Fostering Cosmopolitanisms: 
A Conceptual Survey and 
A Media Experiment in Berlin

Steven Vertovec

WPTC-2K-06

Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology
University of Oxford
51 Banbury Road
Oxford, OX2 6PE

steven.vertovec@anthro.ox.ac.uk
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Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology

University of Oxford

“Cosmopolitanism” is a long-sidelined concept recently re-activated by a wide range of social and political theorists. It is currently most often presented by way of a new politics of the left, postulating alternatives to both ethnocentric nationalism and particularistic multiculturalism. A call for some kind of cosmopolitanism in politics has re-emerged due to an increasing awareness of transnational realities on various levels. For instance on a very broad global level, many political agendas (including human rights, crime and the environment) are beyond the capacity of any one country to act effectively. On an immediate personal level, many individuals are now more prone to articulate complex affiliations, meaningful attachments and multiple allegiances to issues, people, places and traditions that lie beyond the boundaries of their resident nation-state. For these reasons a renewed interest in cosmopolitanism is understandable. Further, as Timothy Brennan points out, “It is not hard to see why a concept that suggests an outward-looking, intercultural sensitivity is attractive when the United States is experiencing new racial tensions, immigrant anxieties, and declining living standards” (1997: 10).

For some theorists, envisioning cosmopolitanism refers to possibilities surrounding global democracy and world citizenship, or concerning new transnational frameworks for alliance-making among social movements. Others invoke cosmopolitanism to advocate a non-communitarian, post-identity politics of overlapping interests and heterogeneous or hybrid
publics, or to challenge conventional notions of belonging, identity and citizenship. And still others use cosmopolitanism descriptively to consider socio-cultural processes or individual behaviors, values or dispositions manifesting cultural multiplicity.

The following article commences with a review of some recent discourses surrounding cosmopolitanism. Whatever their “take” on the term, however, theorists who advocate some sort of cosmopolitanism rarely offer structural, policy, or public sphere prescriptions for fostering it. The media, in its variety, arguably has a key role to play here, and some theories and policy measures on this topic are described. The case of SFB4 Radio Multikulti, a station established in Berlin in 1994, is presented as a self-conscious media experiment trying to foster within the public sphere what we might identify as a number of cosmopolitanisms.

Cosmopolitanisms

The rapidly expanding body of publications regarding cosmopolitanism manifests a variety of discourses or levels of concern. These can be outlined under at least six rubrics.

(1) Socio-Cultural Condition. “The world of the late twentieth century,” Arjun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge observe, “is increasingly a cosmopolitan world. More people are widely traveled, are catholic in their tastes, are more inclusive in the range of cuisines they consume, are attentive to world-wide news, are exposed to global media-covered events and are influenced by universal trends in fashion” (1988: 5-9). In other words, “That the world is coming at each of its local points to look more like a Kuwaiti bazaar than like an Englishmen’s club… seems shatteringly clear” (Geertz 1986: 121). For many, such a condition called cosmopolitanism is to be celebrated for its vibrant cultural creativity (as well as its political challenges to various ethnocentric, racialized and gendered national narratives).

Anthony D. Smith, on the other hand, criticizes the vision of an emergent global, hybrid and “rootless” cosmopolitan culture that he presumes to be marked by “a pastiche of
traditional local, folk and national motifs and styles; a culture of mass consumerism consisting of standardized mass commodities, images, practices and slogans; and an interdependence of all these elements across the globe, based upon the unifying pressures of global telecommunications and computerized information systems”(1995: 20). This critique is based upon a rather extreme characterization of post-modern theory and global process. However, such an extreme view indeed reflects widespread fears, among many professional commentators and members of the public, surrounding globalization and an assumed cosmopolitanism associated with the death of local and national identities. Such resonant tension is found among political thinkers as well.

(2) Ideology or Philosophy. It has been suggested that contemporary political philosophers tend to divide themselves into communitarians, who believe that moral principles and obligations are grounded in specific groups and contexts, and cosmopolitans, who urge that we live in a world governed by principles highlighting rights and justice (Bellamy and Castiglione 1998; cf. Waldron 1992, Cohen 1992, Hollinger 1995). In this sense cosmopolitanism refers to a philosophy that urges us all to be “citizens of the world”, creating a world-wide moral community of humanity committed to universal values. Communitarians, Jeremy Waldron observes, say that the cosmopolitan ideal “embodies all the worst aspects of classical liberalism – atomism, abstraction, alienation from one’s roots, vacuity of commitment, indeterminacy of character, and ambivalence towards the good” (1992: 764-765).

