Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process:  
Comparative Insights from the Mexican and Italian Cases

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INTRODUCTION

How should we conceptualize political community, membership and citizenship in a world where increasing numbers of immigrants and their countries of origin maintain, cultivate and deepen their formal and informal relations? Wherein concrete membership practices transcending nation states abound? Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Haiti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Italy and Portugal have all taken measures attempting to strategically incorporate their diasporic populations into their imagined political community (Anderson, 1991) -- their "global nations" -- and more selectively into their actual political, economic and social life. These efforts are even more interesting because they are not wholly new, as the historical experiences of Italy, Israel, Turkey, Algeria and other states attest.

This paper engages these issues by comparatively analyzing transnational public spheres in the Mexican and Italian cases, focusing on how diasporic or migrant membership practices are embedded, vary and affect politics, especially of the home country. The analysis of the Italian case focuses on the 1880s through the postwar period, while the Mexican the analysis uses an historically informed look at the last 25 or so years. I argue that diasporic membership practices have led to the creation of a transnational public sphere between sending and receiving states that can manifest different degrees of membership.

Theoretically, this paper argues for the utility of rethinking the concept of membership in a political community as what Polanyi (1957) called an “instituted process,” whose significance emerges within the context of the larger relations and institutions within which it is embedded (see Marshall, 1950; Somers, 1993, 1994). In this paper, I analyze how diasporic or migrant membership practices are embedded within four institutions and processes: 1) the sending country’s domestic politics, including both democratic and non-democratic impulses; 2) the sending country’s relationship to the world system, including its development and foreign policy strategies; 3) non-state transnational actors and institutions, including the Catholic Church, and an emergent, sometimes semi-autonomous, transnational civil society between sending and receiving states, both of which can offer the migrants increasing influence in their home countries; and 4) the varying contexts of reception in the US, including the historical differences in American politics in the early and late twentieth century. Embedding the analysis of membership in these contexts enables one to avoid the errors both of state-centered and hard transnational approaches.

This analysis attempts to contribute to the emerging literature on transnational life by giving the state a more central role both in the creation and in the evolution of transnational public sphere in two historical
This move attempts to go beyond the tendency to concentrate on the fact that these processes transcend the state as an analytical end in itself, but also opens up important new dimensions of transnational life to analysis and entertains the probability of variation in outcomes. For example, state policy toward emigration can tend more toward a “homeland policy” (Miller, 1981) in which sending and receiving states both attempt to foster migrants’ return, or towards “diasporic policy” in which emigrants’ exit is largely accepted, and the states goal is to maintain relationships with those migrants. We can also consider different kinds of political tendencies within transnational public spheres, such as the increasingly fascist relations between migrants and the Italian state during the 1920-30s, and the current evolution of Mexican state-migrant relations from one controlling democracy to one pushed along by democratization in Mexico.

This article draws on fieldwork and interviews done during regular visits to Mexico since 1991. Research on the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (“the Program”) began shortly after its founding in late 1990, and has since involved interviews and field trips with Program personnel, including Directors and other staff, state level personnel as well as local community leaders in Mexico and in the US, Mexican politicians, academics and other interested observers. Research with the Zacatecans and Oaxacans was done in California and Zacatecas in July, August, and November, 1995; August and November, 1996 in California and Zacatecas; and May and July, 1998 in California and Zacatecas. I draw on long-term relationships with key informants dating from 1990, on ethnography, and on one-time interviews. Some of the 50 or so interviews were taped and transcribed; notes were taken during or after the rest. The work on the Italian case draws mainly on secondary, and some primary sources, and kindness of various Italianists.

The paper’s first section engages theories on transnationalism, membership and citizenship, and proposes a theoretical framework for looking at membership as an instituted process in historical perspective. The second analyzes how and why the Mexican state has attempted to coopt and control the extra-territorial conduct of Mexican politics, and unintentionally helped create a transnational public sphere and new membership practices that have also changed Mexican politics. The third section analyzes the Italian case, examining both the state’s relationships with its diaspora, and the importance of the Catholic Church and its relationship with the state in the creation of an evolving transnational public sphere. The final section compares the two cases and analyzes their significance for current theories about migration, immigration and transnational life.

THEORETICAL ISSUES
Citizenship, Membership and Immigration

Membership in a political community is usually defined as citizenship, understood in T.H. Marshall's terms of universal rights derived from membership in the state, set against the inequality produced by capitalist markets. This state-centered approach merits comment here for two reasons. First, while it is no longer new to say that migrant membership practices extend beyond borders, so much analysis still assumes that they do not that the repetition is merited. Second, this state-centered view is more useful in understanding current migrant membership practices than most scholars using a transnational perspective will admit. Indeed, one could argue that the transnational perspective correctly extends Marshall's approach. Both view citizenship as a "developing institution" emerging in dialectic engagement with "the rise of capitalism" (Marshall, 1950, (1964:84-5)), thus orienting us towards considering how globalization in its political, social and economic forms is changing current citizenship and membership practices. It is limited in viewing citizenship primarily as a status, as a state-granted membership in a state-created category, focusing only on host state membership that presumes a unique and mutually exclusive membership in the nation-state. Moreover, Marshall presumes that such a march toward substantive citizenship is inexorable and does not recognize the contingency of the construction of citizenship and membership (Barbalet, 1988; Somers, 1993).

In theories of immigration, these different strands contradict. The first leads to the belief that immigrants are thought to make a "clean break" with their country of origin, to leave off being members and citizens of their country of origin as they and their children become full members and citizens of their adopted countries (Smith, 1995). The issue then becomes the extent to which immigrants gain access to the same civic, political and social dimensions of citizenship -- to substantive citizenship (Brubaker, 1989) -- as natives within the new nation state (Portes and Rumbaut, 1993). The strand of Marshall’s thought treating citizenship as developing in a dialectic relationship with capitalism opens the door to membership practices that, like capitalism, extend substantively beyond borders.

Citizenship and Membership Within Transnational and Global Contexts

The transnational and global perspectives on migration are also relevant to our analysis of membership and citizenship practices. Both are in part reactions to the limitations of the classical paradigms of citizenship, assimilation, and modernization and their respective dichotomies: citizen/non-citizen, assimilation/exclusion, traditional/modern. Both emphasize the extent to which the nation state has been transcended by social,
economic and political processes. For present purposes, we define as transnational those works tending to focus on social processes involving particular migrant populations and nation-states (Mexico-US), and as global those tending to analyze how economic, institutional, cultural and other changes at a global level reconfigure power, including the places of states, in our world (Matos, 1997; Glick-Schiller, 1999; Smith, 2001).

Globalization stresses the importance of global level cultural or economic processes in determining or creating broad patterns or institutions, such as the nation-state, citizenship and membership. Some see global forces causing the state to decline steadily in importance, and predict it is on "on its last legs" (Appadurai, 1996), while others predict that these patterns tend to cause the creation of broadly similar, highly rationalized societies ruled by nation states with citizens members (Meyer et al. 1997). Others posit that social movements are now transnational and can address disempowered group grievances better than nation states, and that a transnational civil society is emerging (Tarrow, 1998; Perez Godoy, 1999). These approaches stand out for their homogeneous predictions of globalization's effects, which cannot explain how migrant membership practices evolve or vary by case, nor their increasing importance to sending states.

Other globalists analyze membership more directly. Sassen (1996; 1998) argues that globalization has reconfigured sovereignty and depreciated the value of nation-state citizenship by providing a citizenship-like power to govern to certain sectors of private global capital. This creative tack urges us to consider changes in the conditions within which the state itself is sovereign and conveys or negotiates citizenship and membership. Soysal (1994) posits a "post-national" form of membership in part created by host country institutions because of the requirements of international community agreements based on the human rights of the "modern person" (Jacobson, 1996; Hollifield, 1992; Cornelius et al., 1995). While I think that the concept of "post-national membership" underestimates the importance of the state, nationalism and the different meanings of human rights discourse in the third and first worlds, Soysal's work -- particularly that analyzing how transnational actors variously make claims based in notions of human rights, national identity or local belonging (1997) -- helps guide my analysis of differences, for example, between Zacatecan and Oaxacan membership practices.

The most widely cited formulation of a transnational perspective is often derived from the work of Glick-Schiller, Basch and Szanton (1994 and 1992) and Basch et al. (1994). They argue that: the practices and discourses among "transmigrants" and their states are new or fundamentally different than in the past, that the nation state has been transcended as the main structure organizing political, social and economic life, and that global capitalism is the main force driving transnationalism. Using concepts of a "transnational social field" and "deterritorialized nation-state", Basch et al. (1994) argue that "the nation's people may live
anywhere in the world and still not live outside the state" (1994: 269; Kearney, 1991; Rodriguez, 1996). This formulation is problematic in three ways. First, the absence of a discussion of issues of membership or citizenship is puzzling, given that it pervades migrant and sending state discourse and action. Second, their use of "global capitalism" as the prime mover leads them to overlook the role of an active state in creating transnational public spheres (see, R. Smith, 1997, 1998; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Guarnizo, 1998; Portes et al., 1999; Portes, 1999). Third, the concept of "deteritorialized nation state" fails to appreciate that territoriality is a defining dimension of the nation state because it holds a monopoly on the use of violence and also on the use of resources extracted from and recognition by the collectivity in that territory, and that many migrant actions are directed at the home state (R. Smith, 1998; see M.P. Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Calhoun, 1994). It is, for example, hardly the same "state" that meets with migrants in the US to encourage remittances to Zacatecas, and that uses deadly force to discourage Oaxacan labor and community organizers in Mexico.

Recent work on transnationalism raises or addresses many of these larger issues, but does not theorize the membership manifest in the relationship between states and migrants or does so only implicitly (see Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Mahler, 1998; Kyle, forthcoming, 2001; Gledhill, 1994; Portes et al., 1999). Many use the concept of “transnational community”, arguing that these communities provide a "potentially potent counter" (Portes, 1996; Portes et al. 1999) to the disenfranchising effects of economic globalization, echoing Marshall's juxtaposition of membership and markets. But the concept of transnational communities cannot describe many forms of transnational life, which seem better conceived as adaptations to, rather than broad challenges to, economic globalization. And the transnationalization of political life and of the imagined community is frequently an extension of non-democratic, home country politics, and hence is more a strategy for political control than a counter to global capitalism (M. Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; R. Smith 1997, 1998; Portes, Guarnizo and Landholt, 1999).

