Transnational Challenges to the ‘New’ Multiculturalism

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On the first page of a recent Home Office overview of migration trends and policies (Glover et al. 2001: 1), the following quotations are given:

We have the chance in this century to achieve an open world, an open economy, and an open global society with unprecedented opportunities for people and business. – Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Davos, January 2000

At a time of great population movements we must have clear policies for immigration and asylum. We are committed to fostering social inclusion and respect for ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, because they make our societies strong, our economies more flexible and promote exchange of ideas and knowledge. – Communique of Heads of Government, Berlin Conference on Progressive Governance, June 2000

These statements are used to commence an argument concerning the social and economic benefits of migration to the United Kingdom. The first quote points to positive dimensions of globalization while the latter underscores an environment framed by what we commonly refer to as multiculturalism. The Home Office report underscores the national gains resulting from a combination of the two.

Multiculturalism as policy and philosophy has received considerable criticism since it came to the fore in the public sphere in the 1970s. Recent reformulations have tackled many of the criticisms. However, in order to address more fully the challenges of -- in the Prime Minister’s words -- ‘an open global society’, multiculturalism must face up to some hitherto unrecognized, or newly enhanced, aspects of contemporary migrant and ethnic minority dynamics.

Features of the ‘new’ multiculturalism, along with certain global or ‘transnational’ challenges to it, are described in this paper. First, it is necessary to sketch a picture of the ‘old’ or conventional model of multiculturalism.
Conventional Multiculturalism and its Critics

There is of course a considerable body of literature on the subject of multiculturalism, especially in political philosophy (see among others Gutmann 1994, Goldberg 1994, Kymlicka 1995, Favell 1998a, Willett 1998, Parekh 2000). As neatly summarized by Stephen Castles (2000: 5), much of what is encapsulated in the term multiculturalism concerns ‘abandoning the myth of homogeneous and monocultural nation-states’ and ‘recognizing rights to cultural maintenance and community formation, and linking these to social equality and protection from discrimination.’ In these ways multiculturalism represents a kind of corrective to assimilationist approaches and policies surrounding the national incorporation of immigrants (see Grillo 1998, 2000; Faist 2000). In policy terms, multiculturalism frames procedures, representations, materials and resources in education, health, welfare, policing, the arts and leisure – indeed, in practically every public institutional sphere (especially on the level of local government).

Yet multiculturalism is associated with many – sometimes divergent, sometimes overlapping -- discourses, institutional frameworks and policies invoking the term in rather different ways (Vertovec 1998a). Multiculturalism may refer to a demographic description, a broad political ideology, a set of specific public policies, a goal of institutional restructuring, a mode of resourcing cultural expression, a general moral challenge, a set of new political struggles, and as a kind of feature of postmodernism. Further, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2000) is critical of what she identifies as consumer or boutique multiculturalism, artistic and style multiculturalisms, corporate multiculturalism and role model multiculturalism. All such minimalist, celebratory and tribal forms of multiculturalism, she claims, tend to ‘keep diversity in a box’ (ibid.: 42) and may end up doing more harm than good.

Cross-cutting such a variety of operational forms, Ralph Grillo (2000) usefully distinguishes between ‘weak’ multiculturalism – in which cultural diversity is recognized in the private sphere while a high degree of assimilation is expected of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the public sphere of law and government, the market, education and employment – and ‘strong’ multiculturalism marked by institutional recognition of cultural difference in the public sphere including political representation. We can observe such differential patterns, for example, when comparing immigrant and ethnic minority
policies across Europe, particularly on local levels (Soysal 1994, Ireland 1994, Vertovec 1998b).

Elsewhere Grillo (1998: 195) outlines six commonly identified problems with multicultural theory and practice: (1) multiculturalism’s implicit essentialism; (2) the system of categorization which underpins it; (3) the form that multicultural politics takes; (4) the ritualization of ethnicity often associated with it; (5) the elision of race (and class) that it appears to entail; and (6) the attack on the ‘common core’ which it represents. ‘Many of these criticisms,’ Grillo (ibid.) rightly observes, ‘stem from a focus on “culture”’ (cf. Baumann 1999).