A variant of this argument is found in the question as to whether this sense of cosmopolitanism, and its proposed world citizens, can be reconciled with nationalism, patriotism or loyalty to a single nation-state (see Nussbaum 1994). There seems to be at least two ways to solve this riddle, each proposing to have the best of both worlds. One is advocated by Kwame Anthony Appiah (1998), who raises the possibility of being a
“cosmopolitan patriot” through celebrating different human ways of being while sharing commitment to the political culture of a single nation-state. Another is explained by Georgios Varouxakis, who believes that “patriotism can be expressed in a cosmopolitan language and can seek to promote pride in what one’s nation is contributing to the universal fund of humanity” and demonstrated, for instance, through participation in UN peace missions (1999: 7).

Other theorists effectively seek to transcend the national scale altogether. For example, in his “Cosmopolitan Manifesto” Ulrich Beck argues for “a new dialectic of global and local questions which do not fit into national politics” (1998: 29). “For this,” Beck claims, “there has to be a reinvention of politics, a founding and grounding of the new political subject” (Ibid.) that puts “globality at the heart of political imagination, action and organization” (Ibid.: 30). Such a perspective informs most political scientists who envision a new order of transnational political structures exercising what is sometimes described as “cosmopolitan democracy” (cf. Archibugi and Held 1995, Archibugi, Held and Köhler 1998).

(3) Political Project I: Transnational Institutions. Cosmopolitan democracy in this sense is described by Mary Kaldor as follows:

The term cosmopolitan, when applied to political institutions, implies a layer of governance that constitutes a limitation on the sovereignty of states and yet does not itself constitute a state. In other words, a cosmopolitan institution would co-exist with a system of states but would override states in clearly defined spheres of activity. (in Archibugi 1998: 216)

Foremost examples here are the United Nations and the European Union. The cosmopolitan political institutions envisioned here should address policy quandaries surrounding a host of problems that spill over national borders (such as pollution and crime).
Another transnational site of cosmopolitan democracy is that which Martin Köhler (1998) describes as an emerging global civil society exercising democratic expression in an emerging transnational public sphere. Such a development is evidenced in the growth in the number and size of transnational social movements and networks concerned with a range of issues including the environment, human rights and peace (see Smith et al. 1997).

Combining both kinds of democratic activity, Mary Kaldor (1996) describes processes creating a cosmopolitanism from above, in the form of international organizations, complex partnerships and cooperative agreements between states, and a cosmopolitanism from below through the activities of new transnational social movements. The fact that individuals can continue their roles and identities as national citizens while directly engaging in political activities aimed at a sphere beyond the nation-state points toward an understanding of cosmopolitanism of individuals conveying complex political interests.

(4) Political Project II: Multiple Subjects. On a far more immediate level than the global political agendas addressed by political theorists above, others who invoke a concept of cosmopolitanism do so to describe an embellished attention to the variegated political interests of particular actors. In his version of the term, David Hollinger suggests that “Cosmopolitanism is more oriented to the individual, whom it is likely to understand as a member of a number of different communities simultaneously” (1995: 86). Mitchell Cohen, too, advocates an understanding of cosmopolitanism as “a multidimensional conception of political society and human relations, one that implies an important democratic principle: the legitimacy of plural loyalties” (1992: 482).

In fact this take on cosmopolitanism is an age-old one that Martha Nussbaum traces to the ancient Greek Stoics and their proposal that “we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles” (1994: 4). In this view, each circle is considered to represent a different kind or level of attachment or identification: self,
family, group, city, country, humanity. Accordingly, a person’s specific political interests and activity is bound to shift from one “circle” or another. Present-day processes, however, such as diasporic identification and the rise of identity politics, have multiplied people’s interests and affiliations. Now gender, sexuality, age, disability, “homeland,” locality, race, ethnicity, religion – even cultural hybridity itself – are among the key identifications around which the same person might at one time or another politically mobilize.

(5) Attitude or Disposition. In addition to having multiplex identifications, cosmopolitans and cosmopolitanism are often said to be marked by a kind of outlook or “mode of engaging with the world” (Waldron 1992). In this way Ulf Hannerz views cosmopolitanism as “a perspective, a state of mind, or – to take a more processual view – a mode of managing meaning” (1990: 238). Hannerz further suggests that “The perspective of the cosmopolitan must entail relationships to a plurality of cultures” and that this entails “first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences” (Ibid.: 239). Cosmopolitanism here represents a desire for, and appreciation of, cultural diversity – a view that Pierre-André Taguieff (1990) has deemed “heterophilia.”

The cosmopolitan, then, develops “habits of mind and life” through which he or she can end up anywhere in the world and be “in the same relation of familiarity and strangeness” to the local culture (Iyer 1997: 30), and by the same token, “feel partially adjusted everywhere” (Ibid.: 32).

