A European Space for Transnationalism?

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Abstract

A transnational discourse and research associated with the phenomenon have become well-established in the Americas and Asia-Pacific. But, particularly if judged by press coverage and public debate, this is perhaps less so within Europe. This may be surprising given the region’s long history of various non-national social and cultural formations, including the classic diasporas. Recent attempts to refine a social scientific definition and analysis of transnationalism have mostly taken the Americas as their starting point. This raises the question of just how ‘transnational’ transnationalism is. This paper proposes that there is scope for a more macro-regional approach to transnationalism, and that there are good grounds for expecting European space to differ from the Americas. Using the concepts of ‘migration order’ and ‘migration configuration’, it suggests some basic distinctions derived from history, politics and geography. Eastern and Western European varieties of transnationalism can be distinguished, and within the European Union there are both internal and external forms. The paper considers whether these several kinds can in fact be considered part of a single process, an emerging European mobility order described by a geography of concentrically-defined regions.
‘It is precisely in the name of European values that Estonia needs a secure border … Our border is the border of European values.’ Estonian President Lennart Meri, March 1993, cited in G. Smith (1999).

Introduction

The reflections in this paper were prompted not by empirical research but by the experience of combing the world’s on-line press agencies and newspapers in order to produce the quarterly news digest *Traces* for the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s Transnational Communities Programme. Devoting a week or more every three months for over two years to tracking down stories with a transnational angle has persuaded me that transnationalism is less than fully globalised. Another paper could written about the regional discourse of globalisation and transnationalism based on press reporting, how certain terms are or are not used across the world, and so on. But for now I just want to state how surprisingly little attention is paid to transnationalism (however defined) in the European press. It is not simply that there is almost use of the term ‘transnationalism’ in papers and news agencies, which is also true of North American and Asian sources. It is more that, with some exceptions, the kinds of processes, relations, and phenomena we might wish to describe as transnational receive scant publicity. This was amply demonstrated by the Pinochet affair. The significant world-wide network of Chilean activists, which collated evidence and pressured the UK and Spanish authorities to bring about the general’s trial, was scarcely mentioned. The coverage in the British press at least remained stubbornly international, based on a clear separation of foreign and domestic news.

A similar point might be made about published research on transnationalism, although this is becoming less valid over time. The key texts and exemplary cases of transnationalism have been drawn from either the Americas of the Asia-Pacific region (for example, Basch et al. 1994, Glick-Schiller et al. 1992, Kearney 1991, Levitt 1998, Ong and Nonini 1997, Pries 1999, Portes et al. 1999, Rouse 1991, Smith and Guarnizo 1998), as have many of the sceptical reactions and corrections to transnationalism (for example Foner 1999, Mintz 1998). There are few European contributions to a recent reader, *Migrations, Diasporas and Transnationalism* (Vertovec and Cohen 1999).¹

Why might this be so? A number of reasons suggest themselves:

- There isn’t any transnationalism in Europe, which seems very unlikely given that the same broad mix of causes - economic globalization and the transport and communications revolution - occur there as anywhere else.
- There is transnationalism but it hasn’t been recognised as such or researchers have been slow to recognise the inadequacies of a conventional migration paradigm, which seems plausible.
- Transnationalism either takes a different form or is conflated with and subsumed under other processes and phenomena termed variously supra-national or post-national, which is also plausible.

¹ A notable exception is Ulf Hannerz’s *Transnational Connections* (1996) which, unusually draws on ethnographic observations from Africa and Europe.
The Case for a Macro-Regional Approach to Transnationalism

Katharyne Mitchell (1997a, see also 1997b) advocates ‘bringing geography back in’ to studies of transnationalism, diaspora and hybridity. Exploring the macro-regional dimensions of transnationalism is one part of this process.

Firstly, there are naïve geographical questions. One might ask of any phenomenon, what is its spatial distribution, relative location and so forth. And, as Lewis and Wigen (1997) argue, since we are bound to use macro-geographical expressions and approaches we ought to be aware and critical of them.2

Secondly, a more regional approach fits into the various efforts to distance transnationalism (and globalization) from the emphasis on deterritorialization given to it both by the pioneering work of Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton and, in a different sense, by some approaches rooted in cultural studies, notably Appadurai. In their desire to move away from the kind of bounded entities and concepts which characterised standard migration research, such as community or world systems theory, Glick Schiller et al. (1992) have been faulted. As two leading authors suggest, ‘…the image of transnational migrants as deterritorialized, free-floating people represented by the now popular adage ‘neither her nor there’ deserves closer scrutiny’ (Guarnizo and Smith 1998 p12). A similar stress on materially ‘grounded’ study is voiced by Nonini and Ong (1997 p12), who are critical of an ‘American cultural studies approach’ that ‘treats transnationalism as a set of abstracted, dematerialized cultural flows, giving scant attention either to the concrete, everyday changes in people’s lives or to the structural configurations that accompany global capitalism.’