In this set of understandings, ‘culture’ is: a kind of package (often talked of as migrants’ ‘cultural baggage’) of collective behavioural-moral-aesthetic traits and ‘customs’, rather mysteriously transmitted between generations, best suited to particular geographical locations yet largely unaffected by history of a change of context, which instills a discrete quality into the feelings, values, practices, social relationships, predilections and intrinsic nature of all who ‘belong to (a particular) it’. (Vertovec 1996: 51)

Essentialized understandings of culture have been observed, over the past few decades, in multicultural programmes and frameworks in areas such as educational curricula, media images, forums of ‘ethnic community leadership’, public funding mechanisms, and professional training courses and handbooks (for instance, in police or social services).

Scrutiny of the cultural essentialism in multicultural policies has been made in Canada (Kobayashi 1993), Australia (Castles et al. 1988), Mauritius (Eriksen 1997), United States (Turner 1993), Germany (Radtke 1994), Sweden (Ålund and Schierup 1991) and Britain (for instance, Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1993). Looking beyond policy approaches, Gerd Baumann (1996) describes how the same essentialist understanding of minority ‘cultures’ -- and their co-defined ‘communities’ -- are adopted by members of ethnic minority groups themselves. Through detailed ethnography he demonstrates how reified views of culture and community infuse both dominant (e.g., media and government) and demotic (people’s everyday) modes of discourse.

In addition to the core critique of essentialism, Alibhai-Brown (2000) outlines the following ‘troubles with multiculturalism’: it is only about ‘ethnic minorities’; it has created a sense of white exclusion; its model of representation only deals with elites; it
freezes change and can entrench inequalities; it erects group barriers; it is seen as ‘woolly liberalism’; it has not engaged with globalisation.

However, another feature of much multicultural discourse and policy concerns a bounded nation-building project. Via multiculturalism, Adrian Favell (1998b) observes,

...[E]thnic minorities are offered cultural tolerance, even ‘multicultural’ rights and institutions, in exchange for acceptance of basic principles and the rule of law; they are imagined as culturally-laden social groups, who need to be integrated and individualised by a public sphere which offers voice and participation, transforming them from ‘immigrants’, into full and free ‘citizens’; they are to become full, assimilated nationals, in a nation-state re-imagined to balance cultural diversity, with a formal equality of status and membership.

Implicit in this process is what Favell sees as ‘an under-theorised, elite re-production of a long-lost idea of national political community; papering over inequality, conflict and power relations with a therapeutical, top-down discourse of multicultural unity’ (ibid.). He is critical of the way such an approach reappropriates a ‘functionalist, Parsonian idea of social integration’ purporting to ‘unite all classes, and all groups – whether majority or minority – around some singular ideas of national political culture’ (ibid.).

The premise here is what we might call the ‘container model’ of the nation state. In this, social cohesion, cultural belonging and political participation are mutually defined within the geographical and administrative boundaries of the state (cf. Brubaker 1989, Turner 1997, Vertovec 1999b, Faist 2000). Lydia Morris (1997: 194) comments,

The European nation has, at least in principal, grown up around an ‘ideal’ of cultural homogeneity, established and reinforced through the state controlled transmission of literate culture (Gellner 1983), alongside state control over entry and the acquisition of citizenship; thus the nation represents territorialized cultural belonging, while the state formalizes and controls legal membership.

Assimilationist models of immigrant incorporation were rather unabashed in their views of the nation-state imagined in this way: immigrants were expected to acculturate and adopt a sense of belonging to the country of reception. Multiculturalism did away with the expectation of assimilation and acculturation, while the expectation of common attachment to the encompassing nation-state went unchallenged.
The culturally essentializing model of multiculturalism, for one, has recently been importantly rethought. Multiculturalism’s relationship to the nation-state, however, seems to remain as was.

**Multiculturalism Rethought: The Parekh Report**

The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, set up by the Runnymede Trust in January 1998, has produced what arguably amounts to a new take on multiculturalism. The Commission and its activities represent a far-reaching endeavor over three years involving numerous consultations among academics, civil servants, government departments, NGOs, community groups and members of the general public. In October 2000 the Commission produced its conclusions: a 400-page document entitled *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* (Runnymede Trust 2000), also known as *The Parekh Report* after the Commission’s chairperson, Lord Parekh. The Report is unquestionably the most comprehensive overview of race and ethnic relations in Britain, including some 140 policy recommendations across the fields of education, health and welfare, employment, criminal justice, arts, media and sport. The Report is groundbreaking and sweeping in its approach, articulation and recommendations. [It was unfortunately received by the media in controversial terms following a (deliberate?) misreading by the right-wing *Daily Telegraph* which claimed the Commission sees ‘British’ as a ‘racist’ term. The Report in fact discusses the ‘racial’ overtones of the term – that is, merely that ‘British’ has historically solely been identified with white people but now it is no longer.]

