the USA (see Mahler 1998; Guarnizo and Smith 1998, Smith, 2000).

As mentioned political institutions in the sending state has been heralded as central actors in shaping the field of transnational political practices. There are however only few comparative studies of how receiving states shape transnational political networks’ choice of sites and venues for their practices. Yet, transnational political networks continuous use of different sites tells us indicates the fundamental tension between states and transnational political practices. Herein, the receiving state plays a central role by setting the boundaries of inclusion, exclusion and citizenship, allowing or prohibiting various forms of political mobilization within their boundaries.

Comparative studies of immigrant political participation in Western Europe, dealing with the dyadic relationship between immigrants and their host-country, consider the significance of receiving countries’ ‘political opportunity structure’ for migrants’ collective patterns of organization and the strategies of participation. Such studies hold that host-societies shape the collective organization of migrants by providing certain resources for, and models of, organizing (Soysal 1994: 84, 235; Doomernik, 1995). Similarly, the more rights and access to relevant political gatekeepers in the receiving country (trade unions, political parties or NGOs), the more immigrants’ political activities are channeled into the political system of the receiving country and adapted to the political discourse and ways of negotiating various demands (see Soysal 1994; Ireland 1994).

However, in my own research I have found that if one includes the transnational dimension of migrants transnational practices these dynamics of inclusive/exclusive political structures does not hold. At least in Europe, transnational practices are not very welcome, neither in countries with more exclusive political systems (such as Germany) or in countries with inclusive multicultural policies of incorporation (such as the Netherlands and Denmark). More inclusive political structures, which make for more
participation and co-operation on immigrant political issues, may at the same time, and for that very reason, serve to exclude dialogue on homeland politics. In both Holland, Denmark and Germany there are examples of how migrant descent members and candidates are excluded from political parties because of their membership of organizations with an agenda oriented towards a different religion, nation or state than that of the party. Different national discourses on the political inclusion of immigrants may exist alongside remarkably similar discourses on homeland politics. That is, although migrants’ ethnic and religious identities may be easily tolerated, even encouraged through funding of social and cultural associations, there is less enthusiasm when it comes to the political promotion of such distinctiveness in the homeland (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001).

Where local institutional structures may serve to constrain, global institutional structures may facilitate transnational political practices. In particular discourses of human rights provides the language for negotiation between transnational political networks and states and international organizations the site where such negotiation may take place. Studies of ‘transnationalism’ within the discipline of International Relations have established the significance of the institutionalization of international cooperation, that is, international (non-governmental, intergovernmental and supranational) organizations for the work of non-state actors lobbying for democratization and human rights (Risse-Kappen, 1995).

In particular, transnational political networks who oppose a state, which has strong allies in their host-states or simply is too powerful for other states to meddle with, may turn to international organizations such as the UN, OSCE, European Council, and the like. The continuous lobbying by the PLO for recognition of Palestine as a member of the UN is one of the more classic examples. Another example is the Tibetans, who have advocated their story of persecution and discrimination by the Chinese in international fora rather than their host-state, India. However, only more resourceful groups manage to lobby international organizations at a more professional level on their own. In my own research only a few movements have managed to navigate their way into contacting political institutions at European level, and even then lobbying is fairly sporadic.
Rather, the so-called trans-state advocacy networks of NGOs are very valuable (See Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Co-opting of NGOs at both the national and international level is a much sought after strategy for transnational political networks since such organizations facilitate contact with levels of policy making which are otherwise difficult to gain access to for a diaspora organization (see Ellis and Khan, 1999). 2 For instance, one project within the transnational communities research programme demonstrate how Andean indigenous political organizations have become ‘scaled up’ as they link up with local and international NGOs. Similarly, migrants’ transnational practices weave themselves into such nets of influence. In my own research notably Kurdish organizations have managed to plug into networks of international human rights organizations with easier access to policy makers than the Kurds themselves (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2002b).

Another, probably more important role of international organizations is to provide a normative frame of reference for those groups advocating democratization and human rights agendas. To provide the ‘discursive space of the global human rights arena as a distinct site...’ (Smith, 2000). For instance, research on diaspora political groups in the US has argued that cold war bi-polarity between Western and Soviet foreign policy interests meant that migrant groups based in the West (in particular the U.S.) would position themselves accordingly. Migrants opposing political regimes supported by the Soviet Union were welcomed, and those supporting such regimes spoke to deaf ears (Shain, 1999). Today, there seems to be more ample leverage for foreign policy lobbying of migrants as ideals of democracy, pluralism, self-determination and human rights are, at in least in principle, heralded as central to foreign policy making of western states in the post-cold war era. Moreover, the treatment of minorities has increasingly become a trans-state issue, with the introduction of new and broader regional security structures, implementation of norms of humanitarian intervention and calls for the implementation of universal principles of human rights. Accordingly, in some cases states have become

2 See Geddes (2000) for an analysis of how migrant politics is conducted also at transnational level in Europe.
more open to the idea of subordinating their domestic politics to the scrutiny of foreign states and international organizations (G. Smith 1999).