Setting aside for the moment the questionable conflation of material, empirical, everyday and spatial suggested by these quotations, it is possible to distinguish a number of ‘localizing strategies’ in current studies of transnationalism. Although Appadurai (1996) writes of translocalities, Michael Peter Smith (1999) uses the same term in a more sociological way to refer to the rural villages, small towns, metropolitan districts and provinces connected by transnational ties. The significance of locality and trans-local relations is confirmed by much ethnographic research (for example, Goldring 1998, Levitt forthcoming, R. Smith 1998). A second and related localizing move links transnationalism with global cities, and their repositioning in relation to nation states (Sassen 1998). Both these scales are sub-national, as if the conceptual and empirical shift away from the nation-state level could lead to only two polar opposites, global and local, with nothing in between. There are also authors who have advocated a greater focus on the interactions and relations across spatial (and temporal) scales, such as Sum (1999) and the studies in Ungrounded Empires (Ong and Nonini 1997) convey a rich sense of the range and diversity of the sites, zones and regions of Chinese transnationalism. But it seems that the supra-national level plays only a minor part.

Thirdly, and carrying on from this point, another research priority has been suggested in ‘comparing practices of migrants and states vis-à-vis transmigration in different

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2 The aims of this paper reverse the direction taken by Lewis and Wigen, who introduce such transnational concepts as diaspora, archipelago and middle ground to blur the boundaries of their cultural formations and reach a more sophisticated understanding of geographical difference.
broadly geo-political regions (e.g. Latin America and the Asia-Pacific) to determine if
differences within regions are greater than differences between regions,’ (Guarnizo
and Smith 1998, p28). But what is being compared, and are these regions alike?

But as well as suggesting a macro-regional approach in general terms, there might be
good grounds for considering transnationalism in regions other than the Americas.
Appadurai (1986) once noted that in anthropology there were certain gatekeeping
concepts which typified each major region, such as lineage or segment in Africa, caste
in South Asia, or the manipulation of bodily substances in Melanesia. He meant that
not only did it seem natural to study key concepts in paradigm regions, but that these
regions were understood through the lens of such concepts: ‘the burning issues of
anthropological theory are regionalized, so that a particular region comes to more
general theoretical prominence in terms of certain issues’ (Fardon 1990 p.26). One
consequence of which he warns is that ‘as certain kinds of theorizing in anthropology
become cryptophilosophical, the original place of origin of ethnographic descriptions
becomes quite irrelevant…” (Appadurai 1986 p.361). This suggests that we ought to
scrutinise the relations between general concepts and their geographical origins (as for
example in the debates surrounding modernity and postmodernity).

Given that the founding definitions of transnationalism derived from empirical studies
in the Americas (see for instance Glick Schiller et al. 1992), it might be questioned
whether the core features of the concept are general or more particular to that one
region. Or, as one Italian expert on migration studies claimed, does transnationalism
only appear now because of the historical accident of the world’s richest country (the
USA) being adjacent to one of the world’s poorest (Mexico)? Is transnationalism an
accident of geography or a global process, albeit uneven in its extent and effects?

A macro-regional focus therefore contributes to the general grounding of the study of
transnationalism in the relations between spatial and temporal scales, while at the
same time establishing its necessary and contingent factors and providing some basis
for comparative analysis. Within geography there has been a stress on relative
conceptions of space in the understanding of globalization, notably from Massey
(1999). This implies, among other things, that the world should neither be conceived
of as comprised of homogeneous spatial units (for example Huntington’s
civilizations) nor a borderless, frictionless and absolute space across which rush and
spin the flows and networks of globalization and transnationalism. This prompts a
regional perspective, but only if the constructed and contested nature of the region in
question is also acknowledged.

American and European Transnationalism Compared

Are there prima facie grounds for thinking that American and European
transnationalism would differ in any way? At the most abstract level, it may be that
European migration and transmigration patterns have been affected as much by
geopolitical developments as by economic globalization or any ICT revolution. The
collapse of the USSR and the further integration of the European Union have no
obvious correlates in the Americas (although possibly China’s opening for emigration
is comparable in Asia and the Pacific). Secondly, there is a marked demographic contrast between the European Union and the USA. According to a recent UN report (United Nations 2000), even at current levels of immigration, the EU will not replace either its total population or its working age population (scenario I). By contrast, the USA will continue to grow and, by 2050, its population will surpass that of the EU. For the 47 countries of the whole of Europe to maintain the size of their working age population by 2050, they would require three times the current level of net immigration. The demographically-driven demand for labour in Europe will undoubtedly affect both future migration and transmigration and future policy on population mobility.

These two contrasts alone are strong enough to suggest that European transnationalism may differ from American. But further comparative analysis will require a more refined understanding of what exactly is being compared. What is Europe in this case? Two concepts, both derived from established migration systems approaches, suggest ways of proceeding: migration orders as detailed by Nick Van Hear, and migration configurations as suggested by Frank Pieke.