(6) Practice or Habitus. Along with a basic perspective or orientation, Hannerz suggests that cosmopolitanism can be a matter of “competence” marked by “a personal ability to make one’s way into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting” as well as by a built-up skill of maneuvering through systems of meaning (1990: 239). Jonathan Friedman, too, sees cosmopolitanism as characterized by a mode of behavior that “in identity
terms [is] betwixt and between without being liminal. It is shifting, participating in many worlds, without becoming part of them” (1994: 204). For Jeremy Waldron, it is such partial cultural competences that comprise “the cosmopolitan self.” “If we live the cosmopolitan life,” he writes, “we draw our allegiances from here, there, and everywhere. Bits of cultures come into our lives from different sources, and there is no guarantee that they will all fit together” (1992: 788-789).

Due to the capacity for competence in a multiplicity of cultural frames, the cosmopolitan, according to Waldron, refuses to think of himself as defined by his location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language (Ibid.: 754). It is also likely due to such reasons that “cosmopolitans” have long been distrusted by locals and nationalists. “Cosmopolite or cosmopolitan in mid-nineteenth century America,” for example, meant “a well-traveled character probably lacking in substance” (Hollinger 1995: 89). For “substance” here we can probably take it to mean readily identifiable provenance, an integrated and predictable pattern of behavioral practice, and loyalty to a single nation-state or cultural identity. Certainly in the current age of transnational flow, diasporic attachments and multiple identity politics, it is even harder to attribute the “substance” of cosmopolitans.

A common stereotype of cosmopolitans depicts privileged, bourgeois, politically uncommitted elites – embodied by wealthy jet-setters, corporate managers, inter-governmental bureaucrats, academics and intellectuals -- who maintain their condition “by virtue of independent means, expensive tastes, and a globe-trotting lifestyle” (Robbins 1998b: 248). In this characterization, cosmopolitanism is conceived largely as a matter of consumption, an acquired taste for music, food, fashion, art, and literature from all parts of the world.

However, there is currently an increasing interest in recognizing that “cosmopolitan” philosophies, institutions, dispositions and practices – “actually existing cosmopolitanism”
(Robbins 1998a) – exist among a wide variety of non-elites, not least migrants and refugees. In this approach to cosmopolitanism there is emphasis on more positive, socio-culturally and politically transformative meanings of the term (see for instance Schein 1998a,b). And it is in this sense that James Clifford describes how the term cosmopolitanism helps to undermine the “naturalness” of ethnic absolutisms (1998: 365), recognizes “worldly, productive sites of crossing; complex, unfinished paths between local and global attachments “ (Ibid.: 362), and “presupposes encounters between worldly historical actors willing to link up aspects of their complex, different experiences” (Ibid.: 365).

Indeed, much literature accounting for the term’s relatively recent re-vitalization has been produced precisely to displace the aloof, globe-trotting bourgeois image of cosmopolitanism in order to propose more progressive connotations. To do this, various writers have employed a range of qualifiers to modify or refine the term, including “discrepant cosmopolitanisms” (Clifford 1992, 1998), “exclusionary cosmopolitanism” and “inclusionary cosmopolitanism” (Anderson 1998), “rooted cosmopolitanism” (Cohen 1992), “oppositional cosmopolitanism” (Schein 1998a,b), “ec-centric or ex-orbitant cosmopolitanism” (Radhakrishnan 1995) and the seemingly strange hybrid notion, “cosmopolitan communitarianism” (Bellamy and Castiglione 1998).

While the trend towards positively re-appropriating notions of cosmopolitanism is to be welcomed for its socially and politically transformative potential, practically all the recent writings on the topic remain in the realm of rhetoric. There is little description or analysis of how contemporary cosmopolitan philosophies, political projects, outlooks or practices can be formed, instilled or bolstered. In short, there are few recipes for fostering cosmopolitanisms.

One important exception has been Martha Nussbaum’s (1994) call for “cosmopolitan education.” Such an educational agenda, forming the basis for the construction of attitudes as well as institutions, would have among its goals: to appreciate how common ends are
variously instantiated in many cultures, to vividly imagine the different based on a mastery of facts, and to stimulate in every person an overall “process of world thinking” (Ibid.: 4).

In addition to the educational system, the fostering of cosmopolitanisms (that is, cosmopolitanism understood through each rubric above, and through their combination) is a process that would need to be located among a number of intermediary institutions in public space, including journals, conferences and political discussions. The media, in its variety, also represent an obvious site for stimulating cosmopolitan awarenesses and highlighting cosmopolitan practices. To date, this has mostly been addressed through media structures and programs surrounding the presentation of cultural diversity or multiculturalism.