Other work has broached issues of membership and state-migrant relations. Guarnizo’s (1998) concept of "transnational social formations" (i.e. nation-state formations that involve more than one national territory) analyzes "transnational practices and relations between states and the transmigrant population". But this concept does not discuss how state-migrant dynamics attempt to redefine the terms and limits of membership in a political community, not recognize what is distinctly political about these state-migrant relations. Despite differences, Goldring (1998, 1997) and Smith (1998, 1995) both recognize the importance of political contestation in defining emerging migrant membership practices, as discussed below.

Membership and Citizenship as Instituted Processes.
The current analysis proposes re-conceptualizing membership and citizenship as instituted processes embedded within the context of transnational migration, and host and home state national development and political strategy within the world system. In this view, citizenship and membership are distinct but analytically related ways of belonging to and participating in a political community. As used here, citizenship refers to ties and relations between categories of persons and states, where these ties are in theory mutually enforceable and in general respected by other states or enforced by international treaties (see Tilly, 1996). Membership describes the broader relations and practices of belonging and participation in a political community. In the context of migration, membership is usually manifest in migrants’ or other diasporic members’ involvement in homeland public life, and can also be institutionalized via non-legal state structures or via non-state entities or structures, including human rights institutions or discourse. Citizenship enables migrants to participate directly in democratic, formal state institutions, such as voting, to have the chance to participate directly in governing and to gain control over state resources. Membership enables participation in less formal, but still often powerful, institutions or processes, but offers no such right to a chance to directly govern.

The difference between membership and citizenship as defined here is similar to what others call formal versus substantive citizenship (e.g. Goldring, 1998). While also useful, I think that reserving the term “citizenship” to describe rights given by states and practices linked to these rights makes sense precisely because possession of state–given citizenship rights still matter so much (see Soysal, 1994, for a different view). It is for this reason that migrants are fighting so hard -- via membership practices -- to expand these citizenship rights, and why so many in sending and receiving countries are resisting these changes.

The difference and limits between citizenship and membership are neither fixed nor eternal. Indeed, citizenship in its current form as an exclusive membership in what Hanagan (1999) calls a “consolidated state” (meaning a national state with a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within a given territory, direct taxation, conscription and centralized administration) became the dominant model only in the 19th century. Memberships in other kinds of sovereign and non-sovereign entities have organized political life throughout history: the Holy Roman or Ottoman Empires, city states in Greece or the Hanseatic League, nomadic tribes, etc. Moreover, the conditions within which states are sovereign and within which they grant citizenship and negotiate membership have changed dramatically with the current era of economic and political integration, NAFTA and the European Union (see Sassen, 1996). Hence, we should expect further redefinition of membership and citizenship. Finally, citizenship and membership practices can be related: when migrants abroad exercise membership by lobbying for the right to vote in presidential elections from
abroad or dual citizenship, membership practices have created new citizenship rights that can be exercised extra-territorially. The practices described in the Mexican case are not historically or comparatively unique. Many sending states and their expatriate populations currently engage in the extra-territorial conduct of home country or migrant politics: the Dominican Republic, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Portugal, India, Italy, and the Philippines, to name a few (Graham, 1997; Guarnizo, 1998; Mangione, 1998; Perlmutter, 1998; Smith, 1997; Goldring, 1998; Blanc-Szanton, 1998; Glick-Schiller, 1999). Reassessing migrant membership in the home country's political community usually serves as a strategy for confronting home country crises in national identity and development, often related to changes in the relationship to the US or world system, to former colonies (Smith, 1993) or territorial possessions or (former Soviet) republics (Tilly, 1998). Finally, diasporic and nationalist movements formed other kinds of extra- or non-territorial forms of membership, especially where such states did not already or did not yet exist, as in the Polish, Irish, Jewish, Armenian, and Palestinian cases (Tololyan, 1998; Hanagan, 1998; Smith, 1998; Cohen, 1997).

DOMESTIC POLITICS ABROAD, DIASPORIC POLITICS AT HOME, AND THE REDEFINITION OF MEMBERSHIP, CITIZENSHIP AND NATION:

The Program for Mexican Communities Abroad as an Attempt to Create the Mexican Global Nation

"Why now?" was the question Mexican migrants asked Consular and other state officials who approached them in the early 1990s to find out how best to serve them. Beginning with this question helps advance the paper's larger task of analyzing the current historical context within which the processes of membership, citizenship and nation are being redefined. This section analyzes why and how the Mexican state attempted to create the "Mexican global nation", setting up the analysis of migrant membership practices that follows.

The dramatic resurgence and expansion in the scope and intensity of the Mexican state's professed interest in Mexicans in the US follows pattern of waxing and waning interest determined by the political importance and definition of US-residing migrants (see Sherman, 1999; Goldring, 1997; Gonzalez Gutierrez, 1997, 1995; Smith, 1998, 1995, 1993). A defeated Mexican state attempted to protect its nationals after losing its northern territory to the US in 1848. An authoritarian Mexican state used Mexican agents to surveil Mexican expatriate politics in the US during the Porfiriato (1887-1911), with US cooperation (Gutierrez, 1986; see Miller, 1981, on authoritarian sending state surveillance in Europe). The revolutionary Mexican state protected US-residing Mexicans as part of a strategy of regime legitimation during the 1920s-40s. A slightly left-leaning state created the Comision mixta de enlace (Hispanic Commission) providing a forum
for the Mexican elite to meet with Chicano academics and students as representatives of *Mexico de afuera* (Mexico outside Mexico; see Gutierrez, 1986).

The current intensification of Mexico's relationship with Mexicans in the US is part of its larger policy of *acercamiento* with the US (Smith, 1996; Garcia Acevedo, 1996). Concretely, the intent is to intensify, broaden and institutionalize the relationship with Mexicans in the US, thus significantly changing migrants actual and potential membership practices. These steps include: the Paisano program, which tries to safeguard the rights of returning migrants and reverse the perception of them as "pochos" (pathetic figures who do not fit in either the US or Mexico; see Monsivais, cited in Zazueta, 1983; see Smith 1995; 1993); youth exchanges and scholarship programs; and the establishment of 21 Cultural Institutes across the US, described by then Secretary of Foreign Relations Fernando Solana as potential "political agents" contributing to Mexico's foreign policy goals (Garcia Acevedo, 1996).

Creating the Program and a New Context for Migrant Membership

The flagship of the *acercamiento* policy on migration is the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad. Formed in 1990 at the behest of then President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the Program's stated goals are to maintain cultural links between Mexico, its emigrants, and their children; to foster investment in the home communities in Mexico; to protect the rights and promote the development of the Mexicans in the US. While these non-political goals do describe much Program activity, analyzing its activities, rhetoric and historical context indicates that it was part of a larger strategy addressing the US, the global system, Mexico's domestic politics, and migrants increasing importance in Mexico.

The Program was on one level a response to the growing realization of the magnitude of US-bound migration and its economic contributions in Mexico. The legalization of more than 3.5 million people -- more than half of whom were Mexican -- through the "amnesty" provisions of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act shocked the Mexican elite out of their assumption that few migrants settled in the US (author interview, 1991). Moreover, by the early 1990s, remittances from Mexico were, conservatively, more than US $2 billion, an amount roughly equal to Mexico's earnings from agricultural export, to 56% of its maquila (export zone) earnings, and 59% of tourist earnings, and accounted for 10% of income and 3% of GDP nationwide (Durand et al., 1996). My fieldnotes show Program and Mexican state officials emphasizing to migrants the importance of their remittances and investments.

The Program also addressed the increasing transnational political activity by opposition groups and Mexican state governments. Then opposition leader and later opposition Senator Adolfo Aguilar Zinzer
explained Mexico's sudden surge in interest in Mexican migrants in the US this way in a 1987 interview:

There is recognition that there are many initiatives developing spontaneously in the private sector and among governors and other officials on both sides of the border that are being carried out autonomously. The Gobernacion Ministry is anxious about the possible political consequences of this, so they are trying to control it. (de la Garza and Vargas, 1992:97)

These autonomous activities included the creation of the Program for Zacatecanos Abroad in 1985 by the PRI dominated Zacatecas state government, and Zacatecan lobbying for creation of a similar federal Program and better treatment by customs officials. The opposition's actions were more important. The conservative National Action Party (PAN) blocked border crossings to draw US media attention to their pro-democracy message during the 1980s. During the mid-1980s, the left leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution's (PRD) work with Mexican pro-democracy movements already active in the US, particularly on the US-Mexico border and in California (de la Garza and Vargas, 1992). Most important was the unexpected and historic break with the PRI by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas to head the PRD ticket in the 1988 presidential campaign, and the alliance it made possible between migrant leaders and members of the PRD, including an insurgent elite (Martinez, 1998; Perez Godoy, 1998). In his 1988 campaign, Cardenas mobilized huge crowds in Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, even visiting striking agricultural workers in Pennsylvania. PRD leaders in California reported being under surveillance in the US and, during later elections, being searched once they entered Mexico (author interviews, 1993, 1998).

The policy of acercamiento with the US was the most important structure within which the creation of the Program and new membership practices were set. Acercamiento represented a profound rethinking of Mexico's relationship with the US and its integration into the world economy. To understand how channeling expatriate politics in the US relates to these larger strategies, we must briefly analyze Mexico's recent politico-economic history.

Mexico's neo-liberal turn, beginning in 1982 with President de la Madrid and continued by his successors, broke with the historic popular pact by which the PRI had ruled since the 1930s. Stated briefly, this pact promised "peace for prosperity": labor was kept tightly controlled in return for wage increases in certain sectors; opposition parties were allowed to compete for election provided the PRI kept power; peasants and urban dwellers were subsidized in return for allegiance; and the government assumed a nationalistic stance towards the outside world and foreign intervention, especially by the United States, powerful transnational corporations, and international financial institutions like the IMF (Cornelius et al. 1989, 1994; Dominguez 1982). The "pact" imposed generous terms for cooptation for many, and selective use of violence and coercion for dissenters.
Neo-liberalism opened the PRI up to the charge that it had abandoned Mexico and the poor. To defend itself and soften the effects of the neo-liberal adjustment policies, President Salinas initiated the National Solidarity Program (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad), using funds gained by selling state owned companies to fund public works projects. While Solidarity helped many poor people, it was also used to sanction political enemies and reward friends, in what Dresser (1991; 1994) describes as "Neo-popular solutions to Neo-liberal problems." After Solidarity ended in 1994, the use of violence against political enemies, especially indigenous people, increased dramatically (Stahler-Sholk, 1998; Kampwirth, 1998).