Van Hear (1998) draws from the literature of forced migration to compose a concept of migration order appropriate to understanding transnational communities. Such orders include four domains: (1) root causes or structural background; (2) proximate causes such as business cycles; (3) precipitating factors which trigger a migration event, such as the onset of war or sudden economic collapse; (4) intervening factors, which affect whether a migration flow is continued or not, including transport, communication and migration regimes, or the attempts by national and international entities to manage migration. Shifts from one order to another may be gradual, ‘transitions’, or sudden, ‘crises’. The break up of the Soviet Union marked one transition for the USSR and East-central Europe, is one example. For Van Hear, it marks a transition from immobility to mobility or a ‘transition from regulated mobility to increasingly disorderly movement,’ (p38). Another example would be the shift from being an immigration country to being an emigration country, for instance in southern Europe. He emphasises that states are not autonomous actors in such transitions, but that they are also made ‘by the strategies and decision-making of individuals and households, and through the development and working out of their networks,’ (p.58).

In the context of studying Chinese international and internal migration as a single process, Pieke (forthcoming) suggests that research should shift from migration as the core variable to migration configuration. A migration configuration:

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3 Of course widespread civil war and unrest in Central America contributed to migration and refugee movements towards North America. The region, including the Caribbean, was dragged into the Cold War during the 1980s in particular.
4 The UN scenario I projects a EU population of 331 million by 2050, based on 300,000 migrants per year. Current net migration to the EU (1990-98) is higher, at 857,000. This rate would maintain the total population, but to maintain the size of the working age population the rate of net immigration would have to almost double. Scenario I for the USA suggests 349 million by 2050, based on 760,000 net immigrants a year, below the current (1990-19960 level of 1.1 million. For Europe as a whole, i.e. all 47 countries, the scenario I projection is for 628 million by 2050, 100 million fewer than at present. This includes net immigration of 950,000 per year. To maintain the working age population would require three times the current rate of net immigration for Europe as a whole (United Nations 2000)
‘includes flows of information, goods, money and other resources. Institutions and networks within the migration configuration shape interaction across different sites, such as kinship groups, friendship and home community networks, emigration and immigration officials and commercial human traffickers, other ethnic groups at a particular destination, airlines, railways and shipping companies, and law firms, human rights groups, and anti-immigration activists.’ (Pieke 2000)

Pieke intends that a configuration should be more actor-centred than a system, and should embrace all forms of mobility. It is not immediately clear what constitutes a migration configuration, although he suggests that a diaspora from one region of China or expatriate migration might be examples. (He also speculates that such configurations might be part of a Chinese world system, in which Europe is a migration frontier.) The point is that migration, including transnational migration, should be placed in a larger, possibly regional, context sensitive to the whole range of mobility.

Although neither of these two concepts is necessarily regional let alone spatial, they point towards a framework for comparison. Furthermore, both place migration in a context of mobility as a whole, including the role of migration regimes (law enforcement, immigration rules etc.). Both indicate that economic and technological forces alone cannot account for either the onset of movement nor its continuation, for example how migrants become transnational communities.

There is insufficient space to spell out all the differences and similarities between Europe and the Americas along these lines. For the moment, we may employ Van Hear’s typology of domains to sketch out what might be relevant:

(1) Root or structural factors include the legacy of imperialism and colonialism on European and colonised states (and its associated ‘transnationalism before transnationalism’ (Vertovec pers. comm.), the collapse of multi-national empires in the 20th century, the geopolitical relations between Christianity and Islam and the long history of emigration. The process of nation-state building differs systematically between old societies and settler societies, but also within Europe between the more class-stratified nation states of the North and West and the organic nation states of the South and East (Mann 1999). In turn this has affected the development of contrasting modes of citizenship and reactions to ethnic or cultural difference. One possible consequence of this relevant to transnational politics for example, is the relative closure of European legislatures and executives to diaspora lobbying5. Another is the apparent significance of religion, notably Islam, as a marker of difference and a foundation for new or revived transnational communities. Demographic factors, notably ageing populations, belong here, along with differences in labour markets and employee mobility.

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5 Some authors have suggested that there are successful instances of diaspora lobbying, for example by Turks and Croats in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen 1998), or by Kashmiris in Great Britain (Ellis and Kahn). But these are probably out-numbered by failures. The Greek-Cypriot lobby in the UK is the largest in Parliament, but has conspicuously failed to shift policy. The symbolic success of French-Armenians in persuading the National Assembly to recognize the Armenian genocide carried little weight with the French government.
(2) Proximate causes and triggering events are, by definition, more particular to places and less relevant to comparison. They include such events as the wars in Yugoslavia, the earthquake in Turkey and the decision of Hungary to let East Germans have access to the West, leading ultimately to the fall of the Berlin Wall.