One of the main purposes of the Report is to usher in a new national narrative and set of policies conveying an understanding that Britain is both a ‘community of citizens’ and a ‘community of communities.’ As part of this goal, the Commission quite consciously seeks to distance itself from the bounded, essentialized notions of ‘community’ conveyed in earlier approaches to multiculturalism. [Such distancing stems, not least, from the Commission’s composition that includes people like Stuart Hall, one of the foremost intellectuals associated with critiquing essentialism and conceptualizing ‘hybridity’. Through its seminars and invited statements, the Commission also obviously listened to a number of academics who were highly critical of essentialized notions of ‘culture’ and ‘community’.] Rather than reified ‘cultures’, references to ‘interacting and
overlapping communities’ (ibid.: 3) and individuals’ multiple identities run throughout the Report. The following citations are worth quoting in number and in full so as to convey fairly the Report’s vigorous emphasis on a renewed understanding of ‘community’ and cultural belonging that should be associated within multiculturalism:

Britain is a land of many different groups, interests and identities, from Home Counties English to Gaels, Geordies and Mancunians to Liverpudlians Irish to Pakistanis, African-Caribbeans to Indians. Some of these identity groups are large, powerful and long-settled. Others are small, new and comparatively powerless. Some are limited to Britain but others have international links; some of the boundaries are clear, some are fuzzy. Many communities overlap; all affect and are affected by others. More and more people have multiple identities – they are Welsh Europeans, Pakistani Yorkshirewomen, Glaswegian Muslims, English Jews and black British. Most enjoy this complexity but also experience conflicting loyalties. The term ‘communities’ can give the impression of stable, coherent, historic groups with tidy boundaries. But situations and relationships are changing. It is simply wrong to think that there are easily measured groups of people – working class Scots, black Londoners, Jews, Irish, ‘middle’ England – who all think alike and are not changed by those around them. For everyone life is more interesting than that. (ibid.: 10)

People have competing attachments to nation, group, subculture, region, city, town, neighborhood and the wider world. They belong to a range of different but overlapping communities, real and symbolic, divided on cultural issues of the day,... Identities, in consequence, are more situational. This makes Britain, contrary to stereotype, more open. (ibid.: 25)

How are the new communities to be viewed in relationship to the nation? One customary approach, which co-exists with the dominant version of the national story,..., is to see them as bounded, homogeneous groupings, each fixedly attached to its ethnicity and traditions. The ‘majority’, by the same token, is imagined to be fixed, unified, settled. This attitude underlies most public policy – for example, school curricula, many aspects of the criminal justice system and the health service, official policy on asylum and immigration, and the way government addresses social exclusion. ...[T]he ‘minority’ communities do not live in separate, self-sufficient enclaves, and they do display substantial internal differences. They too must be reimagined. (ibid: 26)

To speak of ‘the black community’, ‘the Irish community’, ‘the Bangladeshi community’, and so forth, is to refer accurately to a strong sense of group solidarity. But it may also imply a homogeneous set, with fixed internal ties and strongly defined sense of group solidarity. But it may also imply a homogeneous set, with fixed internal ties and strongly defined
boundaries, and this is a hopelessly misleading picture of a complex, shifting multicultural reality. (ibid.: 27)

These communities are not, and have never aspired to be, separate enclaves. They are not permanently locked into unchanging traditions, but interact at every level with mainstream social life, constantly adapting and diversifying their inherited beliefs and values in the light of the migration experience. (ibid.: 27)

..{C}ommunities today are neither self-sufficient nor fixed and stable. They are open, porous formations. It is impossible to invest totally in communities as the sole bearers of the legal right to difference. Many individuals with a strong sense of belonging and loyalty towards their communities do not intend their personal freedom to be bound in perpetuity by communal norms. (ibid.: 37)

The boundaries round a community can be quite hard and fast, making it difficult to join or leave voluntarily. But often they are fluid, unfixed. It is in any case entirely possible for someone to be a member – a significant member – of several different communities at the same time; indeed, this is usual. (ibid.: 51)

Further, a considerable section (ibid.: 29-36) show ways in which specific communities – African-Caribbean, Pakistani, Irish, Gypsy, etc. – are multiple in their makeup.