Breaking this pact also enabled Mexico to profoundly alter its stance towards the US and towards Mexicans in the US. Acercamiento required that Mexico abandon the nationalistic, distrustful, sometimes hostile stance towards the United States, so that economic integration with the US via NAFTA would not compromise Mexico's integrity and so that links with Mexicans and Mexican Americans would not be seen as Mexican intervention in United States internal affairs (de la Garza, 1995; Guarnizo, 1998; Smith, 1996). With Mexican identity not being defined so much in opposition to the United States as before, it became possible for Mexico to also redefine its relationship with Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United States (interview, 1995), and to revise concepts and practices of membership and citizenship. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this change lies in the Mexican Nation initiative of the Mexican Development Plan for 1995-2000, which plans to "strengthen cultural links with Mexicans abroad and with people with Mexican roots outside Mexico, ... to recognize that the Mexican nation extends beyond its physical borders" (page 8). This position was stated succinctly to me by the Program's first Director, Dr. Roger Diaz de Cossio: "This is my job: to create the Mexican global nation."

Redefining the relationship with Mexicans in the US made it possible for Mexico to pursue its domestic and foreign policy interests directly through its nationals or former nationals in the US. It did so first by deepening relations with, and attempting to empower, Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the US by supportive engagement with civil society organizations such as the National Organization of La Raza, and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, and state level bi-lingual organizations. Program officials describe this as part of a strategy to "make Mexican Americans our friends" and help them become "stronger friends". Secondly, Mexico hired public relations consultants to lobby for NAFTA, and according to Charles Kamasaki of NCLR, they helped broker a deal that the Chicano Caucus would support NAFTA in return for creation of the North American Development Bank (NADBANK) and a retraining fund for displaced workers.

Mexico also wanted to control and channel the deterritorialized conduct of Mexican politics in the US. According to Diaz de Cossio, the Program served Salinas by getting NAFTA passed, and quieting the
inquiet opposition politics in the US (author interviews, 1993, 1995). Evidence of this strategy's success comes in contrasting the massive mobilizations for Cardenas in the US in 1988 campaign with the virtual lack of mobilization in 1994. Coopting and channeling the disaffection of US-residing Mexicans through the Program helped control the image of Mexico presented to the US media, and more importantly helped legitimize the regime at home through its good works abroad. Legitimacy has become increasingly important in the 1990s as Mexican elections have become more competitive and transparent (Amparo Casar and de la Madrid, 1998; Perez Godoy, 1998). Yet, as we discuss later, the PRI's attempts to use the Program as an extra-territorial party organization for electoral gain have backfired in important cases, inadvertently helping create a transnational public sphere with greater levels of democratic contestation.

The Mexican State's Attempts to Institutionalize a Thin Form of Migrant Membership in a "Global Nation"

The Mexican state has attempted to institutionalize migrant membership in five ways. The first four serve the PRI's interests in attempting to establish a weak, thin form of membership that Program official and scholar Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez (1997) calls "diasporic membership" (see Smith, 1998). The fifth is the unanticipated result of processes of democratization in Mexico which have created opportunities for effective, institutionally strong mobilization for US-residing migrants, thus thickening membership.

First, the Mexican state has insinuated itself into previously largely autonomous transnational spheres of action, registering more than 500 existing or new community of origin clubs by mid-1998. They also organized sports leagues, and supported US based organizations (e.g. Bilingual associations) aimed at empowering Mexican Americans. Second, the Program has helped establish state level Offices of Emigrant Affairs in the Governor's offices in states of highest out-migration (e.g. Guanajato, Puebla, Michoacan, Oaxaca, Zacatecas), and parallel state level Federations of community of origin committees in the US. These parallel institutions are meant to foster direct, lasting links and effective coordination of activities between Mexicans abroad and their home communities. They also attempt to advocate for migrants vis-a-vis a Mexican bureaucracy that often regards them as "pochos". The PRI also used them for partisan purposes in recent elections, with ironic results.

Third, the Program has institutionalized itself by surviving two sexenios, or six-year presidential terms. This matters because most programs last only one sexenio, and because it is staffed mostly by foreign service officers who were trained or lived in the US, supported NAFTA and see close US-Mexico ties as essential to Mexico's future (1995, author interviews). Fourth, Mexico has passed a "no loss of nationality"
amendment to the Mexican Constitution, which provides that one no longer loses Mexican nationality by acquiring citizenship in another country. Possessing Mexican nationality does not enable one to vote in Mexican elections, and has mainly helped migrant elites who are now able to become US citizens and still carry a Mexican passport, own land that would be restricted to non-nationals or non-citizens, and enjoy certain other advantages. The Mexican state passed this measure in the wake of anti-immigrant politics such as Proposition 187 in California, intend it to help Mexican Americans defend themselves in American politics as citizens while still maintaining strong links to Mexico. Towards this end, Program officials routinely exhort Mexican immigrants to take out US citizenship and become politically active.

The fifth change results from democratization in Mexico, and has most affected migrant membership. In 1996, PRD Senator Porfirio Munoz Ledo included as part of a Reform of the State legislation making it legal for Mexicans in the US to vote in Mexican Presidential elections in 2000 (Martinez, 1998). That the opposition could force such provisions on an unwilling PRI is evidence of the significant decentralization of power away from an omnipotent President and towards a system where Congress matters and the Chamber of Deputies, or lower house, is not controlled by the PRI (Amparo Casar and de la Madrid, 1998; Amparo Casar, 1997; Perez Godoy, 1998). There were two upshots. First, the failure of the Mexican Congress to pass laws implementing this Constitutional change catalyzed a transnational organizing campaign among Mexican immigrants and others in Mexico and the US demanding that the state do so, an ironic "exportation" of democracy (see Martinez, 1998a). Second, the Constitutional changes gave migrants a Mexico-based, institutionally embedded basis for their struggle, while still using their location outside the US to organize free from coercion. In terms of our theories, we can say that decentralization of power in Mexico led to the establishment of a citizenship right in the Mexican constitution (to vote for president), and catalyzed migrant politics, leading to an intensification of migrant claims making and other political membership practices.

**DEGREES AND DIMENSIONS OF MEMBERSHIP IN A TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE:**

**The Mexican Case**

The previous section of this paper laid out an analysis of why the Mexican state created the Program, and how it has attempted to institutionalize a "thin" form of migrant membership. The current section analyzes how migrant membership and a transnational public sphere have actually worked and evolved, focusing on how Zacatecan and Oaxacan migrants have experienced different kinds of migrant membership, and how migrants have become more central to Mexican politics with the election of Vicente Fox as president of
Mexico in July of 2000. We analyze how migrant membership practices in each case are embedded within relevant local, national and global institutions and conditions, how the Mexican state's actions in creating a transnational public sphere have led to unintended consequences, and how democratization at home has changed membership practices abroad.

The extent to which the place of Mexican migrants in the US in Mexican politics has changed would be hard to overstate. From being a marginal group whose interests were sometimes considered, and who were perjoratively described as “pochos”, they are called “true heroes” by Mexico’s new president, a central and essential part of the Mexican imagined community. And Mexican politics is being transnationally conducted as never before: three US-residing Mexicans ran for Congress in 2000, and one won; a US-residing immigrant is running for mayor of the large city of Jerez, Zacatecas, and the five candidates for that office came to Los Angeles recently to debate in front of Zacatecano migrants.

**Zacatecans -- Expatriate Politics Reflecting Mexico’s Transformation: From Corporate Membership to Democratic Engagement and Contestation**

The Zacatecans have played an important role in the transnationalization of the conduct of contemporary Mexican politics. Indeed, one might argue that part of the blueprint for Fox’s 2000 strategy victory lay in the victory of Ricardo Monreal in the election for Governor of the state of Zacatecas, which has lost more population than perhaps any other state to migration. For example, 34 of its 57 municipios or counties lost population over the 1990s (NYT 6-19-01). Zacatecans transnational politics offers an interesting case of migrant membership embedded in other structures and practices, which evolved. The Zacatecans were a model for the organization of the federal Program for Mexican Communities Abroad started in 1990; the Governor of Zacatecas started such a program in 1985. Over the course of more than a decade, there was an increasing full corporate relationship between the Mexican state and the federal Program, the state of Zacatecas and Zacatecans in the US. The concrete benefits of these arrangements included remittances and legitimacy for the Mexican and Zacatecan states as migrants came to view them as entities concerned with their welfare, and recognition and political influence for Zacatecan leaders abroad. The Zacatecas state government started, and the federal government later copied a two for one and then a three for one program, whereby money remitted by migrants for public works projects in Mexico would be matched by state, local and federal monies. Zacatecans in Los Angeles were so important to the governor of Zacatecas that a practice emerged of holding court in the Mexican embassy every year, as the governor came up for the festivities surrounding the Miss Zacatecas pageant in Los Angeles. This provided a forum for both Zacatecan state
leaders and immigrant leaders to make deals, demonstrate their influence with the other, and consolidate political support.

However, frictions developed within the Federation over the nature of this corporate relationship with the Consulate, and became one factor contributing to the split within the Federation and formation of the Front and support of the PRD and Monreal. The split within the Federation emerged within the context of two causally related processes: democratization in Mexico and the PRI's attempts to control it; and the "new federalism", particularly the decentralization of administrative practices governing the use of public funds at the local level, including those remitted by Mexicans abroad. Embedded within these two processes, migrant membership democratically thickened. The new federalism introduced in the mid 1990s changed the locus of local control over monies remitted by migrants out of the hands of Committees they had appointed into the hand of the local municipal president and a committee appointed by him (from author interviews, 1996, 1998; Goldring 1997). A faction critical of this policy, and critical of the Consulate’s growing influence in the main Zacatecas organization in Los Angeles, the Zacatecas Federation, was ousted from power in favor of one that embraced this closer corporatist control by the Consulate. Perhaps the most transparent illustration of the PRI's political use of the Zacatecan Federation was its creation of and attempt to manipulate the Confederation of Zacatecan Federations. Created as an umbrella organization for all Zacatecans in the US in late 1997, Consular officials attempted to reconduct an election that “their” candidate lost. Critics say the intent was to use the Confederation to better control the politics of Zacatecans abroad and to mobilize support for PRI candidates in the 1998 Governor's race and the 2000 Presidential election.