(3) Intervening factors, by contrast, are significant in the contrast between Europe and the Americas. In general, affluent European societies have done their best to exclude migrants and refugees in the past two or more decades and show every sign of continuing to do so. This contrasts with the USA and Canada. In addition, there is the generally lower level of mobility within Europe compared with much of the Americas, the result of the uneven diffusion of technology (e.g. Internet) and the slower pace of deregulation for air transport, telecommunications and so forth. Cheap travel and telephone calls, so vital to transnational connections, have not sprung up evenly and contemporaneously. Although Ukrainians, for example, only require a visa to cross into the Czech republic to find casual work, the $50 passport fee is still beyond many people. And although Med TV was available by satellite throughout Europe, few Kurds could afford a dish (Wahlbeck 1998). That the EU itself is taking a lead in the regulation of e-commerce, telecommunications and air travel both suggests convergence and promises greater mobility for the average EU citizen. Another point of comparison might be the differential development of commercial money transfer facilities (now big business in the Americas).

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic and political integration of the European Union are the two major political forces influencing transnational migration above and beyond economic globalization and technological change. I have suggested that these geopolitical factors hold the key to differentiating between American and European transnationalism. Yet they also appear to distinguish between broadly Western and Eastern European migration orders. I wish to maintain this distinction for now (despite its Cold War undertones), but later speculate on how the two are linked in an emerging single European mobility order.

‘Eastern’ Transnationalism

In his survey of forced migration Van Hear (1998) notes that diasporas are made, unmade and remade, and the same may be said of transnational communities after the fall of the Soviet Union. When Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999) define transnationalism as ‘occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contact over time across national borders’ (219) they are referring to people moving across borders. But in Eastern and Central Europe there is a corresponding history of borders moving across people and their communities. This shakes up the region’s many cross-border transnational communities. There is also a dark history of ethnic cleansing, forced migration, expulsion, and forced assimilation (Mann 1999),

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6 Air passenger travel is one example of the uneven nature of the communication, information and transportation revolution. In 1998 North America accounted for 34% of the world's air traffic, compared with 28% in Europe. Seventeen of the world's busiest 25 airports are in the USA, but only 5 in Europe (International Civil Aviation Organisation Annual Report 1999). But, partly because of the spread of low cost airlines in Europe, the Air Traffic Action Group predicts a doubling of air passenger traffic in Europe between 2000 and 2015, with international flights increasing faster than domestic ones.
with ramifications for transnational connections. In the years after 1914 for example, transnationals were as likely to be armed soldiers as economic migrants.\(^7\)

The exemplary types of this regional transnationalism include:

- ‘Made Diasporas’, notably the five million people forced from Yugoslavia, the vast majority of whom have not returned, including the recent exodus from Kosovo and Albania. Further afield are those fleeing civil violence in Algeria and southeastern Anatolia, many of whom pass through the region.
- ‘Stranded minorities’ such as the 25 million ethnic Russians left inside the successor states to the USSR but outside the Russian Federation, among whom a strong sense of community and a willingness to engage in collective political action has been slow to develop (Smith 1999). Yet this potential transnational community has become a significant thorn in bilateral relations between Russia and some Baltic States for example. Relations between Russia and Latvia deteriorated during 1998 over the latter’s citizenship laws and the commemorative activities of the Latvia SS Legion. By contrast, the stranded post-1919 Hungarians, of whom there are 1.6 million in Romania and around 350,000 in Serbia, have been able to revive many transnational connections since 1989. There are also renewed levels of cultural and political life between Lithuanians, Belorussians and Ukrainians in Poland and their respective national homelands.
- ‘Unmade Transnational Communities’. Of the 17.7 million Germans living east of Germany and Austria in 1945, only 2.6 million remain: 11.7 million fled, and 3.2 million died in war or massacre (Mann 1999). Between 1989 and 1999 alone, the number of ethnic Germans in Romania’s Transylvania region plummeted from 114,000 to 17,000. But among some Germans formerly of the Sudetenland, there are loud demands for compensation from the Czech government for the loss of property.
- ‘Thawed Exiles’. Exile communities from the Soviet era have begun to get involved in their homelands from abroad, such as Czech exiles in the USA campaigning for restitution and voting rights or even, in the cases of Lithuania and Latvia, actually returning to become President.
- ‘Crossed Out Border Communities’, for example along the Estonian-Russian border, the ‘Ikea curtain’ (Meek 1999). The river Narva flows between the towns of Narva in Estonia and Ivangorod in Russia. Until 1991 there was easy movement between them, but now Narva has cut off the water and sewage supplies to its debt-strapped neighbour and the border is enforced. As James Meek (The Guardian 4.2.99) describes it: ‘Short commutes to work became daily trips abroad. The quick walk across the bridge to the shops became a winding path past a chain-link fence topped by barbed wire, with queues at two customs posts and two passport controls.’ The irony is that the majority of Narva’s inhabitants are themselves ethnic Russians.
- ‘Remade Diasporas’, such as the returning Bulgarian Turks, of whom 350,000 fled to Turkey from the mid-1980s in response to coercive assimilation. Now many are returning.