In my own research, patterns of dialogue between Kurdish and Turkish political organizations and German or Dutch political actors illustrate how transnational political networks change their formulation of political agendas in order to comply with more internationally accepted discourses of human rights. Certain Kurdish organizations, for instance, have gone from radical leftwing paroles advocating freedom for Kurdish workers to stressing human rights violations against the Kurdish people in Turkey or Iraq. In Germany, it is those organizations evoking democracy and human rights rhetoric in their information campaigns which more easily reach the attention of more central policy-makers while those stressing nationalist separatist or radical communist ideology are confined to dialogue with more marginalized political counterparts (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2002b).

Considering this multilevel institutional environment I would argue that a process of ‘dual institutional channeling’ is taking place. Transnational political networks’ strategies and activities may not only adapt to their local institutional environment but also be shaped as they appropriate global (western liberal) norms of democracy and human rights via their interaction with national and international institutions.

The ‘Then What’:
Transnational political networks enter political processes at local, national and international level as actors in their own right. However, observations like that raise as many questions as they answer. What makes some transnational political networks more influential than others? And how do we go about measuring this influence? When, if at all, do migrants transnational political activities bring about change? Who benefits from migrants transnational political practices? And what are the consequences for the role of state in domestic and international politics?
One of the key parameters for discussing change seems to be the way that transnational political practices contribute to democratic political processes. ‘Democratic political processes’ mainly refers to both democratization in the country of origin and the evolvement of multi-cultural democracy in the receiving country (see notably Shain, 1999; Faist, 2000a: 328).

The effect on the sending country: In terms of the country of origin, recent research has argued how outside political participation benefits democratic processes at home. The very term ‘grass-root transnationalism’ implies bottom up participation in what may be otherwise top-down democracies. For instance, trans-local initiatives may not only benefit the home village or region but also challenge political rule at national level (Portes, 1999). Similarly, the formation of ‘transnational civil society’, with the communicative power to question, criticize and publicize may strengthen democratic control at home. And in cases where migrants can participate directly in the politics of their country of origin from afar, they are understood to have a platform from where they can obtain less biased information and exert an influence in the politics of their homeland that would be unobtainable if they had not left.

While such findings are a valuable contribution to the constructive dimension of the relationship between sending countries and their citizens abroad, some caution should be included. First of all it is very difficult to ‘measure’ the influence from abroad in terms of democratization and social change. In my own research, data on the channeling of economic and political support through cross border networks are hard to come by. Even more accessible processes are difficult to assess since actual electoral participation is marginal, and the candidates from Germany in Turkish elections are not very controversial in terms of the general party political agenda (see Østergaard-Nielsen, forthcoming).

Similarly, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how much influence transnational political networks can exercise by putting pressure on their host-governments. An analysis of U.S. policies towards the Middle East, Haiti, Cuba, or Northern Ireland, would be deficient
without considering the efforts of Jews, Arabs, Haitians, Cubans or Irish diasporas respectively. However, as argued elsewhere, diaspora political lobbying does not redirect foreign policy away from governments’ already defined national interests such as economic or security political relations with the homeland/or other countries in the region. (Østergaard-Nielsen 2002a). Indeed, it is important to emphasize that far from all homeland political groups are very successful. Many a homeland political campaign is ignored or even forbidden if the political movement uses too radical means to get noticed.

Moreover part of the difficulty with assessing the contribution by transnational political networks to democratization in homelands relates to the lack of accountability of transnational political networks. It is, for instance, difficult to determine ‘who represents who’ in terms of political organization of migrants.

Firstly, how representative are the transnational political networks of the groups abroad. That is, to what extent are those organization who often advocate democratization at home actually based on democratic principles; to what extent are they anchored within the population of migrants/refugees abroad. Not all ‘grassroot’ transnational practices are very rooted. The Kurdish organizations of not only organizations with a tight hierarchical militant structure such as the PKK but also the so-called Exile Parliament stand out as not having much input from its members or of having anything that remotely looks like democratic election processes. Likewise, the rightwing nationalist Turkish federation in Germany present their ‘elected’ leaders, always pre-approved by the party executive in Ankara, for the crowds at their annual meetings. In any case, the claims for representation by organizations is usually difficult to evaluate since organizations rarely underestimate their membership and support.