**Multiculturalism and the Media**

Given the increased consciousness of cultural diversity in Western societies over the past few decades, there has arisen a need for giving expression to difference in the public sphere, for “creating a public in which all the groups can and must communicate” (Sandercock 1998: 199). Indeed, it has come to be considered an essential part of democracy itself to guarantee media systems that adequately articulate the ethnic diversity of the citizenry (Husband 1994).

Since the 1980s the Council of Europe, for instance, has been actively engaging issues surrounding cultural diversity and the media through a series of conferences and policy recommendation documents (such as Council of Europe 1987, 1994). Most of its discourse and resultant recommendations address the highlighting of difference through notions of cultural rights and the preservation of immigrant cultures. Deniz Göktürk points out, however, that “The focus on cultural difference which claims to be liberating, in practice, often covers up existing crosscultural traffic and makes dialogue and interaction more difficult” (1999: 7). And “Let’s be honest,” says BBC producer Anil Gupta, “there has been an awful lot of crap put out in the name of right-on, PC, quota-fulfilling, multi-culturalism” (1998: 6). In this
sense, then, the multicultural strategies in many forms of media, although providing a much-needed presence for ethnic minorities in public space, have not necessarily generated or sharpened cosmopolitan sensitivities in minority or majority populations.

More recently, the Council has broadened its discourse to recognize the desirability of media creating “transverse links, i.e. ones that transcend the boundaries between identities” (Perotti 1997: 25). This seems to echo the advice of Ella Shohat and Robert Stam (1994) who call for the media to encourage ethnic/cultural interlocution and an interweaving of voices.

Dialog can be painful and polyphony can become cacaphony. But cultural polyphony would orchestrate a multifaceted polylog among all those interested in restructuring power in more egalitarian ways. It would promote a mutually enriching proliferation of emancipatory discourses, transcending a mere coexistence of voices to foster a mutual adoption of other voices and accents. (Ibid.: 346)

Such a call seems to have found its way, too, into the media policy recommendations that emerged from the 1997 United Nations World Television Forum. These include proposals for the transformation of broadcasting organizations to create structures in which different voices participate in collective dialogue. This would be intended to make media services more responsive and open to culturally alternative sources of programming and, ideally, stimulate new, hybrid forms of programming (Robins et al. 1997).

Complex, cross-over dialogues and representations in public space via diverse media programs, it is suggested, can be one way of fostering cosmopolitanisms. Public space cosmopolitanism would draw attention to, and increase awareness of, everyday forms of cultural multiplicity. This represents a rather different agenda than much media multiculturalism, which can often be read as a patronizing ethnic exceptionalism. In other words, “the media can normalize as well as exoticize other cultures” (Shohat and Stam 1994: 347).
Such a strategy has been adopted by the radio station SFB4 in Berlin, a context that, in a host of ways, lends itself to concepts of cosmopolitanism.

**Context Berlin**

Since the early decades of this century, Berlin has been associated with broad notions of cosmopolitanism. In the 1920s, the city was world-renowned as a site of cultural creativity spawned by an influx of foreign artists and intellectuals. During the Nazi reign, Hitler and other leaders despised Berlin’s cosmopolitanism (which, for them, was associated with leftists and Jews). By the 1970s and 1980s, Berlin was again largely associated with free-thinkers and immigrants – this time represented by an alternative sub-culture of radical Germans alongside a large population of Turks and other “guestworkers.” Today, throughout the rest of Germany Berlin is often viewed as a “city of foreigners” (Richie 1998: 791).

Today it has become practically de rigueur, when publicly addressing the city, to invoke approvingly Berlin’s legacy of worldliness. Since 1991, for instance, Berlin’s Commissioner for Foreign Affairs (*Ausländerbeauftragte*), Barbara John, has conducted a series of public discussions, led by invited German and “foreign” politicians, writers, scientists and publishers, on the theme “*Berlin – tolerant und weltoffen*”: that is, “Berlin – tolerant and liberal/cosmopolitan, or literally “world-open” (its derivative noun Weltoffenheit, “world-openness,” is the German word usually used synonymously with cosmopolitanism; see Vertovec 1996). In a recent joint policy platform issued to the Berlin Senate, representatives of the Social Democrats, Democratic Socialists and Greens initiated their views on dual citizenship with the statement that “In particular in Berlin as a tolerant, weltoffen Federal Capital it is urgently necessary to facilitate naturalization for long-dwelling foreigners” (in Junge 1999). And in his inaugural address, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (drawing on Habermas) described how the renewed capital Berlin opens itself to Germany