In addition to these explicitly geopolitical types of transnationalism, political and economic dislocation since 1989 in Eastern and Central Europe have resulted in a thoroughgoing transition from ‘regulated immobility to increasingly disorderly

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\(^7\) In the Polish-Soviet war of 1919-1920 up to a million men marched back and forth across borders.
movement’, as Van Hear puts it. A specifically transnational element is subsumed within this wider context. The dimensions of these changes have been best described by Clare Wallace, Oxana Chmouliar and Elena Sidorenko (Wallace et al. 1996, Wallace 1999). Without using the term itself, they document the migration order for the region since 1989. Rather than the anticipated ‘flood’ from East to West there has emerged a much wider field of mobility. It is travel, not just migration, that is on the increase. And alongside the movement of people there are flows of goods, meeting new consumption demands, and capital investment. Moreover, the majority of moves are short distance and cross-border, between neighbouring countries. Many are of short duration, like the enforced prostitution of migrant women across the Czech/Austrian and Polish/German borders (OSCE 1999). Wallace (1999) concludes that ‘the opening of borders, allowing for free communication between countries, resulted not so much in globalization as in regionalization,’ (p206).

Among the types of movers are: forced migrants; transit migrants from Africa, China and the Middle East; labour migrants; postmodern migrants, such as young Americans in Prague; tourists and border traders; and suitcase peddlers. Many of these of course correspond with the kinds of transnationals described in the Americas. And they are linked with ethnically-defined niches and networks, as Wallace et al. (1996) explain:

‘the ethnicization of these trading relations is an important element in making such long range communication possible in countries where telecommunication infrastructure and travel facilities are below average,’ (p277).

They have emerged as the result of geopolitical change, but are also linked to underdeveloped civil societies where corruption and the black market flourished. If traffickers in human beings, arms and drugs (increasingly using the same networks, routes and criminal organisations) are added to this list, then it becomes clear that the future development of civil society is also in question. The transition to greater mobility, including transnationalism, may be a central fact shaping governance, authority and security in Eastern and Central Europe for the next decade or more.

‘Western’ Transnationalism

The Western European variant of transnationalism contains two varieties. One is much like the economically-driven transnational migration described by Portes et al. (1999), which also extends to social and political connections of all kinds. The other is more peculiar to the European Union, transnationalism as emerging within and making use of EU economic and political space. This is the sense in which the EU itself uses the term ‘transnational’.

I previously raised the possibility that there was no transnationalism in Europe comparable to that located and studied in the Americas or Asia-Pacific. There are of course many studies of the classic diasporas, including Greek, Irish and Italian. But in addition, a growing body of research reveals the presence of the full range of transnational processes, activities and communities. These include regular trading, hometown associations, remittances, periodic returns for festivals and holidays, diaspora lobbying, satellite broadcasting among many other things. Nonetheless, such
studies have focused on a small number of exemplary cases, usually linking one homeland and one European country of destination. The exemplary cases include Maghrebis in France (for example Cesari 1993, 1997, 1998; Vasile 1997; Wihtol de Wenden 1998); Turks and Kurds in Germany (for example Caglar 1995a, 1995b, 1998; Chaplin 1996; Faist 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Göktürk 1999; Østergaard-Nielsen 1998; Schiffauer 1999; Wahlbeck 1998); and South Asians in Great Britain (for example Gardner 1995; Werbner 1990). They rarely examine or compare transnational communities and relations in different European countries from the same origin. There is also scope for cross-regional comparisons between the Americas, Asia-Pacific and Europe.

The second variety is what was once termed supra-nationalism within the European Union. In EU documentation, for example in the Leonardo da Vinci vocational training programme or Culture 2000 (European Union IP/99/768), transnational refers to activities within EU space as a whole, beyond the national scale but more across or between nations than standing above them. This space is occupied by migrants from above and from below. From above, the EU has created institutions which stimulate and facilitate organisation across the 15 member states and encourage lobbying direct in Brussels and Strasbourg. The main example for migrants is the Migrants Forum, an umbrella body for nationally-defined migrant and ethnic lobbies. Although it has not generally been regarded as successful (see Danese 1998), some authors sense the possibility of new, post-national forms of citizenship empowering migrants at the EU level and actively demanded by migrant organisations (Kastoryano 1994, 1998). Directorate General I has funding for joint ventures between migrant communities and their homelands, particularly as part of the Union’s Mediterranean programme (Danese 1998). In this way, the two varieties of European transnationalism are linked, raising questions as to whether one is an alternative to the other, or whether they are compatible.