This was the stage onto which entered a huge political opportunity for the faction critical of the Fund 26 and the Federation's increasingly close relationship with the Consulate: Ricardo Monreal's candidacy for Governor of Zacatecas. Monreal was an important young PRI politician in Zacatecas, and at the age of 37 had already been a Congressman, a Senator, an official in the largest city government, and President of the PRI and another statewide organization. When Monreal was not chosen to be the PRI candidate for governor, he split with the PRI and formed the Citizens Alliance, an umbrella group under which he channeled the energies of the PRD, the growing protest vote that previously went to the PAN (Arteaga, 1998), previously unenfranchised groups, and most importantly, huge number of the dissident priistas, some 20,000 of whom demonstrated with him when he launched his independent candidacy. In the end, he defeated the PRI candidate, Pepe Olvera, by 8% in the state reporting the highest percent of PRI votes (74%) in the 1994 Presidential elections.

Monreal’s support was from the what some call the “PRI inconforme”("nonconforming PRI") -- Priistas by history, thought and action but operating under the label of another party, in part to protest
undemocratic party candidate selection mechanisms. Monreal joined a growing group of former priistas, from national PRD leaders Cuahutemoc Cardenas to Senate leader Porfirio Munoz Ledo, who have won some measure of power through competitive politics and decentralization of power and have provided migrants with access to institutionalized base of support within Mexico (see Perez Godoy, 1998; Martinez, 1998; Smith, 1998). The right to vote from abroad in the year 2000 elections has been a crucial issue separating the PRI from the "PRI inconforme".

Monreal’s candidacy split the Zacatecas Federation in two, with the faction closer to the Consulate staying in the Federation and supporting Olvera, and the other faction supporting Monreal. This split mirrors the PRI and the PRI inconforme in Mexico. In return for migrants’ support, Monreal has put migrant issues on his state’s and on the national agenda and changed the place of migrants in Zacatecas politics. He made three trips to California (more than his opponents) during this campaign, and was covered by the Zacatecas media doing so. Zacatecan academics believe this helped mobilize a pro-Monreal vote and linked Monreal with democratization, change and inclusion of immigrants. He has helped to give national prominence to migrant membership issues and argued that including migrants in Mexico's public life is necessary for Mexican democracy. Second, Monreal has promised to change the relationship between Zacatecans abroad and the state government, and in 2001 promised to introduce a bill to enable Zacatecans abroad to vote in state elections. He has also named a prominent former Zacatecas Federation leader who broke to help form the Frente Civico Zacatecan to represent Zacatecans there, as a kind of secretary of migrant affairs for the state government of Zacatecas. And he has promised to run the Zacatecas Two for One program under the old rules, not the new ones, giving migrants more control (see also Goldring, 1998). In keeping these campaign promises, Monreal makes plausible future claims that he is making government more accountable to all Zacatecans, including the "absent ones" in the US, and positions himself well vis-à-vis wider migrant populations in future elections.

**Oaxacans: Attenuated, Contested Membership While Resisting Co-optation and "Scaling Up"**

Oaxacans present a marked contrast to the Zacatecans in terms of the substance of their membership practices and claims and institutions within which they are embedded. This is especially so for indigenous Oaxacans, who are among the most marginalized sectors in one of Mexico's poorest states. Zacatecans and Oaxacans have different issues and different historical relations with the Mexican and American states, with local and global economies, and different kinds of semi-autonomous migrant practices and institutions. All this makes initial Oaxacan citizenship and membership in Mexico less substantive than Zacatecan, and
affects how transnational practices thicken and thin, strengthen or weaken, their membership. Factors helping thicken Oaxacan migrant membership include their ability to "scale up" (Fox, 1996), the freedom from repression and access to US media that residence in the US offers, and the political opportunity of the Zapatistas rebellion/uprising. Factors thinning their membership include their integration into perhaps the most exploitative and globally integrated Mexican and US labor markets, their US context of incorporation, and their antagonistic relationship with the Mexican state. The end result has been a different kind of migrant membership, and the recent joining of Oaxacan interests with US-residing, "non-conforming PRI" via the Vote 2000 Coalition.

Oaxacans, especially indigenous groups like the Indigenous Oaxacan Binational Front (FIOB), as a group had a more antagonist relationship with the Mexican state than their mestizo compatriots from Zacatecas. They are also poorer on the whole in the US, and less likely to have affluent businessmen leaders, as do the Zacatecans. They are also more geographically dispersed and have been in the US for less time, making prospects for political mobilization here more difficult (Kearney, 1991; Smith 1995, 1998; Rivera, 1998; Neiburg, 1988; Carrasco, 1961; Wolf, 1957). These factors all create weaker Oaxacan migrant membership compared to Zacatecans.

The stands Zacatecans and Oaxacans each took on Mexican state proposals for dual nationality illustrate their different relations with it. Zacatecans publicly supported dual nationality, while the Oaxacans called it "partial" and criticized it for continuing to dis-enfranchise indigenous people (author interviews, 1995 and 1996; FIOB documents, 1995). These positions reflect the Zacatecans corporate and the Oaxacans antagonistic relationship with the Mexican state, but also their US context of incorporation. Zacatecans, especially their leaders, are US citizens or permanent residents eligible for US citizenship, while Oaxacans and their leaders are mainly either undocumented immigrants or legal immigrants who have more of their families in Mexico. Dual nationality benefitted Zacatecan leaders because they could take out US citizenship and still hold Mexican passports, own land in certain areas in Mexico and be majority owners in business. For the mostly undocumented, poor Oaxacans, only dual citizenship linked to the right to vote from abroad would do because it would end their dis-enfranchisement in Mexico.

Other aspects of transnationalization, globalization and US incorporation have strengthened Oaxacan migrant membership. Being in the US has helped Oaxacans forge links with US based human rights groups and other organizations like the United Farmworkers Union (UFW), and NGOs such as California Legal Rural Assistance, and to attend the first Indigenous Congress organized by the Zapatistas in Chiapas in 1996/7 (Rivera, 1998: 5; Kearney 1998). In addition to organizing in the migrant destination areas and establishing field offices in Oaxaca and California, the FIOB has organized a base of twenty-two
communities in Oaxaca. They have signed work agreements with the state of Oaxaca (Rivera, 1998), and organized binational mobilizations linking their local issues with larger indigenous issues. They also use their access to US media and supporting organizations to pressure local caciques and others who use force to repress them to, for example, apply pressure for the release of kidnapped leaders. Moreover, the charged context of acercamiento has made it more important for the Mexican state to attend to Oaxacans demands, at least publicly. Despite conditions that would tend to weaken their membership, such as extreme marginalization and dispersion in Mexico and the US, Oaxacans have been able to strengthen their political claims making and migrant membership.

The "VOTE 2000" Movement and the Election of Vicente Fox in 2000: Migrant Membership Claims Based in Citizenship Rights (in the Mexican Constitution) and Practiced Abroad 4

A final case of claims-making and migrant membership is what I call the Vote 2000 movement, composed of migrants in the US and Mexico, opposition leaders from the PRD and PAN, “non-conforming” priistas, Mexican and US academics, NGOs and others. This became an increasingly important issue leading up to and in the 2000 presidential elections, in which the eventual winner, the PANista Vicente Fox, made support for migrants abroad an important part of his campaign, in contradistinction to the PRI’s refusal, during summer of 1999, to enact the legislation needed to make this Constitutional right into law. The campaign to get the vote from abroad began with PRDistas abroad in the 1980s (Martinez, 1998), and gained impetus recently when it was institutionalized via the Mexican Constitutional changes of 1996 (Perez Godoy, 1998) and through a newly created and surprisingly autonomous Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) (Smith, 1998). Proximately, the vote from abroad issue gained greater prominence when a group of Mexican and Mexican American expatriates and activists began publicizing the issue in 1998, and an Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) report concluded that it was feasible to implement the right to vote for migrants for the year 2000 presidential elections, despite the PRI’s protestations. These events catalyzed migrants’ transnational politics by giving a stronger legal and political basis to their membership claims. Their membership claims were aimed at securing citizenship rights, and that they had a Constitutional basis aided them greatly.

Whether migrants can vote from abroad matters for practical and symbolic reasons. First, nearly 8 million Mexican nationals live in the US, about half of all Mexicans have a relative in the US, and about one-third will make a trip in their lifetime (Massey and Espinosa, 1997). Hence, migrants could theoretically determine a Mexican Presidential election, though requirements of current electoral laws make it unlikely that more than a few hundred thousand would vote if this right were implemented.5 Second, public sentiment,
especially among migrants, increasingly views awarding “los ausentes” (“absent ones” or migrants) the right to vote as a condition for making Mexico truly democratic (Martinez, 2000). To oppose this right is to oppose democracy and side with an authoritarian past. "Never Again a Mexico Without US!” is a somewhat ironic slogan of one Vote 2000 coalition movement. Finally, Fox’s advisors believe that the migrant vote was important in their candidate’s victory in 2000.

The Vote 2000 movement significantly changed the nature of migrant membership claims making during the campaign. First, it helped propel the issue to national prominence and to move control over debate on such issues out of Mexico City into migrant sending states, such as the relatively unimportant state of Zacatecas, whose small Autonomous University has hosted several forums on the issue, even publishing the Declaration of Zacatecas in 1998, which proclaimed -- with the support of an ambitious Governor Monreal -- that migrants should be given the right to vote from abroad and to participate in public life in Mexico. Second, it has fostered a broad US-residing migrant-Mexican domestic opposition coalition with strong roots both in Mexican opposition parties and groups and in US civil society, including Latino neighborhood and political organizations. Finally, the VOTE 2000 Movement has helped strengthen defense of human rights and civil society, drawing on horizontal links of migrant groups in the US and in Mexico, and vertical links to the opposition and non-conforming priistas in Mexico and to the US media.