Barbara John observes that “weltoffen” used to mean something like “Berlin is welcoming to the world”; “now the world is here,” she says, and various agencies must help Berlin’s population to realize this reality (interview, 14 January 1999). Currently Berlin is home to 440,247 registered “non-Germans” (Nichtdeutsche) whose origins lay in 184 other countries – practically every country in the world (Ausländerbeauftragte 1998). They comprise no less than 13% of Berlin’s total population of 3,387,901 in 1997. The category includes some 137,000 Turks, 28,000 Poles, 22,000 “former Soviet Union,” 18,000 Bosnians, 13,000 Italians, 13,000 Croats, 11,000 Greeks and over 37,000 listed simply as “former Yugoslavia” (Ibid.).

Ethnic and cultural diversity is one of Berlin’s hallmarks. Heidrun Suhr remarks:

Most contemporary West Berlin authors now incorporate Fremde [Others, foreigners] into their narratives as part of the Berlin setting. As an integral part of the city’s local color, they are present as a backdrop, in all forms of fiction. Szeneliteratur [a genre depicting the Berlin “scene”] in particular always includes some reference to foreigners as proof of its authenticity, its direct link to Berlin reality. (1990: 234-235)

Due to the recognized fact of its diversity and its popular image suggesting some kind of Weltoffenheit (alongside its renewed position as capital city), policy makers in Berlin believe it is this city’s role to provide a model of positively functioning cultural diversity for the rest of Germany. In other words, they wish Berlin to be the “integration workshop of the nation” (John 1997). For a while Frankfurt am Main could contest Berlin’s model role. In the late 1980s and early 1990s Frankfurt’s local government’s office for multicultural affairs promoted many high profile projects communicating information and encouraging discussion in the city’s public sphere in order to facilitate the “growing together” (Zusammenwachsen) of
all resident ethnic groups (Welz 1992, Friedmann and Lehrer 1998). Yet overall since 1981, when Berlin was the first German Land to establish an office of Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs, Berlin’s policies and initiatives – some reinforcing communalism, other encouraging cosmopolitanism -- have indeed been exemplary for the rest of (West) Germany (see Schwartz 1992, Vertovec 1996).

Broadcast media in Berlin have recently been the focus of considerable public attention concerning potential trajectories for the future of the city’s ethnic diversity. On the one hand, from outside the city, new forms of transnational media, especially satellite and cable television, have significantly transformed patterns of listening and viewing (Robins 1998). This is particularly the case with Turkish television programs broadcast from Istanbul and watched in real time in Berlin. Much public debate has ensued following claims that Berlin Turks’ consumption of media from Turkey has led to communalist viewing patterns, an “ethnicisation” of the media landscape and, therefore, increased cultural isolation and social ghettoization (Becker 1997).

On the other hand, a new self-conceived “media experiment” called Radio Multikulti has been established in order to promote a rather different pattern.

**SFB4 Radio Multikulti**

Public radio Sender Freies Berlin’s (SFB) fourth station, nicknamed Radio Multikulti, first went on the air in September 1994. The station was initially financed (with a very low budget of 6.5 million DM) for the trial period 1994-97 by the media institute of Berlin-Brandenburg, the Federal Ministry of Labor, and license-funded SFB. After the trial, SFB4 Radio Multikulti has subsequently been awarded permanent funding due to its recognized success over its initial three years.
For media service promoting “life in cultural diversity and awareness of others,” in 1995 the radio station was awarded the CIVIS prize from the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs, the Freudenberg Foundation and the national broadcasting systems WDR (Westdeutsche Rundfunk) and ARD (der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland). Also in 1995 UNESCO recognized the station as German partner for the World Decade for Cultural Development. And in 1997 Radio Multikulti was proclaimed radio station of the year by the media organization Internationale Medienhilfe.

Radio Multikulti was established as an experiment based on certain innovations in the media treatment of multiculturalism. “Multi-cultural radio should not be like ‘normal’ radio,” insists Radio Multikulti station director Friedrich Voß. “It should offer the cultural diversity of everyday Berlin” (Voß 1995). The station’s goals focus on the keywords: “Integration” and “Weltoffenheit” (see SFB4 Multikulti 1998). Like many other public institutions in Berlin, SFB4’s strategy is formulated with reference to highlighting the importance of the city – especially as renewed capital – as an example for other parts of Germany.