What does the Commission concretely recommend by way of a new multiculturalism? The recommendations in The Parekh Report mostly focus on measures and policies designed to mitigate or combat discrimination. The Commission proposes a set of general principles surrounding equal treatment but also sensitivity to ‘real differences of experience, background and perception’ (ibid.: 296) to the effect that concepts of equality and diversity must be part of government machinery at all levels. Its 140 specific recommendations pertaining to given areas of public policy include some of the following: there must be systematic representation of ethnic communities on public bodies; ethnic monitoring should run throughout the media, criminal justice, health and education systems; police, probation and prison officers should have training in issues of race and diversity; all school inspection reports should include a section on ‘Race Equality and Cultural Diversity’; organizations funded by public bodies should lose their funding if they do not make their staff and activities more inclusive; at least one-sixth of the parliamentary second chamber (present House of Lords) should be from Asian and black community backgrounds; there should be an advisory forum on race equality and
cultural diversity for each government department as well as for the government as a whole; the government should formally declare that the United Kingdom is a multicultural society and should issue a draft declaration for consultation.

*The Parekh Report* is particularly focused on a systematic effort to monitor all of society’s public institutions and instill in them both an appreciation of cultural diversity and a realization of how they may discriminate against minorities. It is unclear how a more open view towards multiple and overlapping communities and identities plays directly into these kinds of policy recommendations. Still, the attempts at publicly emphasizing non-essentialized understandings of cultures and communities takes multiculturalism many strides forward from its conventional forms prevalent over the past thirty or so years.

The renewed vision of multiculturalism represented by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain nevertheless seems to focus on the ongoing container model of the nation-state – albeit perhaps a rather more porous one. The Commission underscores the need for core values and common belonging unifying citizens and communities. ‘Shared cultural meanings,’ the Commission (ibid.: 16) believes, along with ‘the common national story, weld a nation of individuals into a social unity. People feel in consequence a sense of membership and belonging, and solidarity with and empathy for fellow citizens whom they will never personally know.’ The Commission seeks such an emphasis on social cohesion in one nation while avoiding ‘oppressive uniformity based on a single substantive culture’ (ibid.: 56). The key mechanism for accomplishing this is citizenship (including calls for a British citizenship ceremony).

A parallel kind of ‘new’ multiculturalism has been mooted in the United States, too. A key instrument of this was the congressionally-sponsored Commission on Immigration Reform, which published its report in 1996 (see King 2000: 283ff.). The Commission advocated a renewed commitment to integrating immigrants, while recognizing diversity, by way of an emphasis on citizenship, national identity and strong, common civic values.

As Stephen Castles (2000: 5) points out, conventional multiculturalism generally ‘does not question the territory principal’ and ‘maintains the idea of a primary belonging to one society and a loyalty to just on nation-state.’ The newer takes on multiculturalism
– despite their conscious anti-essentialism – also perpetuate the nation-state-as-territorial-container model.

In one small passage, fictionally summarizing people’s variegated impressions of community belonging, *The Parekh Report* hints at something rather different: ‘It is not unusual, particularly in the modern world, for some of my loyalties to be transnational – I have feelings of kinship and shared interests with people in at least two different countries’ (Runnymede Trust 2000: 51). The Report does not probe the implications of this statement for multiculturalism or the model of the nation-state that it promulgates. However, such dual sense of belonging represents a growing challenge to both.

**Challenges of Transnationalism in Migration**

The past ten years have witnessed the ascendance of an approach to migration that accents the attachments migrants maintain to people, traditions and movements located outside the boundaries of the nation-state in which they reside (see for instance Glick Schiller et al. 1992, Smith and Guarnizo 1998, Vertovec and Cohen 1999, Portes et al. 1999a, Pries 1999 and the website of the ESRC Transnational Communities Programme, www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk). While recognizing the similarities to long-standing forms of migrant connection to homelands, today most who engage the approach underscore the numerous ways how, and the reasons why, today’s linkages are different or more intense than the homeland-immigration land connections of migrants in earlier periods (Foner 1997, Morawska 1999, Portes et al. 1999b, Grillo et al. 2000).