The Election of Vicente Fox in 2000: Prospects for Migrant Membership and Citizenship

The election of Vicente Fox as president in the 2000 elections raises a number of issues for diasporic or migrant membership and citizenship. First, Fox’s advisors believe that support by migrants played an important role in his election (author interviews, 2000). Moreover, the PRI’s strategic error in not approving the right to vote in 1999 handed Fox the issue and became part of his larger strategy of becoming the candidate of the opposition, with significant support from both left and right. He was able to paint the PRI as anti-democratic and anti-change because it did not want to include migrants in the US in Mexican political life. The results were impressive. For example, Fox got approximately 65% of the symbolic vote cast in Chicago, a PRD stronghold (Cano...). He also campaigned repeatedly and actively in the US, while the PRI candidate shied away. Fox also gave out thousands of 5-minute, international calling cards in the US for migrants to call their relatives in Mexico and urge them to vote for Fox. Since the election, Fox has continued to reiterate his support for migrant issues, repeating in the first heady weeks after his election that he wanted to be the president of “all 118 million Mexicans” -- 100 million in Mexico, and 18 million in the US (author’s field notes), reiterated his belief that Mexicans in the US should be allowed to vote for
presidential elections abroad, and voiced support for the notion of electoral representation in the Mexican Congress for Mexicans living in the US. His first visit to the US as president-elect was not to Washington DC, but to meet with Mexican leaders in East Harlem, New York City (the first leader of a foreign country since Fidel Castro in 1961 to visit East Harlem, I think). Finally, Fox has appointed Juan Hernandez, who served as his informal chief of staff for his campaign for the last several years, as the first cabinet level Advisor to the President for Mexicans Abroad. While his work continues the tradition established under the PRI, it has a new intensity and status because of Hernandez’s closeness to the President.

My bet is that Fox will use migrant support as part of a strategy of governing as the opposition, selling his agenda as a break with the corrupt years of the PRI, and depicting himself as fixing a broken piece of Mexican democracy by creating ways for migrants to be included, to make the “Mexico de afuera” part of the Mexican nation. Were he to be able to implement his program, he would further strengthen and institutionalize membership practices and citizenship rights, including voting rights (which would move migrants membership and citizenship more to the right on state institutional axis of Figure 1 [not shown here]). The extent to which migrants ability to democratically contest their positions will depend on a variety of factors, including the extent both to which migrants are successful in expanding their citizenship rights, and to which the Fox administration politicizes (or does not) institutions reaching out to them.

Fox will face challenges in the US and Mexico that will affect migrant membership and citizenship. In Mexico, a key factor will be opposition from the PRI, and to a lesser extent, the PRD. The PRI is split between those who think that the party must reach out to migrants to make up for its mistake, so it can contest for migrant support, and others who don’t want migrants involved, in part because they believe migrants will vote against them. People appointed by the PRI still staff much of the Mexican bureaucracy, the PRI has the largest minorities in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies (House), and a plurality of states are governed by PRI governors. Many of these governors have their own state level programs for their migrants abroad, which they could use to help the PRI in Mexico. Fox will also face challenges in the US. He has come into office with his own vision for deepening relations with the US, including a guest worker program, but also a deeper kind of longer term integration between the US and Mexico, one resembling integration in the European Union more than our current “free trade” agreement, including eventual elimination of border controls and more systematic integration of policies affecting both nations (such as drug trafficking). Yet as he moves to further strengthen migrants membership’ and citizenship, Fox must walk a delicate line in the US. When, for example, Fox assured migrants they counted by declaring that he wanted to be the president of all 118 million Mexicans, but glossed over the fact that more than half of the 18 million he
referred to are actually US-born Mexican Americans. The rhetoric of a Mexican president wanting to be
president of Mexican Americans in the US played poorly in the US. Moreover, I have repeatedly seen US
and Mexican officials wince at the image of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans waiting outside the Los
Angeles Consulate to vote for president of Mexico, raising uncomfortable issues of sovereignty and political
limits. US officials are telling Mexican officials that how these rights are implemented will be key “the
logistics” could be a problem for us, one US governor is quoted as telling a Mexican politician I spoke with.
The current talk is of a representational scheme, whereby Mexicans in the US would elect representatives
who would then be able to vote for them and/or represent them in Mexico.

In addition to Fox’s new politics of inclusion for migrants in the US, the rest of the political system
has also responded. For example, the defeated PRI has formed a parliamentary committee on migration, and
appointed seven federal senators to work in cultivating relations with Mexicans in one of seven regions in the
US, wherein reside migrants from their respective states. The change in rhetoric and positions with respect to
migrants in the US is remarkable. Whereas the PRI’s actions blocked the right to vote from abroad less than
two years ago in 1999, in 2001 PRI senators now come to the US to talk of the PRI’s “grave errors,”
including with respect to migrants, and stating that “we have been given the bill. We did not get the
presidency” and must now become a “mature opposition”. PRI politicians in the US now argue for how they
are helping to develop a plan to implement the right to vote, focusing on the logistics and meeting with
American legislators to see what is political feasible in the US -- the focus in not on whether, but how, this
right should be implemented. It is also interesting that the PRI is cultivating this relationship with migrants
via gubernatorial and congressional power, a sign of its loss of executive power and of the increasing
decentralization of power in Mexico.

ITALY AND ITS DIASPORA: EVOLVING RELATIONS UNDER LIBERAL AND FASCIST
REGIMES

Emigration has been a pervasive reality for the Italian state since soon after its founding in the 1860s. Its
emigration policies have been designed to help consolidate both its liberal and fascist nation-building
projects, and to help both of these regimes pursue their foreign policies within a relatively weak position
within the world system. Under the liberal regime, autonomous transnational lobbying and discourse focused
on the state, pushing it to regulate certain aspects of emigration and emigrant life, including creating the
General Commission on Emigration and passing legislation to regulate remittances. Under the fascist regime,
the state attempted to use emigration policy to control autonomous organizations within the Italian diaspora and within the Italian government and to promote its colonial policy abroad. The evolution of migrant membership practices and creation of transnational public spheres in this case can be analyzed using the instituted process framework described above.

The main focus here is on the Italian state's relations with its diaspora in the Americas, where its strategy fell closer to a diasporic (emigrant) than a homelands (migrant return) policy. During the liberal period in particular, the Italian state's policy in this period was not to directly organize its emigrants in the US beyond traditional consular outreach because, as one contemporary Italian observer put it, "the people of the United States will look on us with suspicion" (Foerster, 1919: 481). However, the Italian state did embark on a broadly based diasporic policy throughout the Americas that included the direct work of the General Commission on Emigration, and the indirect work of subsidizing an extensive network of private organizations, including Catholic and Socialist organizations, as well as local organizations similar to the community of origin clubs in the Mexican case, and those teaching Italian history, culture and language classes. These policies were pursued throughout the Americas, especially before World War Two. We must also note that it was not just state policies that helped create transnational public spheres and affect migrant membership, but also non-state institutions such as the Catholic Church, as we will see (see also work of Peggy Levitt, 1997). Homelands policies were pursued with great vigor during the 1950s-70s among Italian migrants in Europe, and included agencies dedicated to making migrant life and return to Italy easier were significantly supported by the Italian state. Heisler (1984) characterizes the result of these institutions as twofold: they fostered isolation from the host society and "simultaneously reinforced ties with Italy". Heisler describes these as "exclaves" -- in deliberate contradistinction to "enclave" -- within a host country.

The Southern Problem and Diasporic Policies Under the Liberals

The new Italy faced at least two domestic political questions that ended up implicating the relations between the Italian state and its diaspora: the Southern question and the Roman Problem. Italy's version of dependent development was the "southern question" -- how to deal with the disparity in development between the relatively prosperous north and the "backward" south. As in the Mexican and other cases, the policies that were ultimately adopted reflected the domestic politics of the country. In Italy, the compromise was between the landowning class in southern Italy and the educated, liberals in the north. Southern landholders initially opposed emigration because it destabilized social relations, raised the price of labor, and gave peasants the idea that they could move freely, rather than be bound to a particular place (Cinel, 1991). However, when
American remittances flowed in more strongly after 1880, the opinions of both southern and northern elites began to change.

Consistent with the liberal thinking of the day, it was theorized that remittances would solve Italy's development dilemma: since liberal theory held that the lack of capital was the main cause of the south's underdevelopment, the infusion of remittance capital was envisioned to provide a sure solution. For northern elites, southern peasants would leave and return to become small farmers, buying plots with their American remittances. Southern landholders went along with this arrangement because it distracted the northern elite from the question of land reform. Hence, emigration was seen to be a painless solution to the southern question: the northern elite had their liberal economic policy, the southern elite had their land, and emigrants were assisted in leaving. This position was elaborated in the Faina report of the 1907-09 Parliament (Cinel, 1991).

Hence, Italy's answer to the southern question was to actively promote both the emigration of Italians, especially from the south, to other parts of the world, and their return and repatriation to Italy. This allowed Italy to avoid the political instability that the "southern question" might cause, so that emigration would, as one contemporary observer put it, serve as "a powerful safety valve against class hatreds". (Foerster, 1919: 476; Heisler: 1984: 330) In this way, Italy created a "new view of citizenship" resting on the assumption of both temporary emigration and eventual return. In fact, the provision of dual citizenship was actively promoted by some Italian politicians, and was requested repeatedly by Italian emigrants. However, most Italian politicians and most host countries (including the US and Argentina) did not respond favorably to these proposals, and they were not enacted (Foerster, 1919: 486-89). This circulatory logic embodied in the 1901 Emigration Act, which created the General Commission on Emigration, housed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which set the framework for relations between the Italian state and its diaspora for the first quarter of this century. The Commission's philosophy was that immigration was necessary and should be encouraged, but must also be temporary and periodic (Heisler, 1984; Foerster, 1919; Cordasco, 1990). This policy was a realistic response to the position of dependent development within the international system and to the divisive politics that Italy faced at home regarding its domestic economic development.