A city, which in the future will attract more and more businessmen, diplomats, artists and other foreign guests, must show that it is also able to demonstrate peaceful and constructive living-together (Zusammenleben). The goal is integration, not assimilation. A prerequisite for effective integration is information. Prejudice and discrimination result from ignorance, from lack of knowledge of others. Here lies an essential task of the media. (SFB4 Multikulti 1998)

Providing “information” has two meanings with regard to the radio station’s strategy. One is the sense of conveying basic information about the various groups and cultural backgrounds now existing in the city in order to fashion a general climate of acceptance and integration. Another sense is supplying practical assistance to the public – often specifically
immigrants and ethnic minorities – by way of information on developments concerning legal conditions and social programs. Alongside news and public information, the station produces diverse forms of entertainment. The total effect is to foster different understandings of cosmopolitanism, directed at both German and “non-German” people, in everyday settings of Berlin.

Highlighting the fact that 440,000 migrants from 184 nations live in Berlin, Radio Multikulti’s promotional material (brochures and pamphlets, posters, postcards, Internet site) claims that the station provides around-the-clock “borderless” radio “for them and all weltoffenen Berliners.” It proclaims “Multikulti is the radio of cultural diversity with information about cultural living-together (“das Zusammenleben der Kulturen”) among ourselves [in Berlin] and elsewhere.” The station sees itself as “a bridge of sound” (“eine Brücke, die klingt”) both between different cultural groups living in the city, and between each group and its homeland.

“We speak with an accent,” boasts the station through its promotional material. Many if not most of the people presenting programs on Radio Multikulti speak German with a foreign accent (Turkish, Italian, Polish, Croatian, and so forth). The strategy here is to normalize difference by recognizing that Berliners come from many origins. The radio station’s journalists, technicians and other employees are themselves comprised of Germans and a wide variety of “foreigners”: most Radio Multikulti personnel see their own successful cooperative activity as a kind of model too (Bergling 1998).

The daily structure of programming reflects other important aspects of Radio Multikulti’s strategy. Following five minutes of news (each hour on the hour), from 6:05 to 9:00 each morning the day begins with the Breakfast program. This includes reports on developments in world politics, European news, and events in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. “World music” is played intermittently throughout this and all daily programs: the
station specifically excludes “Anglo-American rockpop.” The latter is avoided as it is implicitly regarded as part of a globalizing, hegemonic uniformity represented in most popular media.

Examples of the two- to four-minute reports during the Breakfast program are: a year’s overview of developments among Bosnian refugees in Berlin; a series on the meaning and implications of European monetary union, including an account of Britain’s reluctance to join; an excerpt from an Iranian literary satire; an interview with the Green party politician Cem Ösdemir about dual citizenship; a report on the election of Minnesota’s ex-wrestler Governor Ventura; during Ramadan, daily readings from the Qur’an; a discussion with Berlin Muslims about breaking the fast during Ramadan; a description of Russian Christmas celebrations in Berlin; information about indoor-skiing in Berlin; and a report from Cuba about celebrations for the anniversary of the Revolution contrasted to scenes of daily life.

From 9:05 to 12:00 a variety of light entertainment segments are linked under the program title Meridian. This includes a fifteen-minute “Travel Fever” show (descriptions of reporters’ travel experiences plus a contest, based on knowledge about other countries and people) and a music magazine show including interviews with touring musicians (such as a South African choir, an Australian didgeridoo player and Berlin street musicians). News in English from the BBC World Service is broadcast at 10:00, and in French from RFI at 11:00. Examples of musical presentations in Meridian include songs from a world music CD of the week and live performances by a local Kurdish band, a mixed ethnicity all woman band, and a Jewish Klezmer band.

Metro, “the Berlin magazine,” is broadcast from 12:05 to 14:00. During this part of the day a variety of segments probe specific issues relevant to the social and politician scene in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. Examples include: accounts of the Christian Democrat (CDU) campaign against dual citizenship, a report by a journalist accompanying Berlin’s
mayor as he meets foreign ambassadors new to Berlin; a review of a new theater production of Gogol’s “Dead Souls,” an historical overview of Russian exile writers in Berlin, a visit to a German-Arab association in the Berlin district of Moabit, and an interview with a local (Turkish) psychologist about possible psychological implications of dual citizenship.

For a “siesta” between 14:05 and 15:00 the station presents Diwan, a mixture of music, poetry and story around varying themes. A studio discussion program called Viaduct – “a forum of understanding in diversity” -- is conducted each day from 15:05 to 16:00. Here, invited guests from a range of backgrounds discuss and criticize new activities and initiatives surrounding “everyday culture and the multicultural day” (“die alltägliche Kultur und den multikulturellen Alltag”). Recent themes have covered the meanings of European monetary union for “foreigners” in Berlin, the functions of the regional employment office for women and youth, the implications of the Russian economic crisis, and the successes and problems of Radio Multikulti’s own Turkish-language programs (see below).