Present-day national and local state policies, albeit broadly displacing conventional assimilation models with those of multiculturalism – even, as we have seen, with new takes on multiculturalism -- still have not caught up with migration studies that now demonstrate ways in which contemporary migrants live in ‘transnational communities’. Such types of migrant community, according to Alejandro Portes (1997: 812), comprise

…dense networks across political borders created by immigrants in their quest for economic advancement and social recognition. Through these networks, an increasing number of people are able to live dual lives. Participants are often bilingual, move easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries, and pursue economic, political and cultural interests that require their presence in both.
Newer, cheaper, and more efficient modes of communication and transportation allow migrants to maintain transnationally their home-based relationships and interests.

As more and better research emerges, it is clear that transnational patterns among migrants takes many forms in socio-cultural, economic and political arenas. Further, each form may be ‘broad’ or narrow’ (Itzigsohn et al. 1999), and may vary over time, depending on intensity of exchanges and communication. Rather than a single theory of transnationalism and migration, we will do better to theorize a typology transnationalisms, or ‘degrees of entanglement in national/transnational orders’ (Clifford 1998: 365), and the conditions that affect them.

The economic impacts of transnational migrant communities are extensive. The most significant form of this is to be found in the massive flow of remittances that migrants send to the families and communities in the sending countries. Global remittances currently far exceed US$60 billion each year, while the economies of numerous developing countries are increasingly reliant upon them (Vertovec 1999a, 2000).

The social and cultural impacts are considerable too. Migrant communities maintain intense linkages and exchanges between sending and receiving contexts, including marriage alliances, religious activity, media and commodity consumption. For example, Turkish television programmes are received among Turks across Europe through satellite or cable systems, while Muslim religious leaders circulate between Morocco or Pakistan and their respective communities in Europe. Transnational connections enable migrants as never before to maintain collective identities and practices (see Hannerz 1996, Smith and Guarnizo 1998, Portes et al. 1999a). This has significant bearing on the culture and identity of the so-called second generation, or children born to migrants.

The political impacts of transnational phenomena surrounding contemporary migration are also of far-reaching consequence – especially for the container model of the nation-state. Such consequences take many forms, especially with regard to questions of dual or multiple citizenship and homeland politics.
**Dual Citizenship**

Today, migrants’ transnational connections and claims bring about a variety of political transformations. ‘While nationality can transcend borders and become transnationality’ observe Micheline Labelle and Franklin Midy (1999: 221), ‘political citizenship is typically circumscribed, bounded, and regulated within national borders, even though in its juridical-legal sense it can be dual or multiple. Citizenship can be acquired, lost or accumulated; nationality can be recombined, it can be concealed or displayed, depending on the circumstance or situation.’ Such developments indicate a seeming erosion of the container model of the nation-state as well as a compromise in the nation-state’s ability to monopolise loyalty (Appadurai 1996, Sassen 1996, Joppke 1998).

In Australia, the United States and Western Europe the number of dual nationals is estimated to be several millions and rising. Miriam Feldblum (1998) traces the increase to a variety of factors including not only increased migration and migrants’ increasing political claims, but gender equity reforms in nationality transmission and retention, reforms in nationality criteria, and actual legislation to lift traditional bans on dual nationality. Indeed, in 1997 the Council of Europe decided to rescind its 1963 Convention that called for restrictions in multiple nationality.

The ‘portability of national identity’ (Sassen 1998) among migrants has combined with a tendency towards seeking membership in more than one place. ‘Multiple citizenship is the most visible illustration of overlapping membership in political communities,’ notes Rainer Bauböck (2001). He suggests, ‘For migrants it carries the essential benefit of free movement between two societies to which they are linked by residential and family ties. Yet even this formal overlap does not generally imply a full and simultaneous participation in the legal order and political life of two states.’ Indeed, for some individuals the gaining of ‘citizenship of convenience’ may be seen simply as a kind of glorified travel visa, a licence to do business or an escape hatch (Fritz 1998). In many countries, however, heated public debates concerning dual citizenship and dual nationality have been matched by considerable academic rethinking of rights and obligations surrounding migration and citizenship (see Faist 1999, 2000, Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2000, Castles 2000, Castles and Davidson 2000). This is especially the case in that dual nationality/citizenship is, in several countries, the most important political issue
linked with citizenship. This is coupled with the fact that it is increasing and impossible to prevent, international rules governing dual citizenship are weakly conceived and enacted, and scholarly studies and opinions with regard to dual citizenship are underdeveloped (Hansen and Weil 2002).