The Italian state took a number of steps that helped create a transnational public sphere for contestation and migrant membership practices, all linked to the state’s pursuit of its domestic and foreign policies. One interesting measure was its subsidies for the IstitutoColoniale, founded in 1906 with private funds. The Istituto had three main missions: a humanitarian one, as when it took up collections through its international networks of Italians for earthquakes in Italy; its promotion of "colonial action", aimed at promoting Italian colonization of the Americas, which amounted to little more than a colonialist dream
preceding fascism; and its attempts to federate Italian societies in the US (Foerster, 1919). In 1907 and 1911 the Istituto organized the first and second Congress of Italian Immigrants, where the immigrants pressed their demands for double citizenship, for greater protection of Italians abroad, and for the Italian government to convene an international conference on emigration, which it eventually did under Mussolini in the mid-1920s (Cannistraro and Rosoli, 1979). The Liberal state did actually change laws to make it easier and costless for Italians returning from abroad to re-acquire their Italian citizenship after losing it by acquiring some other citizenship (Foerster, 1919).

Another measure that helped create a sense of a diasporic Italy in the wider world was publication of the *Bolletino dell’Emigrazione* through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1902 to 1927, when the fascists suppressed the General Commission on Emigration and replaced it with the General Bureau of Italians Abroad. The *Bolletino* was the magazine of the Italian diaspora, circulated throughout the world, publishing in its 26 years more than 36,000 pages documenting the activities of Italians throughout the Americas and the world, and showing their links with Italy (Cordasco, 1990). While it was not read by most migrants abroad, it did circulate among community leaders, businessmen and the Italian language press abroad, helping to create a sense of connectedness and community.

**The Banchisti**

The Italian state was a central focus of action by migrants and other actors that resulted in the creation of transnational public spheres with contestation and claims making. This sphere was constituted through claims made on the Italian state, and the Italian state’s attempts to use its links with its diaspora to further its own foreign policy goals. These dynamics are illustrated in two examples, one involving the consulates and the other involving the *banchisti*, the private intermediaries who directed migrant remittances back to Italy, and provided other services linked to Italy. The *banchisti* usually operated through personal networks and friendships with immigrants. They were also unregulated and charged very high fees for their services, and sometimes absconded with the funds entrusted to them. In the late 1890s, immigrants in the US and their families and allies in Italy began to protest the exploitation by the *banchisti* and to demand intervention by the Italian state. Even the US government asked the Italian state to intervene. The *banchisti* and their allies in the US and in Italy answered angrily, and a vigorous debate ensued in Italy and the US. The debate shows that participants were quite concerned that the US government not view the Italian government’s attempts to gain these remittances as incursions into American sovereignty or as hurting American interests.

The Italian state wished to facilitate migrant remittances and protect immigrant savings, while the
banchisti desired to remain autonomous to pursue profit. Academic experts, politicians and other allies of immigrants and banchisti on both sides of the issue and both sides of the Atlantic debated in Italian and American newspapers, including Italian-language newspapers in the US, in the Italian Congress, in intergovernmental communications between the US and Italy, among bankers and banchisti in both countries, and in a variety of other commercial and private spheres in the US and Italy. Advocates for immigrants wanted a Banca Italo-Americano to be created, with central offices in Italy and branches in countries of destination, thus circumventing the banchisti altogether and capturing most migrant remittances (Nitti, 1958 and 1959).

The treasury secretary, Luigi Luzzatti, proposed the Nitti plan to create such a bank, which was denounced by the banchisti, by New York's Italian newspapers and by private bankers in Italy, who handled the banchisti's dealings in Italy. But popular opinion in the US and in Italy was heavily in favor of the proposal, and the allies of immigrants pressed their demands. A compromise was worked out in the Italian Congress by which the Banco di Napoli was empowered in 1901 to open branches that could send and receive emigrant savings which could be used for Italian development. While falling far short of the more than 50% of remittances it hoped to capture, the Banco did handle about 25% of remittances.

The example of the banchisti is important for the development of the theoretical arguments regarding transnational public spheres and a renegotiation of the concepts of nation, membership and citizenship. First, the Italian state served as a focus for the making of these and other demands by Italians abroad. Moreover, not only immigrants made demands, but also other interested actors such as the banchisti and their allies. And they made these demands not just in Italy and in Italian public arenas, but also in the US, especially in Italian-American arenas such as Italian language newspapers. The end result was a change in the Italian state's policy on banking which had important effects on the involved in both countries. This episode also played an important role in changing the orientation of the Italian state towards Italian emigrants, including changing the discourse on emigration, and generating the momentum towards creating the General Commission on Emigration in 1901.

The Roman Problem, the Scalabrini under Liberalism and Fascism

The second domestic political question that had implications for state-diaspora relations was the Roman Problem of relations between the Italian state and the Catholic Church. The crux of this problem was that the consolidation of the Italian Kingdom in the 1860s involved the conquest of the papal principalities and of Rome in 1870. Reacting in anger to being dispossessed of his earthly kingdom, the Pope refused to recognize the Italian Kingdom and forbade Italian Catholics from participating in politics, including voting.
This placed both Italian Catholics and the Italian state in untenable positions: one was forbidden under threat of loss of one’s eternal reward from participating in national politics, but national politics could not work without the participation of this majority of the population. The problem endured until 1929 when Mussolini and Pope Pius XI signed a treaty recognizing the Vatican’s sovereignty and making Catholicism the official state religion of Italy (D’Agostino, 1993: 126).

In this context was born the Pious Society, founded by Bishop Scalabrini in 1887. Scalabrini was part of a minority movement of Catholics that attempted to improve relations between the Vatican and the Italian state. He created a new order of priests, whose pastoral mission was to minister to the needs of migrants and whose activities would not be limited by local parish territory, but rather, would extend throughout the globe. The Scalabrinians’ territory would include all places with lots of migrants. In many cases, Scalabrinians would create parishes where none had existed before in areas with many new migrants, and in other cases their work would take place alongside that of an established local parish that may not have been tending to the needs of the local Italian migrants. If one considers the Catholic church to be a transnational organization, the Scalabrinians can be conceived of as a religious order aimed at serving a transnational congregation of migrants.

The Scalabrinians had a difficult time in America from the 1880s to the 1920s. In this period, they received little support from the American Church for their activities, and Italian priests in general were excluded from leadership positions in the American Church. They also encountered suspicion from many immigrants, who did not usually have an identity as “Italians” but rather as members of their local villages or perhaps regions. However, they had growing success in promoting “Italian Catholic ethnic nationalism” in the US, thus helping to organize parishes and local church politics. This strategy of promoting Italian nationalism and ethnic Catholicism intensified after the Fascists came to power in the mid-1920s. The Fascists saw in the Scalabrinians a way to forge not only Italians, but Fascists. The Scalabrinians saw a way to heal the church-state rift while aiding Italian Catholic migrants abroad. By becoming fervent nationalists abroad, the Scalabrinians helped not only spread Catholicism but also to make Italians abroad, to forge an imagined national community (Anderson, 1991) of Italians where one had not existed before. The tight link between nationalism and Catholicism for the Scalabrinians is captured in the quote below, drawn from the speech Bishop Scalabrini gave to first missionaries he sent to work with Italian migrants in the US and Brazil:

Never furl, never lower to the level of worldly interests the sacred banner of religion: hold it high and unstained always and everywhere. And beside the standard of religion, let the flag of our country, this Italy, fly glorious and revered, for here is the heart of the Church; it is here God willed to establish the center of religious life, the See of his Vicar... (L’Amico del Popolo, July 14, 1888.
This intensified strategy had another element to it, also common among later sending state strategies for reaching out to their diasporas. By the 1920s, the outreach strategy among the Scalabrinians and Fascists was to seek an accommodation, and an innovative and synergistic relationship with the increasing pressure towards Americanization. Indeed, in 1926 the Italian Ambassador to the US advised a strategy that would simultaneously embrace both trends. The Ambassador encouraged Italian immigrants to take US citizenship. Because becoming a US citizen “‘was such a juridical act, ... it does not influence the spiritual ties that the Italians in American feel for their patria of origin (and) offers Italians the opportunity to penetrate the hear of American political life and bring it to the defense of Italian interests (D’Agostino, 1997: 141). He continued that “A preliminary affirmation of loyalty to America. Render possible the most fervid exhortation to the cult of the patria of origin,” (D’Agostino, 1997: 142). D’Agostino sums up the relationship this way:

By the 1920s and 1930s, the Scalabrinians, the Italian Foreign Ministry through its consular system, and Italian America ethnic nationalists formed an ideological and practical consensus. They embraced Italian Nationalism in the construction of an American identity as they shared cultural and material resources for common ends. In short, the Pious Society promoted and legitimized Italian Fascism as a form of ‘Americanism’. (1997: 123)

Both Scalabrinians and consular officials engaged in work to deepen emigrants’ and second generation’s identification with Italy, and support for the Fascist state. Measures toward this end included teaching Italian language classes, providing books that told history as an inexorable march toward the Italian Catholic Empire, and more direct interventions into the civic organizations of local Italian or Italian American leaders in the US. They also, like Mexicans and other countries, stressed an inherently diasporic message: One cannot be a true Italian without also becoming a full “American” as well. The idea here -- as with the Mexican case and many others today -- was that Italian Americans would have their love of Italy stoked, become more powerful Americans, and influence American politics in Italy’s favor.

These outreach efforts were coupled with further attempts to redefine the relationship between Italians who had emigrated and the Fascist state. One of these attempts (noted above without comment) was the renaming of the General Commission on Emigration as the General Bureau of Italians Abroad in 1927. The Fascist state further rejected use of the term "emigrant" in favor of "citizen" to refer to Italians who had emigrated, regardless of their intention to stay abroad or return. The change reflected the state’s position that the Italian nation -- and the Italian state -- included all Italians everywhere, regardless of their place of birth or intentions to return to the home state. Italy even protested the "denaturalization" of its citizens when they took French citizenship (Cannistraro and Rosoli, 1975). This re-formulation of the concept of nation is
common among sending states attempting to renegotiate their relationship with their emigrant populations, and change them into diasporic members of the nation -- hence the abundance of “Programs for ----- Abroad” over the last three decades, including those of Portugal, Ecuador and Mexico are among those that have created such programs. Israel, Germany, France, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, India, the Philippines, and the Dominican Republic have now or have had other initiatives to cultivate relations with emigrants abroad (Feldman-Bianco, 1992; Brubaker, 1993; Smith, 1993).