From 16:05 to 16:45, Heimspiel (“home-play”) provides a space for various foreign-origin people to present aspects of their homelands such as kinds of music, food and drink, festivals, linguistic expressions. This is followed, 16:45-17:00 by a report on some world or local event (such as the visit of a foreign dignitary to Berlin) which developed during the day, usually having been briefly announced during the Breakfast program.

From 17:00 to 22:30 Radio Multikulti switches from German language programs to a succession of programs in “the languages of the world-city.” The duration of the programs, as well as their broadcasting daily or weekly, vary (from an hour in Turkish daily to fifteen minutes in Roma twice per month). Other languages of programs in this time slot are Albanian, Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Polish, Russian, Vietnamese, Italian, Spanish and Greek. Radio Multikulti inherited the SFB’s program established in the 1960s for Yugoslav “guestworkers” that was originally broadcast in Serbo-Croatian; now, reflecting the breakup
of Yugoslavia, Radio Multikulti produces separate programs for Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Bosnians and Macedonians.

Each non-German language program has its own editor and reporters who are usually well known to the respective language communities in Berlin. Editors and reporters canvass such communities for the kinds of information and material that members would like publicly presented or interrogated. Interspersed with popular and traditional music, the programs usually include news reports and analysis from respective “homelands,” local and international news, interviews and reports concerning law, health and social services in Berlin, and local cultural events. The issues are not always confined to the language-group, however; often a report, interview or discussion from one of the German-language programs or from a non-German language program (e.g. Turkish) is translated and broadcast during another non-German language show (e.g. Polish).

Some examples of miscellaneous material in the non-German language programs are: (in Russian) a report on amnesty for deserters of the Russian army and a piece on the opening of a Russian film festival in Saarbrücken; (in Polish) an account about ethnic Poles from Kazakhstan migrating to Poland, a review of a new play opening in Berlin, and interviews with Moroccan students in Berlin on the difficulties they find in maintaining the Ramadan fast; (in Arabic) news from Baghdad about secret cooperation between Unscom and the U.S.A., a discussion of the work of Goethe, and a review of a new art exhibition in Potsdam; (in Turkish) a survey of newly privatized telephone services in Germany and a discussion with Berlin Turks who translate Yiddish texts; (in Serbian) an interview with the editor of an independent Serbian newspaper and on-the-street interviews with Serbs in Berlin concerning the CDU’s campaign against dual citizenship; and (in Croatian) handball and tennis results, a description of difficulties regarding the transference of foreign driving licenses to German ones, and a report on unemployment in Croatia. Practically every non-German language
program also conducts discussions with invited guests and radio phone-in shows concerning
issues like dealing with everyday racism and addressing questions surrounding naturalization
and dual citizenship.

The non-German language editors, together with other senior editors of Radio
Multikulti, claim to maintain close contacts with key associations and other members of the
various ethnic-linguistic communities resident in Berlin. For the station managers such
contacts are the “best audience research studies” conveying up-to-the-minute needs and
interests within these communities (Wolfgang Holler, interview, 14 January 1999). The
managers, editors and journalists are ever conscious of conflicting political sensitivities
existing within various communities in Berlin. The editors seek to ensure that they do not
propagate the views of any one group or movement.

The shift of programming between languages – one of the most experimental aspects
of Radio Multikulti – was originally viewed by station managers as a potential mistake. Now,
some years after the station’s establishment, this is regarded as wholly unproblematic. The
shifts in program language have apparently not lost the station listeners: according to
Wolfgang Holler, many people throughout the city have acquired the opinion “that’s my
channel” and will either simply tune out during another language program and tune-in again
later, or listen through some (albeit non-understood) non-German language program simply to
hear the intermittent music (interview 14 January 1999).

Following the non-German programs, each night from 22:30 to 22:45 the station
provides a course on German as a foreign language, prepared by the Goethe Institute. A
“musical trip” or fictional fantasy is presented between 22:45 and 23:00. Then, from 23:00 to
6:00 the station is devoted entirely to world music. Throughout the week this includes
alternating, hour-long world music programs broadcast from radio stations in Lausanne, Paris,
On weekends there are special programs for rap and hip-hop (especially oriented toward young listeners), drum-and-tribe, bhangra, jazz and “global dance,” along with a weekly live concert. Weekend broadcasting also includes a literary program called Papyrus (in which literature from around the world is criticized and discussed) and a world religions program called From Abraham to Zarathustra (largely comprised of basic teachings of different religions, descriptions of major festivals, and interviews with Berlin-based believers).