In most cases only the rights of the country of residence are ‘active’ while rights pertaining to the other country remain ‘dormant’ (Bauböck 2001). ‘The migrant’s act of taking on two nationalities,’ suggests Rey Koslowski (2001: 34), ‘can be indicative of neither assimilation nor homeland political identification but rather of an ambivalent political identity, multiple political identities or even an apolitical identity.’

Among other issues currently raised in this field, one view holds that transnational ties among migrants weakens their integration in the immigration country, while another view suggests that democracy is actually enhanced by public recognition and representation of migrants’ multiple identities within and outside the country of residence (Castles 1998, Vertovec 1999b, c). In order to recognize the reality, prevalence and variegated modes of the phenomenon, leading theorists have described notions such as ‘flexible’ (Ong 1999), ‘post-national’ (Soysal 1994), ‘diasporic’ (Laguerre 1998) or ‘transnational’ (Bauböck 1994) frameworks of citizenship.

In addition to dual citizenship conceived as acquiring a pair of ‘packages’ of rights and obligations, due to a series of global changes nation-states are now differentially ‘rationing’ aspects of nationality and citizenship and ‘qualifying’ certain social and welfare rights (Feldblum 1998). Such measures cover issues such as voting and holding public office or public employment, inheritance, military service, ability to acquire private property, taxation, access to education, national insurance and pensions, and protection by labour laws.

Issues surrounding transnational migrants and citizenship – and the sometimes fierce political debates they have stimulated (recently in Germany, for example) – underscore the need for more research and empirical data on the intersection of existing state policies, actual patterns of multiple membership, and long-term strategies of migrants and their families.
Homeland Politics

Another important realm of political contention that has been stimulated by transnational migrant communities concerns ‘homeland politics’ -- also sometimes described in terms of long-distance nationalism (e.g., Skrbiš 1999), ‘deterritorialized’ nations (Basch et al. 1994) or ‘the globalization of domestic politics’ (Koslowski 2001). This is represented by a range of political activities among migrants, from community organizing and fundraising, through party campaigning and international lobbying, to supporting war efforts and terrorism.

Just as firms may have an integrated production system with factories and research facilities in states other than the state in which corporate headquarters is located, polities may have a political system with significant actors spread across several states other than that of the homeland. Just as even small firms use fax machines, Federal Express and the internet to market their products globally, political movements and parties reach beyond state borders in organizational and fund-raising activities. As the internet provides relatively inexpensive international communication with vast potential for political organization, emigrants have developed extensive networks of electronic bulletin boards and web pages through which members of diasporas communicate with one another as well as with political actors in the home country. (Koslowski 2001: 1)

Such political involvement is evident among numerous transnational migrant groups such as Sri Lankan Tamils, Kosovan Albanians, Algerians, Philippinos, Mexicans and Columbians. Examples are numerous and global (see ‘Traces’ world news digest at www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk). Overseas campaigning and voting, and even diasporic representation in homeland governments, are increasingly prevalent phenomena. Other, more diverse forms of political engagement seem to be intensifying as well. For instance, within twenty-four hours following the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, Kurdish demonstrations were allegedly orchestrated in over twenty-five cities around the world. In the 1990 election in Croatia, it is reckoned that 80% of money spent by political parties came from Croatian emigrants and their descendants. Much of the Eritrea’s military efforts in the recent war with Ethiopian were paid from an informal 2% ‘tax’ levied throughout the Eritrean refugee diaspora.

The political activities of migrants and ethnic minorities are not always directed solely at ‘home’ country politics, of course. They may be engaged in broader causes and
social movements. For instance, Pnina Werbner (2000) discusses Manchester Pakistani Muslims who lobby for what they deem to be broad Islamicist causes, including human rights violations in Palestine, Bosnia, Chechniya and Kashmir. ‘Far from revealing ambiguous loyalties or unbridgeable cultural chasms,’ Werbner (ibid.: 309) suggests, ‘British Muslim transnational loyalties have challenged the national polity... to explore new forms of multiculturalism and to work for new global human rights causes.’