The Italian Fascist state’s attempt to pursue its foreign policy through its consulates during the mid-1930s provides a different example of the creation of a transnational public sphere, with different claims – making and contestation. Cannistraro (1979) documents how the fascist regime attempted to use consular offices to promote those among the Italians abroad who supported its policies, and to censure those who opposed it, focussing in particular on Vice Consul Ungarelli’s activities in Detroit. This policy abroad reflected the policy at home wherein private agencies whose activities had between 1901 and the mid-1920s been independent were now being incorporated into the General Bureau of Italians Abroad. A primary technique of the consulates was to replace leaders of independent, private organizations such as the Italian Chamber of Commerce and the Italian bank, with Fascist supporters, from, for example, the Fascist League of North America or the Italian Veterans Association. Ungarelli also organized boycotts against Italian or Italian American merchants who would not support or spoke against the Fascists. They also distributed fascist textbooks and brought fascist Italian teachers to the US, and organized vacations for Italian American youth in Italy. The political intent of the consular outreach is clear when one notes that Italian immigration to the US had been greatly decreased for the past several years, but numbers of consular staff were greatly augmented at this time.

The policy, and particularly Ungarelli’s zealous implementation of it, evoked protests from within the Italian American community in the US and from local Italian clergy. Some protestors contacted the US State Department and Congress, which opened an investigation resulting in a letter to the Italian Foreign Ministry informally suggesting that Ungarelli be transferred to another country and that the Italian government’s pursuit of its foreign policy through Italian communities in the US be ended. Mussolini himself responded, acknowledging a “lack of discretion” by some Italian agents. The end result was the Italian Ambassador’s promise that all future "cultural contact" between Italy and Italians in the US would be conducted "unofficially" through private organizations (Cannistraro, 1979: 38-9).

DISCUSSION OF THE MEXICAN AND ITALIAN CASES
Comparing the Mexican and Italian cases yields some interesting insights and speculations. First, comparing these cases makes it clear how many of the processes and tendencies are similar, how much the contemporary world has changed, and how much impact this had on migrant membership practices. One can say that Mexicans in general have enjoyed stronger and more multi-dimensional migrant membership than did the Italians, despite similarities in the demands of the migrants and responses of the state. Italian immigrants demanded dual citizenship and changes in Italian law that would make their diasporic lives easier, and they were able to get some results: the Italian state regulated the *banchisti*, despite rigorous objections, and Italian citizens laws were eased to facilitate the “re-naturalization” of returned migrants. Mexican migrants have similarly demanded changes in Mexican citizenship laws, demanded dual citizenship, and sought other changes to make their diasporic lives easier. But their demands go way beyond those of Italian migrants before, as does the extent to which the Mexican state has accommodated them. Mexico has passed a dual nationality law and is actively considering how to implement a concrete citizenship right -- the right to vote. Its rhetoric has changed in a way that envisions migrants as “heroes” and essential parts of the Mexican nation.

Second, migrant membership and citizenship change and evolve along with the structures and institutions in which they are embedded, including changes in domestic politics, political regimes, integration into the world system, and migrant actions. The migrant membership held by Mexican migrants ten years ago was much weaker on the whole than that of today, or likely, the future. An important reason for the strengthening of this membership has been the evolution of the Mexican political system itself -- its processes of democratization and decentralization of power over the last decade have played key roles in giving the opposition in Mexico and the migrants abroad points of access and influence into politics. Similarly, the relationship between Italian emigrants and the Italian state and with the Italian Catholic Church changed in the change from the Liberal to the Fascist regimes. The Liberals viewed migration as a necessary evil, and attempted -- to an admittedly limited extent -- to maintain diasporic relations with them. They wanted migrants to establish Italy’s presence in the world, but did not have the more expansive view of this relationship that prevailed under the Fascists, where “Italians abroad” were encouraged to become Americans to become better defenders and agents of Italy abroad.

Third, this analysis has also attempted to accommodate variation in migrant membership. In the Italian case, migrant membership practices also showed variation, but this paper has only discussed it as the regimes changed. We can speculate that under Fascism, the ability to democratically contest policies went down greatly, though those organizations working on the side of fascism probably experienced an increase in their ability to deliver material and other resources, something akin to the more corporate power of the
Zacatecans before the Federation split during Monreal’s campaign for governor. Oaxacans also present different degrees of migrant membership, through their different relationship to the state and labor markets in Mexico and the US, and to Mexico’s larger strategic integration with the US. Zacatecans have stronger membership than Oaxacans, and a greater ability to exercise their Mexican citizenship rights and participate in politics both in Mexico and in the US. While the FIOB has, for example, been able to use the freedom it has by virtue of being in the US to organize in Oaxaca and even win local municipal elections in Oaxaca, Zacatecans -- even divided into two organizations -- still have access to the Governor of the state and his staff in ways unimaginable to their Oaxacan counterparts. And Oaxacans still must appeal to international human rights regimes and defenders in the US to help protect them in Mexico, while Zacatecans, on the whole, do not. Instead, they focus their energies more on influencing politics in and getting resources from their home state, getting more recognition from the Mexican state for their organizations in the US, and increasingly, on local electoral politics in the US. However, despite these differences, Zacatecans and Oaxacans have both benefitted in making their claims by being in the US, by Mexico’s strategy of integration with the US and of acercamiento with Mexicans there, and by the Mexican state’s own extension of itself into the US. The Program for Mexican communities Abroad and the strategy of acercamiento helped create the political space that changed Zacatecans and Oaxacans in the US from “pochos” into valued members of the “Mexican global nation”. The secular processes of democratization and decentralization of power in Mexico also facilitated this change and the demand for greater inclusion by migrants.

This analysis illustrates the importance of differentiating between citizenship and membership. Migrants have used membership practices like public protests in the US for Oaxacans and the collaboration between Zacatecans in the US and the Zacatecas government to press for expanded citizenship rights, including the right to vote for President from abroad, and the right to elect representatives for those living abroad. Italian immigrants also wanted dual citizenship rights but never got them. That migrants see a difference between these broader membership practices and the concrete, enforceable ties that citizenship rights offer is important, and needs to taken seriously by theorists too.

Fourth, some of the differences in the two cases have to do with differences in the world system and the places of Mexico, Italy, and the especially the US in them in the early and later parts of the twentieth century. The US looms much larger in Mexico’s strategic map of the world today than it did in Italy’s before 1939. This is partly because the US has become a hegemon and only superpower at century’s end, but also because the multi-dimensionality and asymmetric interdependence of the Mexico-US relationship make the US stances towards Mexico much more important to it than were US stances towards Italy earlier. Though asymmetric, this interdependence does work two ways, and Mexico also gets special consideration (positive
and negative) as it negotiates its relationship with the US and its immigrants, including its deepening of NAFTA and consideration of guest worker programs, but also, I suspect, in the leeway it is being given (or not) in attempting to implement the right to vote from abroad. This leeway is tightly constrained by the size of the potential political mobilization -- in ways that other countries that allow emigrants to vote from the US are not -- but because of Mexico’s importance to the US. Another critical factors is the growing importance of Mexican Americans in American politics, which I think is moving US politicians to work more closely with Mexican officials behind the scenes to make sure that some kind of mutually suitable arrangement is made. In terms of theory, Mexico has become much more important in the US both as a strategic foreign policy partner and next door neighbor, but also as a symbol for the growing Mexican American vote. For Mexicans today, not only has Mexico given then dual nationality, they are now working on how to implement the provision of political rights, which would represent the giving of a key citizenship right to those residing in the US. This contrasts markedly with fact that the idea of giving Italians dual nationality, no less dual citizenship, was thought to be too dangerous because it would create too much “suspicion among the Americans”, so it was never implemented for the Italians in the early part of the last century.

Fifth, another difference between the cases was the direction that the regimes moved in the two cases. In the Mexican case, the general trend in Mexico and in the transnational sphere linked to Mexican politics is towards greater democratization, despite the state’s attempts to control this. Italian politics was moving in the other direction, from the Liberal to the Fascist regimes, and the content and contestation possible in the Italian transnational public sphere similarly changed. It is hard to imagine the fight over the regulation of the banchisti that took place under the Liberal regime taking place under the Fascists, or at least not taking place in the same way, with vigorous debate over the measure in the Italian parliament and other public venues in Italy and the US. It seems more likely that the Fascist state would have imposed a solution to the problem on the interested parties. These differences account in part for the fact that despite the Mexican state’s intense involvement in Mexican immigrant civic organizations in the US, those who felt wronged in this process did not go to the American state to protest intervention, but to the Mexican political process to seek change there.

Finally, it is fascinating how similar some of the themes and solutions to them are. For example, migrants in both cases wanted greater inclusion in their home countries, including dual citizenship, and in both cases the states wanted to accommodate them in some similar ways. Both states made it easier for returning migrants to regain their lost sending state citizenship, and both evolved into a strategy of encouraging their emigrants to become US citizens in order to better defend both their own and their homeland’s interests. There is also a pattern, not just in these two cases, for the homeland to resolve this
“pochos problem” by renaming their emigrants as “Italians/Mexicans/Portuguese etc – abroad”.

CONCLUSION: Engagement with other Theories

Most theories of membership posit state citizenship as the main form of membership in a political community (see Brubaker, 1989), or posit an oppositional relationship between the leveling tendency of political membership and the exaggeration of differences by capitalist markets (Marshall, 1950). Most theories of globalization or transnationalization focus mainly on economic, cultural or political processes that transcend the state and are theorized to make it less powerful or relevant, or focus on "post-national membership" or transnational social movements (Soysal, 1994; Meyer et al. 1997; Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, 1998; Perez Godoy, 1998; Basch et al., 1994; Kearney, 1991; Rodriguez, 1996). These theories capture important, persisting aspects of reality, but also obscure the increasingly interesting reality of migrant membership practices and the state’s role in creating them.

Indeed, while immigrants do still assimilate to their host nations, and most politics is still conducted within or between nation states, transnational political practices have become increasingly important. And while the transnationalization of migrant life proceeds apace, it is not making the state obsolete, either as a concept or a political structure. Moreover, while global capitalism is indeed important in creating conditions causing migration (Basch et al. 1994; Appadurai, 1996), "global capitalism" as such cannot explain the kinds of transnational political practice analyzed here. Finally, while the human rights regime and transnational social movements do facilitate and strengthen migrant claims making, such claims are made largely towards and through states.