From below, some transnational groups have formed European-wide organisations, although not necessarily confined to the EU but also the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Well-known examples include Jews and Roma, but there are others. Li Minghuan (1998) and Christiansen (1998) record the proliferation of Chinese associations since 1945. While the European Federation of Chinese Organisations receives backing from Beijing, the rival Association of Taiwanese Chambers of Commerce is supported by Taiwan. According to these authors, Chinese migrants think of themselves as going to and living in Europe, rather than any one particular European country. They are organised at this level, also though family associations. Yet, as Piek (1998) observes, the Chinese have been under-studied at a European level or as a European transnational group above and beyond each nationalised ethnic minority.

Note however that, unlike EU-nationals resident in other EU countries, non-EU-nationals do not enjoy the full rights of citizenship. European Union territory continues to differentiate between these two potential kinds of transnationals.

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8 For example, Danese (1998) argues that the Senegalese in Italy have strong hometown organisations but weak representation at the EU level. This is because there is no Italian-level organisation among Senegalese. Their activities and efforts are subsumed under Mouridist religious brotherhoods.
Towards a Single European Mobility Order?

‘Free movement within the EU could some day begin just west of Minsk,’ (Koslowski 1998)

Are these many varieties of transnationalism linked together through the development of a single European mobility order? I use the term mobility order to avoid confusion with Van Hear’s and Pieké’s concepts (which nonetheless inspire the term), and to emphasise the significance of mobility of all kinds for understanding transnational movement and transactions. I also want to refer to something located at a larger or higher regional level than migration orders. This order partly rests on the economic and demographic contrasts within the wider region (including the Maghreb). It is also the consequence of policies undertaken not just by the European Union, but also by the other supranational organisations in the region, among them the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU). Whether these organisations are pulling in the same direction or whether they conflict remains to be answered. But it does seem clear that the European Union is hegemonic (recall that its 15 members are also members of the other organisations).

The simplest way to understand what this order might be is to consider the Austrian government’s proposal to the K4 Committee of the European Union in July 1998 and later discussed by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council of Ministers and the Tampere inter-governmental conference (October 1999). (Migration and asylum policies moved from the EU third pillar to the first pillar at the conference.) The proposal suggested organising EU migration and asylum policy in a series of concentric circles extending more or less across the world. The innermost circle of EU countries abiding by the Schengen Treaty have agreed to co-ordinate both immigration control and policing, and permit free circulation across their common borders. Beyond this are the EU members either not yet or not intending to sign the Treaty, including the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, all 15 constitute the space of EU transnationalism (as defined above), although actual migration and labour mobility between them appears surprisingly low. Only around 5 million persons, or 1.5 per cent of the EU’s population, reside in an EU country other than the one of their birth for example. (This is around one third of the total number of non-EU nationals resident in the 15 states.) There is of course a higher level of transnational commuting short of change of residence. Policies on asylum, cross-border policing, dual citizenship etc. are converging slowly and unevenly. There are differences between states intent on full harmonization and states content with just co-ordination.

The second ring consists of aspirant members of the European Union, within the so-called ‘buffer zone’. The price to pay for eventual membership by Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary is greater EU influence now over migration, visa, asylum and border policies, as well as economic and social affairs in general (Koslowski 1998). The EU no longer regards them as a potential source of unwanted immigration, but policies in these areas will be expected to fall into line with the EU. They are deemed safe countries as far as refugee and asylum policy is

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9 The Schengen Treaty countries include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, with Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway and Greece at various stages of complying with the Treaty.
concerned. Its influence can be benign, for example the PHARE and TACIS programmes fund NGOs in Central Europe to tackle the rising problem of human trafficking, female and child prostitution. And there are also bilateral relations. For example Germany funds Poland to reinforce its border controls with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Once more or less open for 35 years, the tightening of this border has infuriated thousands of cross-border traders. The EU finances the electronic passport-reading devices at Poland’s new border posts.10

As part of the pre-membership process, aspirant states may also be obliged to loosen ties with their diasporas. Hungary, for example, has been required to drop all claims to Romanian territory and cease involvement in the affairs of the ethnic Hungarians living there. They fear the coming of stricter border controls in line with Schengen. Political and administrative intervention in the full range of mobility policies places EU influence at the centre of governance throughout the second ring. It may also impact on relations between states. In both ways, the conditions for transnational communities are affected.

Transit countries, the third circle sketched in the Austrian proposal, include countries no longer so regarded as a source of unwanted immigration. They include North Africa, the rest of Central and Eastern Europe (including prospective but not immediate candidates for EU membership), Turkey and Russia. EU relations with some of these transit countries, notably in North Africa, formally link migration, trade and development together, for example through the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. But these connections are not backed up by the lure of eventual membership. The EU relies more on diplomatic procedures to exert influence in this circle. An example of diplomatic co-operation in this region is the meetings held between EU and Turkish high-level police officers to address a sudden upsurge in Kurdish refugees entering Europe in early 1998. These meetings were inconclusive and marked by friction between the parties over the role of the PKK in the exodus.