The dynamics of each case of transnational migrant political involvement are affected by specific conditions in both sending and receiving contexts, including migrant status and dual nationality or citizenship, access to funds and resources, and the host country’s laws, policies and relations with the migrants’ homeland. Host countries must confront each case with policies shaping the kind of activities it will tolerate -- even support -- and to what degree it will do so. In reaction to many such transnational activities, Britain’s new Terrorism Act 2000 severely restricts the political activities of a large number of expatriate organizations and movements with cells or offices in the UK -- including an outright ban on twenty-one bodies as different as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Workers Party of Kurdistan and November 17 in Greece (The Guardian 14 March 2001).

With the increasing ease of communication, combined with greater ability to transfer funds and resources, it is certain that transnational migrant groups and their political activities will play increasingly significant roles in many national and international arenas (see Shain 1999, Itzigsohn 2000, Østergaard-Nielsen 2001). Again, politicians and political scientists waver on whether, or to what degree, this is desirable. As Koslowski (2001: 20) comments, one reason migrants’ transnational politics presents such fundamental problems is that ‘Democratic theory does not provide a good answer to the question of whether or not emigrants should be able to participate in the homeland’s elections, campaign financing, and other activities of democratic rule, because democratic theory assumes a bounded demos.’ Multiculturalism, too, has been founded on a bounded demos; hence, as the repository of visions of democratic diversity, it need also loosen its conceptual boundaries.
**Conclusion**

The global flows, multiple identities and cross-border networks represented by transnational migrant communities critically test prior assumptions that the nation-state functions as a kind of container of social, economic and political processes. Throughout the 1990s we have heard the often-repeated idea that globalization has brought with it the declining capacity – or at least no longer an exclusive role -- of the nation-state in a number of spheres. This is especially said to be the case concerning economic globalization, which is marked by developments that may tend to undermine traditional political community rather than expand it from the national to a global space (Bauböck 2001). The nation-state is not about to disappear under the impact of globalization, yet ideals of national sovereignty are increasingly seen as no longer entirely viable in an interdependent world (Holton 1998).

For Ulrich Beck, the most interesting questions surrounding globalization involve processes through which ‘sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities and networks’ (2000: 11). We constantly need to rethink the relationship between the national and the transnational spheres. With regard to this relationship, Saskia Sassen (1998: 52) observes,

> One of the features of the current phase of globalization is that the fact that a process happens within the territory of a sovereign state does not necessarily mean it is national. This transgression of borders does violence to many of the methods and conceptual frameworks prevalent in social science. Developing the theoretical and empirical specifications that can accommodate this transgression of borders is difficult and will be time-consuming. But it has started.

Beck, too, notes how transnationalism stimulates, within social science as well as politics, a shift away from ‘methodological nationalism’, which refers to ‘the explicit or implicit assumptions about the nation-state being the power container of social processes and the national being the key-order for studying major social, economic and political processes’ (2000: 3).

Migrants’ transnational political allegiances pose immediate problems for nation-state-focused assumptions as well as policies, including multiculturalism. Yet the nation-centred perspectives of both sending and receiving countries often either misinterpret or
‘plainly ignore’ migrants’ transnational orientations (Bauböck 1998: 26). Despite the
dearth of policy attention, however, ‘International migration transnationalizes both
sending and receiving societies by extending relevant forms of membership beyond the
boundaries of territories and of citizenship’ (ibid.).

One of the most obvious forms that such transnationalizing of memberships takes
is dual citizenship or dual nationality. Over half the world’s nation-states now recognize
some form of dual citizenship or dual nationality (Fritz 1998). Migrant sending states
such as Mexico, Dominican Republic, Morocco and Turkey are making it easier for
emigrants to keep their nationality in order to foster stronger ethnic lobbies working in
their homeland national interests as well as to bolster remittances. Migrant receiving
states such as Switzerland and the Netherlands permit dual nationality in order to
facilitate naturalization; the United Kingdom is rather indifferent about it, while the
ruling Social Democratic Party in Germany has recently backtracked on a dual
citizenship policy following considerable public opposition.