SFB4 Radio Multikulti is generally thought to appeal to Berlin’s “globetrotters and cosmopolitans” (Messmer 1998: 33). One survey shows that SFB4 Radio Multikulti held only about 0.7% audience share for Berlin (1% in the former West Berlin). While low, this figure actually represents more than many others in Berlin – especially in public radio, and not least SFB1, the classic “culture” radio station – in a city with no less than thirty-six radio stations. Perhaps more importantly, one needs to bear in mind that this official survey of listeners only questions “Germans.” “Foreigners” are overlooked. Therefore it is estimated that perhaps three-fifths of Radio Multikulti’s listeners are not counted because they don’t have German citizenship (Braun 1998). The station’s own informal inquiry, according to SFB4’s Senior Editor Wolfgang Holler, suggests that Multikulti has an enormous share of the audience among ethnic minority communities: from perhaps 40% of the city’s 28,000 Poles up to 90% of the 8,000 Vietnamese in Berlin (interview, 14 January 1999). Radio Multikulti now also reaches much further than Berlin, and than Germany, by way of the internet (see http://www.multikulti.de).

While the listening audience may not be massive, the members of SFB4 Radio Multikulti believe they are making a difference and that their experiment is already a success. The station has indeed become a kind of media role model. The national ARD network of radio and television stations now transmits Radio Multikulti-produced programs to numerous
other parts of Germany. KISS FM, a commercial Berlin radio station built around popular
music, has recently followed Multikulti by creating a program in Turkish, largely devoted to
German-Turkish hip-hop, for young German-born Turks in the city. But for Wolfgang Holler,
Radio Multikulti’s impact has been more subtle: “The idea behind this all, we are realizing
now. Just to be there, we are changing minds. Just to be on air, just that German listeners are
listening to people with an accent and are getting used to it. And they’re seeing: hey, it’s
normal” (interview 14 January 1999).

Conclusion
While arguably having broken new ground in the public representation of cultural diversity,
SFB4 Radio Multikulti also exhibits occasional evidence of “non-cosmopolitan” thinking.
Sometimes the treatment of specific groups sounds rather bounded and essentialist,
particularly when addressing needs of cultural retention among migrants. This is reminiscent
of what David Hollinger (1995) has called pluralism, in describing a multiculturalist approach
he considers to be the opposite of cosmopolitanism. For Hollinger, cosmopolitanism
represents an emphasis on individual, multiple affiliations, while pluralism emphasizes
inherited boundaries and the importance of protecting and preserving ethnic identities. In this
respect, Radio Multikulti’s presentation often slips back and forth between cosmopolitan and
pluralist multiculturalisms.

Radio Multikulti does succeed in communicating a variety of meanings of
cosmopolitanism akin to those described earlier in this article. That is, concerning
cosmopolitanism as socio-cultural condition, the station’s programs are filled with
descriptions of Berlin as a culturally complex environment reflecting globalization and other
large-scale processes. As ideology or philosophy, Radio Multikulti’s general approach to a
range of issues reflects deep concerns with conceived universal values such as human rights
and anti-racism, and its programming strategies are arguably based on a humanistic view of peoples of the world who can be united not only around such universal values, but around diverse expressions of art and music as well. Cosmopolitanism as a political project of transnational institutions is supported by Radio Multikulti’s abundant reporting of (and obvious support for) political frameworks such as dual citizenship and institutions such as the European Union. The cosmopolitan political project of representing multiple identities is seen to be supported by Radio Multikulti’s mode of addressing the complexity of Berliners themselves – as networked in multi-origin communities yet still as Berliners, and as women, youths of the first, second and third generation, as deeply concerned with district and neighborhood politics as well as with city and Germany-wide politics. The facilitation of cosmopolitan dispositions – open to gaining familiarity and ease with that which is different -- is underscored in practically every program SFB4 produces since their raison d’être is exactly to expose the public to difference. And finally, cosmopolitanism as practice is represented on the air in numerous ways, from the presenters “with accents” through the playing of hybrid forms of music to interviews and debates involving “non-German”-origin Berliners.

As James Clifford (1998: 362) has remarked, cosmopolitanism is especially to be found in people’s lived encounters or in “worldly, productive sites of crossing.” But “The process of cultural meeting and mixing,” Deniz Göktürk points out, “cannot be ordered through cultural politics and definitely not steered from above” (1994: 33). Radio Multikulti attempts to foster cosmopolitanisms by conveying or offering the space for everyday realities of crossing, rather than by moralistically prescribing good ethnic relations. Staff at the station importantly believe that the best way to foster change is to provide basic information and good journalistic descriptions regarding a range of current cosmopolitanisms already existing throughout Berlin.
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