Although EU influence is less direct in this zone, many transit countries are members of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, both of which have their own interests in mobility. Like the EU, these interests place migration within a wider concern for transnational activities including human trafficking, drug smuggling and terrorism. The OSCE’s field missions in the Balkans for example, are regarded by the organisation as a vital part of its Task Force on Trafficking in South East Europe. The OSCE provides funding, support and expertise for training border and judicial authorities as far away as Kyrgyzstan (OSCE 1999). It also mediated the relations between Croatia and the Croat diaspora in Bosnia-Hercegovina (the 11th constituency) by supplying many of the 350 observers to the parliamentary elections in January 2000. Also in this region, the EU and Council of Europe have intervened on behalf of minority ethnic or ethno-national groups when under threat from majority or ruling ethnic groups. Examples of groups assisted under the 1997 European Convention on nationality include the Roma in Slovakia, but also Russians in Latvia and Lithuania. The Council of Europe has been

10 The EU has also invested in the physical infrastructure of mobility. Part of the $1.8 billion aid package promised to southeastern Europe in March 2000 includes funding for bridges and roads, e.g. a new Danube bridge between Romania and Bulgaria, and better crossings between Macedonia and Kosovo.
noticeably more active in advancing the rights of Roma than the EU, suggesting that there are significant differences between the various supranational organisations.

It is difficult to separate the elements of a mobility order in this circle from wider concerns for European political and cultural hegemony. The close and evolving connections between the politics of mobility and politics of security in this zone are summarised in remarks made by Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy to a meeting of the Western European Union:

‘Globalization has brought with it a wide range of transnational challenges, many of which were unheard of a generation ago. The threat of terrorism, international drug-dealing, money-laundering, the spread of AIDS: all these present us with new, “globalised” problems and new responsibilities…As the Union enlarges, and as we face new challenges in the next century, we have to be prepared to take more responsibility for regional security, particularly in those areas bordering the Union where we have direct interests at stake. We also have to be prepared, where necessary, to use all legitimate means to project security and stability beyond our borders. And we need to be able to assert our values of humanitarian solidarity and respect for human rights in all areas where people’s lives depend on relief assistance..’ (Solana 1999, emphasis added).

The final outer circle consists of countries still regarded as being sources of unwanted immigration, and against whom the full range of EU immigration policies are to be directed. But this includes more than the devices of exclusion. In February 2000 the EU announced its £8.5 billion aid and trade package for 71 poorer countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, a new agreement replacing the Lome convention (1975). For the first time, the EU will attach conditions to aid relating to migration. Recipients will be required to take back illegal immigrants entering from their territory, even if they are not citizens.

The order outlined above is not conclusive, and nor would it exist in a political vacuum. But I do suggest that the several forms of transnationalism can be placed within the context of differing zones such as those outlined in the four circles. Transnational communities and transnational movement can also be related to the full range of mobility patterns and policies. Elements of a common European migration regime - legislation, training, protocols etc. - may therefore be built into a wider mobility order, which extends from technical assistance for border policing through to regional co-operation in security and law enforcement. It is driven by a hegemonic European Union, but not without countervailing influence, for instance from Turkey over Kurds.

Because the EU 15 are intent on lifting internal barriers to the movement of people and the circulation of goods, they require not only strengthened surveillance of collective external borders, but also intervention in the surrounding states of aspirant EU members and transit countries - the buffer zone. Intra-EU transnationalism, the second variety of the ‘Western’ transnationalism mentioned above, would appear to be at the expense of extra-EU transnationalism, the first variety. But this paradox may be more apparent than real, for two reasons. Firstly, by hardening the EU’s external walls (Fortress Europe) the fifteen are driving cross-border activities
underground. Often this means criminal organisations (OSCE 1999), and sometimes entangled with networks supplying arms and drugs. It is as if the EU is actively helping to make the transnational monster it fears on its eastern borders. Secondly, by elevating some transit countries into potential members and pushing the effective external border eastwards, a new tier of states is being drawn into the intra-EU transnationalism. But by beefing up the eastern borders of the aspirant members, trafficking routes have been driven to the north (across the Baltic) and to the south, through the Balkans, Morocco and Tunisia. Transnational problems are thereby more widely regionalised 11.

In any case, it is difficult to gauge the impact of the mobility order on transnational migration and communities. Not all migrants are transmigrants and not all cross-border moves are transnational. The various policies and programmes described as a mobility order set the conditions under which individuals, families and communities make their decisions. Staying put, commuting, suitcase trading, migrating permanently or living transnationally are different options. It seems unlikely that the mobility order will simply have the stated effect of successfully managing all movement.