A more open set of policies surrounding the taking of citizenship and the
acceptance of dual citizenship and nationality could arguably comprise an additional
element in a ‘new’ multiculturalism (cf. King 2000: 283). With relevance here, Bauböck
proposes that ‘Liberal democracies ought to respond to the transnationalization of
societies through immigration by opening admission to their citizenship and to their
dominant national cultures, while at the same time acknowledging that such access need
not come at the expense of the migrants’ previous political and cultural affiliations’
(1998: 47). The modern nation-state container model has normally functioned with an
implicit zero-sum understanding of social/cultural/political belonging: either one is in, or
out. The argument now is that the model should be loosened to accept transnational
migrants’ ‘stable dual orientation’ to both ‘here’ (immigration context) and ‘there’
(emigration context) (Grillo 2000).

Currently the position of many transnationally oriented migrants and ethnic
minorities, however, is akin to the Senegalese transmigrants described by Bruno Riccio
(1999). With many local and national policy frameworks simply unable to address their
transnational livelihood, the Senegalese are presented with a socio-political condition that
is neither migrant ‘integration’ nor ‘exclusion’, ‘but something new and different’ (ibid.:
‘We are confronted with a community,’ Riccio (ibid.) concludes, ‘that is part of society but does not enjoy citizenship, whilst challenging the criteria with which we conceptualize it.’

The in-between position of many transnational migrants may be grasped as an advantageous strategy, too. Adrian Favell (1998b) presents such a possibility, pointing out that

If [immigrants] have begun to refuse the logic of national integration and belonging, therefore, it is likely to be because the structural changes identified by the sociologists of the transnational are indeed taking place. As immigrants, classically between two (or more) cultures, they are also good indicators of the power to be found by playing on the line between belonging and non-belonging. To be able to refuse norms, or choose when and where they might be useful to follow, is a rare power, and a somewhat problematic concept for the theory of socialisation that must be at the heart of any sociological theory. To discover a new form of anomie as a source of social action and capital, might indeed be the most interesting and paradoxical discovery to be made from charting the contemporary politics of belonging in Western Europe.

Despite such interesting potentialities, though, if the logic and rationale of multiculturalism is to be carried through, then subscribing nation-states should be more welcoming to migrants’ and ethnic minorities’ transnational connections (rather than, as is common, viewing them with suspicion). This would seem an important step towards the goal of combining the advantages of both ‘global open society’ and respect for diversity mentioned at the outset of this paper.

Just as multiculturalism rests in a public recognition of communal and cultural rights within a nation-state, should this not be extended to a right of community or cultural affiliation outside of the nation-state? After all, multiculturalism is about recognizing identity in its own terms. And, as James Clifford (1998: 369) suggests, ‘identity is never only about location, about shoring up a safe “home,” crucial as that task may be in certain circumstances. Identity is also, inescapably, about displacement and relocation, the experience of sustaining and mediating complex affiliations, multiple attachments.’ The ‘new’ multiculturalism represented by The Parekh Report indeed appreciates multiple and complex forms of identity, but ones mainly limited to within the shores of Britain. Yet patterns of transnationalism being underscored in current migration
studies demonstrate the kinds and strengths of multiple and complex identities that cross those shores. A truly sensitive and relevant multiculturalism should recognize that.

Alibhai-Brown (2000: 9-10) has colourfully conveyed as much by stating how

Multiculturalism, built around the images of 1950s Britain and 1950s immigrants, shows no real understanding of the complexity of our links with the rest of the world – the support from British Muslims for Bosnians and Kosovars; the flows of money from, say, British Bangladeshis which are almost never mentioned when looking at the government aid and official charitable donations which they quite probably dwarf; the Japanese businessman who is much part of this landscape as is the newly arrived Kosovar Albanian; the act that there are almost as many Americans in Britain as people of Jamaican origin. ...The Hindus who built the exquisite marble temple in Neasden raised the money through strong connections across the globe. When these links don’t fit the neat multicultural story then they are left out and forgotten. The complexity of our real internationalism, our sense of the possibilities when identities move beyond the home and the hearth, is diminished.

The transnational challenges to multiculturalism (old or new) suggest that a real recognition of ‘diversity’ includes not just easily conceived notions of cultural difference or community belonging, nor of rather more sophisticated ideas surrounding multiple or hybridized identities, but also to diversity of attachments and belongings – some of which refer to people, places and traditions outside of the containing limits of nation-state residence.
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