Using an instituted process perspective, I argue that transnational life and migrant membership claims are in significant part the result of sending states reactions to transnationalization and globalization. In the Mexican case, the state extended itself to 1) to monopolize the conduct of Mexican politics in the US, ensuring that NAFTA would pass and pursuing the dream of creating a strong domestic Mexican lobby; and 2) gaining control over the de facto transnationalization of migrant politics in order to control its possible effects on Mexico's domestic politics, especially its democratic transition. In this view, global capitalism manifests itself in the Mexican case via the states neo-liberal strategy of integration with the US via NAFTA, and through the concomitant state strategies to control Mexican politics in the US. Hence, properly contextualized, we can argue that it is the state's extension -- and not simply its transcendence via migration - - that makes possible the kind of migrant membership claims and politics analyzed here. Attributing causality
to "global capitalism”, “global structures”, or "transnationalization" does not adequately capture the causal sequence of events nor their theoretical import. Similarly, I analyzed how relations between the Italian diaspora and state changed as the latter moved from a Liberal to a Fascist Regime, and how the Fascist state’s greater extension in the US provoked protest to the American state by Italian Americans. 

My approach treats migrant membership as an instituted process, invoking Polyani (1957), and drawing on Somers (1993) and Tilly (1996) by taking their focus on institutions and ties, respectively. But I attempt to do so considering not just institutions, but also conditions beyond the domestic arena that affect how states are sovereign and negotiate membership and extend citizenship (Sassen, 1996; 1998; Gledhill, 1996; Smith, 1998). Hence, I analyze the concrete ways the global context gets translated into political strategy by state and civil society actors, both domestic and foreign, and how this affects migrant membership practices.

My approach is also consistent, to an extent, with Marshall's view of membership practices as evolving in dialectical engagement with the rise of capitalism, a tack also taken others (Portes, 1996; Goldring, 1998). The focus on migrants on gaining state recognition and legal, citizenship rights -- such as the right to vote -- is also consistent with Marshall’s emphasis on state conferred status as key in defining citizenship. I attempt to move beyond Marshall's conception of inexorable progress towards more substantive membership by specifying more precisely the terms of engagement within a global, transnational and democratizing contexts, and by tracing how membership thickens and thins within for Zacatecans, Oaxacans and the Vote 2000 movement.

The instituted process view also differs from the globalist notion of seemingly inexorable movement towards "post-national membership" derived from the notion of the rights of the "modern person" or inherent in modern global structures (Soysal, 1994; Meyer et al. 1997) or global social movement empowerment (Tarrow, 1998; Perez Godoy, 1998). While my analysis is consistent with the globalist perspective in showing how an international human rights regime has helped secure basic human rights for migrants, and transnational social movements have empowered migrants -- as for the Oaxacans, above -- it also analyzes how lower level institutions, forces and conditions matter. For example, migrants struggle for the right to vote from abroad would have been less successful without the Mexican Constitutional change giving them legal basis for their claims, and if the Mexican state had not redefined the Mexican nation and materially extended itself, thus inadvertently creating an extra-territorial arena for such claims. Hence, locally based democratization and struggle within Mexico -- which would not be of much interest to globalists or standard transnationalists -- are critical in creating conditions for Mexican migrant claims making. And other migrant sending states have extended themselves differently, for purposes ranging from explicit surveillance and
coercion of expatriates to achieving foreign policy goals (Miller, 1981; Silverstein, 1998; Guarnizo, 1998; Smith, 1998). The globalist and strong transnationalist perspective cannot adequately explain these variations, while an instituted processes perspective provides a framework for comparatively analyzing them.

For these reasons, I do not posit a theory of transnational citizenship (Bauböck, 1994), or theorize the emergence of some polity that will replace the state. I see Mexican transnationalization and migrant membership claims largely as the extra-territorial conduct of Mexican local, state and national politics, and the conduct of Mexican foreign and domestic policy through and within its nationals in the US, but within a transnational and global context. It is in large part a strategic creation of the Mexican state in reacting to globalization and domestic politics, and of the unintended consequences of this state extension, as in Monreal’s use of Zacatecans in the US to gain support back home. The movement towards diasporic or migrant citizenship rights complicates the picture somewhat by codifying a relationship of belonging to two political communities at once, but the rights discussed are still firmly based in the nation state.

Similarly, I do not use the concept of the "deterioralized nation-state” to describe the relationship between "migrants" and their homeland governments (Basch et al. 1994). This concept fails to appreciate that it is the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of violence (Weber, 1964), resources and recognition within a given territory that enables it to maintain power, and the lack of such coercive power with respect to US-residing migrants that better enables them to press political and human rights demands. Migrants in the US can renegotiate the terms of their engagement with the Mexican state by threatening to exercise their option to turn "loyal exit" (adapting Hirschman, 1970) into "permanent withdrawal" by refusing to participate -- to withhold cooperation and dollars, or to "go native", by focusing solely on the US. Basch et al.’s (1994) concept does not direct our attention towards how such a renegotiation might work because it equates the relationship between a state and its extra-territorial migrants with territorially bounded state-civil society relations.

Basch et al.’s (1994) concept and the standard transnational position also fail to appreciate that the extra-territorially extended state is not powerless. It has the power to disburse resources outside its own territory, and perhaps most powerfully, it can extend recognition and organizational resources to some and not other migrant groups (Calhoun, 1994). Moreover, the state has its full powers with respect to migrant communities and those who do not leave Mexico. Moreover, neither of these views helps us understand how the decentralization of power and democratization in Mexico created vital opportunities for migrant mobilization migrants (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1998), without which migrant demands for the right to vote might have remained as unheard in the late-1990s as they were in the mid-1980s. Finally, for all the transcendence of the state and the creation of a transnational public sphere, most migrant claims are directed
at and based in the Mexican state and are oriented towards gaining power in Mexico, though increasingly migrants see a need to mobilize in the US too.

The end result is that through the creation of a transnational public sphere, civil society groups and the Mexican state are renegotiating their relationship and creating new forms and degrees of migrant membership. Figure 2 shows the movement of Oaxacan, Zacatecan and Vote 2000 groups traced herein along state institutional and autonomous axes of political participation. The Zacatecans move from having stronger, thicker state institutional and democratically weaker, thinner membership as the corporatist Zacatecan Federation (Z1), to having somewhat less strong institutional membership in step two with the split within the organization (Z2), and then to having stronger democratic and institutional membership again as the Civic Front in step three (Z3) with Monreal's election and joining with the Vote 2000 movement. The Oaxacans begin with democratically stronger, thicker and institutionally weaker, thinner membership (O1) than the Zacatecans, and move towards institutionally thicker but still democratically thick membership with the emergence of the Vote 2000 coalition and actions to counteract death threats (O2). The Vote 2000 Coalition moves from an institutionally thin, democratically thick, position (V1), to one that it both institutionally and democratically thick (V2). This figure is intended as a heuristic tool for tracing how migrant membership practices evolve.

For the Italian case, the transnational public sphere created enabled migrants and their advocates like the Scalabrinians to challenge the *banchisti* and win, which would give them thicker membership. The evolution towards Fascism is somewhat complicated. While it probably increased the ability of some groups to deliver the goods to their constituents, it certainly decreased the ability of most migrant groups to democratically contest anything in their relationship with the Italian state.

This paper offers a framework for analysis of migrant membership practices that posits the emergence and evolution of such practices and their substance in response to four factors: home country domestic politics, engagement with the world system, semi-autonomous migrant politics, and US context of incorporation. Proposing a framework rather than a definitive theory -- as the globalists and transnationalists seem to be doing -- is a plea for the importance of historically grounded analysis that can trace the causal sequence of events to provide a deeper understanding of social reality. This framework can also accommodate comparative analysis of other cases (see Smith, 1998; Guarnizo, 1998). My hope is that this knowledge will also help build organizations and institutions that help incorporate migrants into their respective political communities.
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ENDNOTES

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2 Several scholars of Italian migration very generously discussed my ideas with me. These include Donna Gabaccia, Peter D’Agostino, Mary Brown, Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, and Ted Perlmutter.

3 This "deterritorialized" state lacks the coercive power and control over resources and other powers that it has at home. However, that these migrants make claims on that coercive home state in that venue is an important change in the relationship between them and the sending state, and can yield a renegotiation in the state-civil society relationship, and in particular can open up democratic possibilities in this relationship. Part of this difference can be conceptualized using Hirschman's "Exit, Voice and Loyalty" framework (for a different use of Hirschman, see Roberts, 1997). Migrating to and settling in another state while maintaining various political and other links with one's home state creates the possibilities for creative use of exit, voice and loyalty that would not be available were one to reside within the home state's territory.

4 My debt to Margaret Somers (1993, 1994) is clear here, though I have redefined public sphere more broadly than she and set the concept within a different set of institutions and forces. My analysis is consistent with Polanyi's 1957 essay.

5 This is why it makes sense to talk about European Union citizenship: it is an organization that is sovereign in some way, answers to no higher authority, has the authority to regulate movement, and mediates the relationship between individuals and the community. Some observers have conceptualized European Union citizenship as "fragmented citizenship" because it simultaneously provides more than one set of rights as an individual, more than one means of access to these rights, and more than one sense of belonging in a national community. See Wiener's (1997) interesting evolution of the EU citizenship (see also Hanagan, 1998).

6 Author interview with Kamasaki, 1996. The theory was that Latino business persons, especially Mexican Americans, would be ideally placed as cultural intermediaries to facilitate the new business ventures. This has not happened for a variety of reasons, including the lack of knowledge of large scale business among most Latino entrepreneurs, and the
preference of Mexican companies for dealing with large American firms (Spener, 1996).

7 These requirements include that one hold the new electoral credential, and that one be registered in the still to be created National Registry of Voters. I think that the PRI’s anti-vote stance is ill conceived even from a purely self-interested point of view. I predict that the PRI and PRD would each gain a plurality of the vote, while the loser would be the conservative PAN party, which is seen as the party of the rich. The PRI would do well because through the Program, it has organized in the US for ten years, and because many of the most active members of the Program have the goal of keeping the PRI in power. The PRD would do well partly because of its long history of organizing, but mainly as a protest vote.

8 This section draws extensively on D’Agostino’s work and conversations with him.

9 The Italian Americans were more likely second and third generation mixed with first generation, but this would be an interesting issue to know more about.