Conclusion

Transnational networks and transnational communities are undoubtedly hallmarks of the early twenty-first century, although there are significant antecedents. The groundbreaking research on transnationalism was based on empirical anomalies observed in research on migration to the USA, as well as the observations of globalization in Asia-Pacific. Concepts and definitions based on the experience of these world regions are equally applicable elsewhere. But I have also suggested that there are certain distinctive characteristics of transnationalism in Europe. These partly derive from two general features, geopolitical change (e.g. fall of the USSR, EU integration) and demographic ageing. The mix of transnational networks and communities throughout Europe is varied, although a crude contrast can be made between West and East. Particularly in Eastern Europe, it makes sense to view transnational social processes as components of a wider transition from one migration order to another, involving higher levels of mobility of all kinds. People and borders both move.

But as well as accounting for the varieties of transnationalism, I go on to speculate that they are linked at a macro-regional level through the influence of the EU on migration regimes. This influence is in part a consequence of the EU’s moves towards internal freedom of circulation, transnationalism in the sense of greater integration of states and movement between them. Four zones are recognised. The EU itself (Schengen and non-Schengen); the aspirant members of the former buffer zone, such as Poland and Slovenia; the transit zone of Eastern and Central Europe, Turkey and North Africa; and the ACP developing countries, for the first time bound in agreements with the EU on migration and repatriation policy. In the outer zones, particularly the middle two, the EU interacts with other supranational organisations (OSCE, Council of Europe), and transnationalism becomes integrated into larger security concerns. These are also the areas where ‘European values’ are imposed and

11 It is disturbing that the OSCE’s recent action plan on trafficking appears not to consider the possibility that unrealistically strict immigration polices are driving migrants into the hands of smugglers.
contested, and where the contradictions between espoused human rights and constraints on movement are most glaring. The refusal of the EU (and possibly the OSCE) to recognise that greater restrictions on migration into the EU or back and forth across its external borders drives migrants underground into the hands of transnational traffickers is a serious problem. What does seem possible is that the bars to permanent immigration will remain and the demand for youthful labour in an ageing region will be met by seasonal and temporary migration, and transmigration, legal and illegal. In all such cases, basic human rights are at severe risk.

**Postscript**

One episode in particular seems to exemplify the emergence of a European mobility order, where migration, security, human rights, diasporas and inter-state relations collide. It is the case of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), and his flight into captivity. Under the threat of Turkish invasion, Syria expelled Ocalan in November 1998. He fled to Moscow via Greece and Armenia, where he went into hiding with the support of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the ultranationalist politician. When rumours of his presence spread, both Turkey and the US State Department urged the Russian government to deport him. He entered Italy on a false passport, was arrested and detained under house arrest. Italy refused to hand him over to Turkey, because it could execute Ocalan, but neither did it offer him asylum. Despite there being a warrant for his arrest on terrorist charges in Germany, Bonn was reluctant to cause unrest among German Kurds (numbering c500,000) by bringing him to justice. On January 16th Ocalan left Italy, there being no charges against him. He flew to Russia but was prevented from going through customs and passport control, allowing the authorities to honestly inform Turkey that he had never entered Russian territory. He then flew to Greece, on to Minsk in Belarus and, along the way, tried to land in Amsterdam to present himself to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. Belgian jet fighters prevented him landing there and he was refused permission to refuel in Switzerland. He may have touched down in Milan airport before flying on to Greece, where again his plane was isolated on the runway. It appears then that the Greek authorities persuaded him to seek asylum in South Africa, smuggling him into the Greek embassy in Nairobi. But the city was full of US and Israeli spooks, following the embassy bombing in July. US agents tipped off Turkey, whose commandos seized Ocalan on his way to the airport on February 15th. Widespread demonstrations, embassy occupations and civil unrest of all kinds were immediately sparked throughout Kurdish communities, not just in Europe but also in Central Asia, Australia and the Philippines. He was detained on a Turkish prison island and later sentenced to death. While on trial, the European Union appealed for clemency and requested observer status at the proceedings (both denied), part of a sustained diplomatic effort to save his life. He now awaits the outcome of the appeal procedure.

European Union territory was hermetically sealed against Ocalan, as he bounced between airport runways, kept in zones of uncertain sovereignty and even challenged in airspace. Having been forced out of the EU and the zone of transit countries he was not even safe in an embassy in Africa. Yet, having been the victim of the

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12 For fuller details see *Traces* issues 4 and 5 at http://www/transcomm.ox.ac.uk/traces.
European mobility regime, the EU then pleaded that he be granted civil rights. It was made clear to the Turkish authorities that the death penalty did not accord with ‘European values’, and was incompatible with eventual membership of the Union. As with the diplomatic freeze on Austria, these developments seem paradoxical or hypocritical. They are consistent, after a fashion. Human rights are to be guaranteed according to the geography of concentric circles. Everyone in their place.

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