Secondly, it is not always clear to what extent transnational political institutions represent the groups in the sending country. Exile may provide a platform for voicing discontent

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3 A vaguely related point is that using the migrant organization as points of entry to research on transnational political practices may give an awry understanding of the degree of engagement within the migrant group as a whole.
with totalitarian regimes, but sometimes such intervention may hamper rather than bridge disputes in homeland politics. For instance, leaders of Kurdish oriented legal parties in Turkey are not always delighted with the efforts of the more radical Kurdish diaspora, and most certainly do not want to be identified as closely linked to them (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2002a). And what about all those transnational political practices that enters into homelands with democratically elected regimes? Clearly all governments want supportive lobby groups abroad – in particular when they reside in countries that are influential in global politics. Yet, a comparative workshop on ‘Perceptions and Policies of Sending Countries’ held under the auspices of the ESRC Transnational Communities Programme last July revealed that some sending countries such as Armenia (Pannosean, 2000) and Cyprus (Demitreou, 2000) are ambiguous about the wish for political influence from afar since those who left have lost touch with everyday reality of their homelands and focus on more emotive issues - like Anderson’s description of long distance nationalism (Anderson, 1992). In case of countries in conflict it has even been argued that ‘transnational mobilization and international involvement can exacerbate problems encountered by domestic coalitions, and introduce additional obstacles to the effective pursuit of social change’ (Maney, 2000). While opposing groups can be brought together abroad who would not otherwise cooperate in the country of origin, this can also lead to formation of rival blocks that are exported back to the domestic policy area.

**The effect on the receiving country:** While indirect or direct intervention in homeland affairs may not lead to immediate democratization in the sending country, it has significant impact for the evolution of multicultural democracy in the host-countries. Not everyone welcomes this development. Among the shriller opponents is Huntington (1997) who argues that while immigrants wanted to become American in the past, the ‘disintegrative cult of multiculturalism’ legitimates diaspora political claims for U.S. intervention in the affairs of their homelands. As a further consequence of this ‘domestication’ of foreign policy, foreign capital and interests increasingly influence American elections turning senatorial elections into contests between Indians and Pakistanis or Arabs and Jews throughout the country (1997: 46-7). This is a development, which, in Huntington’s opinion, erodes the democratic relationship between policy-makers and their
electorates. By contrast, Shain (1999) has put forward the more constructive argument that the foreign policy lobbying of ethnic groups in the U. S. keep foreign policy makers true to the principles of human rights and self-determination in their dealings with countries abroad (see also Ruggie, 1997), and the consequences for the domestic scene are also positive: as diaspora leaders are advocating principles of human rights, they feel compelled to adhere to these principles in their dealings with other diasporas within the U.S. (Shain, 1999).

Such more normative discussion of the ‘good and bad’ of transnational political practices can also be found in the more migrant oriented literature. Within European based scholarship it is stressed that transnational political loyalty and political incorporation in the receiving country are not mutually exclusive (Faist, 2000b; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2000a; Fennema and Tillie, 2000). Similarly, Portes (1999) argues against such practices having disintegrative consequences for the host society and culture. Migrant’s transnational political orientation gives them a voice that they would otherwise not have. This serves to empower them, invest them with a sense of purpose and self-worth, and thus ‘act as an effective antidote to the tendency towards downward assimilation...’ (Portes, 1999:471; see also Goldring, 1997).

Again there are also research findings which indicate a slight caution to such arguments: First, transnational political practices can also serve to dis-empower. Schiller and Fouron (1999) note how transnationalism among Haitians in the United States lessen their participation in US based grass-root struggles for social justice. Similarly, Kurds in London, who spend their day illegally working long hours under harsh conditions in the sweatshops of Northern London use their sparse free time to mobilize around homeland political agendas which are untenable in even the most optimistic analysis of Turkish and Middle eastern regional politics, instead of rallying for better social and legal conditions for asylum seekers in the UK. That is, although political loyalty in general is by no means a zero-sum game between receiving country and homeland, processes of political mobilization related to the homeland may serve to divert attention in particular instances.
Second, transnational political practices might serve to exclude in cases with migrant populations with majority/minority issues. Certain Turkish and Kurdish organizations find it hard to cooperate because of their homeland party political, ethnic or religious differences. This may skewer representation in immigrant political fora. For instance in one of the main consultative institutions in the Netherlands the ethnic minority of Kurds have never been represented - and the religious minority of Alevi only briefly – their organizational heads are unable to bury the hatchet with the Turkish conservative pro-government organizations. Thus Dutch inclusive incorporation strategies curiously end up resembling exclusive minority policies in Turkey. This is particularly sensitive in a political system where immigrant participation centers on immigrant organizations as is the case in the Netherlands (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001).

**Challenging the State?**

Yet, whatever their actual impact on democratization in sending or receiving countries the phenomena of transnational political practices in and of themselves further erode the (admittedly quite dated) distinction between foreign and domestic policy. They contribute to what has been referred to as a ‘diffusion of domestic politics’ (Miller, 1981) or a ‘globalization of domestic politics’ in both the sending and receiving country.

In the light of such observations, it has been argued that the scope and impact of transnational political practices challenge the role of the state in contemporary world politics. Debates on the role of the state has been fluctuating between Realists and Liberalists within the discipline of International relations for the past 4 decades. Realist resistance to legitimation of other actors to considered alongside the state are opposed by liberal approaches that stress the impact of non-state actors such as NGOs and multinational companies or the impact of transnational diffusion of people, goods and ideas. Most Realists agree with Liberalists that the significance of non-state actors, such as NGOs and multinational companies, should be taken into account in any interpretation of international relations and global politics. It is the degree to which non-state actors matter that they differ on (Keohane and Nye, 1971; Rosenau, 1993; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Josselin and Wallace, 2002).
Recent literature on migrant transnational practices has questioned the post-national discourse on ‘de-territorialization’ that characterized the earlier analysis of in particular sending countries’ policies towards nationals abroad (see notably Schiller et al., 1992). They point to the processes of ‘re-territorialization’, to the very degree to which state institutions coopt or are at least involved in channeling migrants transnational practices. As importantly, they question whether migrants transnational practices challenge state institutions or serve their interests (see, among others, Smith 2000; Mahler, 1998; 2000, Faist, 2000b:327). In my own research state-institutions certainly figure as important actors which form and reconstitute transnational political ties and networks. Indeed, one of the major challenges is to assess the balance between state-authority and non-state autonomy in the analysis of Turkish and Kurdish homeland political practices. Such ambiguity is probably more prevalent in research on homeland political networks which are more directly plugged into party politics in the homeland, than with the more local – local oriented networks. Still, it points to careful application of two central concepts in the more recent literature on migrant transnational political practices: ‘bottom up/grassroot transnationalism’ and ‘transnational civil society’.

**Conclusions**
Empirical investigation and theorizing of migrants’ transnational political practices place them in a framework that critically examines their role and agency in local and global politics. Such inquiry moves on from appreciating the degree of ‘transnational-ness’ of migrants’ political practices to taking these practices serious as part of local, national and international political processes. In other words it adds the ‘how’ and the ‘then what’ to the understanding of the ‘why’.

Likewise the global and local politics of transnational networks and practices are part and parcel of the understanding of their agency. There is a multilevel process of institutional channelling at work. While the institutional and normative local context of transnational political practices, including the way that such practices are embedded in local discourses on immigrant incorporation, shape (constrain) their institutional space for action, the
global context of human rights norms facilitate such agency. As mentioned in several recent articles (Mahler, 1998; Smith, 2000) more comparative research, in particular of the ‘same’ transnational political network in different political contexts or ‘different’ transnational networks within the same political context could provide more systematic understanding of the thresholds of tolerance set down by receiving/sending states. Moreover, in the quest for a more holistic understanding of such processes it would be interesting with more research on the seemingly silent majority of such networks in order to come closer to an understanding of the complex set of internal factors (lack of resources) and external factors (access to policymaking) which contribute to homeland political mobilization and its success. It is, in other words, also important to stop and listen at the Hyde Park Corner of transnational politics, even if central policy makers rarely pass by.

Another aspect of such inquiry is to critically examine the democratic transparency and accountability of transnational networks and the short and long term implications for democratic political processes in domestic and global politics. This not only refers to the need to further compare instances when transnational political network challenge vs. reproduce existing hierarchies of power in countries of origin. Also, it is questionable if democracy, the main legitimating principle of government, can follow the ‘migration of issues, problems, strategies and solutions into transnational society’ which globalization entails (Dryzek, 2000:30). Research on the boundedness and unboundedness of transnational political networks could provide an interesting contribution to such wider questioning of processes of globalization and democracy.

One way of going about this is to compare the dynamics of migrants’ transnational networks to that of other non-state actors such as environmental or human rights NGOs within a more international relations based theoretical frameworks of transnational relations (such as those employed by Keck and Sikkink or Risse-Kappen or Josselin and Wallace, 2002). How do the strategies and influence of migrants’ transnational political networks compare to that of other non state actors? Moreover, international relations, some argue, are shaped by a plurality of influences, only some of which are states and
their direct representatives. Transnational companies, social networks, or links among city and regional authorities, now bypass state power and state boundaries. To what extent do other non-state actors shape the political institutional space of migrants’ transnational political practices? As part of that exercise it could be beneficial to question the extent to which: they relate to the universalistic vs. the communitarian, have ethic principles in terms of violent means, are democratic in internal structure, etc. (see Halliday, 2002). This is not a call for ‘securitizing’ migrants’ transnational political networks, but to apply the same critical analysis to their practices as has been applied to analysis of other non state actors in recent years.

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